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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to discuss the challenges facing land tenure reform in Kenya, with 
special focus on the pastoral Maasai and Boorana communities. The question of land ownership has 
been one of the major issues in Kenya since the colonial period. The study examines some of the 
contemporary legal and policy concerns from an historical perspective with a view to understanding 
current legal and institutional constraints. The colonial land tenure policy that spans a period of over 
100 years still endures in spite of the social, political and economic transformation the society has 
undergone. My main objective is to examine the extent to which land rights of pastoral communities 
have been and continue to be undermined by inherited statutory land tenure regimes. This study 
demonstrates that the introduction of the alien notion of land tenure diminishes rather than strengthens 
the access of communities to land and other land-based natural resources.  
  The study demonstrates that contrary to widely held views of policy makers and 
commentators, the conventional approach to land management, centralised statutory legal frameworks 
have not secured land rights for the pastoralists. The study assesses the effectiveness of this policy as 
applied by colonial and post-colonial governments. The failure by successive governments to 
undertake a comprehensive land reform has led to conflicts between communities, resulting in 
social, economic, and political repercussions. Inappropriate and irrational government policy 
of land tenure conversion from communal to private holdings has been the source of 
escalating conflicts, as demonstrated by this study. Finally, the study illustrates simmering 
new challenges confronting the pastoralists due to increasing encroachment of other land use such as 
agriculture, mining, oil exploration and ecotourism. It explores alternative policy and legislative 
reforms that will comprehensively address the unresolved historical and contemporary land 
grievances.    1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
African pastoralists, like many other rural communities in the world have deep 
attachment to land and land-based resources. The pastoral people depend on land for their 
food, medicine, water and more importantly for livestock keeping and transhumance.
1 
However, due to rapid social, political and economic changes over the last centuries, 
ownership and access to land resources have increasingly been compromised in many pastoral 
areas.
2 In Kenya, the state had played the major role in dispossessing indigenous communities 
of their land. The colonial government imposed legal and institutional mechanisms which 
placed land under their control and allowed them to alienate ‘native’ lands to European 
settlers. The settlers who had the famed ‘White Highlands’ exclusively created for them, 
dominated agricultural economy for almost seventy years of colonial rule.
3  The colonial 
government left an enduring legacy that anchored entitlements to land on laws and policies 
made by state authorities, with the sole intention of benefiting a particular interest group. In 
the process, the pre-existing customary landholders were dispossessed and denied their rights 
to sustainable livelihoods.  
                                                 
1 Salih, M.M. A., Ahmed, A.G.M (2001) (eds.) African Pastoralism. OSSREA, ISS. Published by Pluto in 
association with OSSREA; Pastoralism as Conservation in the Horn of Africa, 2007. World Initiative for 
Sustainable Pastoralism, UNDP. WISP Policy Paper Brief No.3. 
 
2 John Markakis (2004) Pastoralism on the Margins, p.22 Minority Rights Group International. Report. 
3 Bruce, J.W., Mighot-Adhola, E.S (1994) (Eds.)Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, p.119. 
Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company.  2 
 
For indigenous communities land and property relationship is predicated on their 
customary practices and institutional arrangements such as Boorana’s ‘aadaa-seera’ (laws 
and customs) that, amongst other functions, ensures inalienable rights of members to land 
resources.
4 However, with the establishment of colonial rule, the authorities introduced new 
laws and policies, which in effect not only eroded indigenous peoples’ access to land 
resources but also entrenched dualistic approaches to property laws. In Kenya, registered 
tenure system was and still is treated as formal untouchable tenure regime, hence 
comparatively presumed as more secure than the customary system, which is insidiously 
understood as informal, and therefore inferior.
5 However, in spite of that imposed tenure 
system some indigenous communities like the Maasai and Boorana pastoralists have 
enduringly preserved much of their traditional ways of life. The pastoralists are among the 
ancient societies who still practice one of the oldest human occupations: keeping livestock on 
a large scale in their natural habitats. Rangelands in Africa are home to many pastoral people 
who depend almost entirely on that production system.  
The pastoralists, in common with many rural communities in Africa and elsewhere, 
rely heavily on land resources and conditions affecting the way those resources are managed, 
owned or accessed. Institutional and legal frameworks thus have significant impacts on social, 
                                                 
4 Tache, B.D (2000) Individualising the Commons: Changing Resource Tenure among Boorana Oromo of 
Southern Ethiopia, p.32. 
5 The contemporary nomeclature used in land and land tenure discourses refer to customary or communal land as 
‘informal’ while private and registered land as formal. The meaning is not precise and mostly warped in 
assumptions that the formal is superir to the informal and therefore the need to evolve from communal to private 
to achieve security of tenure. Okoth-Ofendo has succintly probematised the issue in his seminal paper, 
Formalising ‘informal’ Property Systems: The prolematiques in land rights reform in Africa. A Thematic survey 
paper presented in Oslo, Norway on 28 October, 2008. Hernando De Soto (2000) in his book, The Mystery of 
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails everwhere Else, talks about ‘formalizing’ the informal,. 
Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill’s journal article, Do African Systems of Land Tenure Require A Special Terminology? 
is a good starting point to rethink some of the deeply entrenched concepts used in African contemporary land 
tenure issues that needs to be questioned and clarified.  3 
 
economic, cultural, and political aspects of the people. Land tenure is about certain conditions 
and terms, which in modern states are provided in statutory laws and policies. Whoever 
controls land controls the process which defines those terms and conditions.
6 It is evident in 
many cases that current land tenure regimes favour the state in the management and control of 
land resources, which more often than not operates against the rights and interests of groups 
such as pastoralists. The pastoral communities in Kenya today are facing many challenges, as 
government policies tend to encourage land alienation for private use, agricultural expansion, 
reserves for wildlife, exploration and exploitation of minerals, investments in ecotourism, 
etc.
7  
Pastoralists may be confined to the margins of political and economic spectrum in 
Kenya, but their land question cannot be underestimated. Of Kenya’s 44.6 million hectares, 
only 20% is considered arable, earmarked for agricultural development. The remaining 80% 
is arid and semi-arid land, predominantly inhabited by the pastoralists.
8  This has important 
implications for natural resources development in pastoral areas. Successive governments of 
Kenya have mainly focused on the more productive agricultural areas for public investment, 
undermining development in the arid and semi-arid areas.
9 This policy goes back to colonial 
days. As early as the 1930s, J. Parkinson, one of the pioneer administrators of the region said 
that “Kenya may be divided into Kenya proper, familiar to the tourist and settler, and the 
                                                 
6 Alden Willy, L (2008) Whose Land Is It? Commons and Conflict States: Why Ownership of the Commons 
Matters in Making and Keeping Peace, pp 2-4. 
7 Fratkin, E (1997) Pastoralism: Governance and Development Issues, p.236. Annual Review of Anthropology, 
Vol. 26, pp.(235-261). 
8 The Ninth National Development Plan, 2002-2008. Nairobi. Government Printer. 
9 Okoth-Ogendo (1996) Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management. The Kenya Experience. Land Tenure 
in Development Cooperation. GTZ. Published by Sahara nad Sahel Observatory. Paris. 4 
 
Northern Frontier Province, hot, parched, and dusty areas where access is barred unless by 
special permit.”
10  Frank Bernard, an American geographer whose research dealt with 
environmental issues in the mid 1980s, with particular focus on pastoral regions, described the 
situation in the north as follows: 
With the exception of ethnic partitioning of Maasai and the imposition of quarantines to 
restrict animal movements, the colonial government neglected the African-occupied 
rangelands. Unless pastoralists came into conflict with wildlife or European-type ranching, 
they were generally left to their own devices.
11  
  Pastoral areas also have a history of land-related conflicts, which have become a 
dominant feature in modern Kenya, as claims and grievances over land degenerate into 
political feuds and inter-communal violence. The land issue, which the late land law scholar 
Professor Okoth-Ogendo  calls the ‘last colonial question’ is yet to be subjected to appropriate 
legal and institutional reforms many years after the end of the colonialism.
12 Since 
independence from Britain in 1963, various leaders and communities have constantly 
demanded land reforms but successive governments have either ignored or tactfully deferred 
them until very recently. Rather than being a neutral mediator, the state and government of 
Kenya has in fact been part of the problem.
13 The unresolved land question has also brought 
about rift, not only between communities but also between the state and society.  
                                                 
10 Parkinson, J (1939) Notes on the Northern Frontier Province, Kenya. P.162. The Royal Geographical Society  
with the Institute of British Geographers) 
11 Bernard , F.E (1985) Planning and Envornmental Risks in Kenyan Drylands, p.63. Geographical Review, 
Vol.75, (pp.58-70) 
12 Other Kenyan scholars such as Dr. Karuti Kanyingi, (2000) Re-Distribution from Above: The Politics of Land 
Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya, and Prof. Paul Syagga (2007) Land Ownership and Use in Kenya: Policy 
of Prescriptions from an Inequality Perspective, have used the tool of ‘land question’ to discuss contemporary 
land issues in Kenya. See Prof. Okoth-Ogendo (2007) The Last Colonial Question: an essay in the pathology of 
land administration systems in Africa. Oslo.  
13 See foe example Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land 
(2004). The Commission was appointed  the Government of Kenya in 2002. The Report roundly points out the 5 
 
The historical assessment of the structure and functions of colonial land tenure regime 
is important in understanding the challenges that face Kenya as it deals with issues of land 
tenure reforms. It is now more than a century since the colonial government imposed alien 
land tenure regimes, replacing or compromising African customary tenure systems. The 
colonial rulers had applied the English notion of property laws which virtually gave them 
unfettered control of land resources.  
The most visible pastoral community during the ‘scramble’ for land in the early phase 
of colonial occupation was the Maasai. The settler communities targeted temperate rangelands 
and demanded that authorities alienate the land for their settlement.  The Maasai became the 
first indigenous community to fall victim of land settlement when their evictions took place 
after signing two agreements with the Protectorate representatives. On the other hand, the 
northern pastoralists such as the Boorana became part of the British East Africa Protectorate 
because of boundary delimitation aimed at controlling Italian and Abyssinian southern 
expansion. The colonial attitude of treating pastoralists as outlying and not fully part of its 
nascent state arrangement, while initially giving them with some sense of autonomy, 
progressively created a culture of marginalisation and control. The attitude soon coalesced 
into state policy that treated pastoralists as outsiders who required ‘hemming in’ and blending 
with mainstream society. 
Theoretical assumptions that categorise societies into ‘modern’ or ‘traditional’ have to 
some extent played a role in the marginalisation of the pastoralists. The pastoralists have 
increasingly faced prejudice from not only state but also other powerful interests, including 
                                                                                                                                                         
role of government in land crisis. It was accused of ‘land grabbing’ and ‘laundering’, especially with senior 
government officials from the head of state to the junior village heads allegrdly involved in the scams. 6 
 
multinational institutions that give financial support to government development projects.
14   
In common with most states where there are sizable populations of pastoralists, there have 
been tendencies to design programmes aimed at changing their way of life in order to 
ostensibly be in league with other ‘modern’ societies. This kind of thinking has permeated 
into land tenure policies and legal frameworks in many African countries.
15 Programmes and 
policies implemented by successive governments from the colonial period clearly show the 
patterns of pervasive bias in favour of sedentarised and agricultural communities.
16 In the 
1970s and 1980s there were large-scale development projects by international donor agencies 
many of whose policies, driven by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ theory, emphasised   
privatisation of the range, commercial ranching, and sedentarisation of nomads, particularly in 
Africa.
17  The ‘tragedy of the commons’ hypothesised that a communal system of land tenure 
would lead to the degradation of environments.
18 The highly centralised development 
planning is largely based on agrarian political economy, scantily taking into account the 
interests and rights of the pastoralists. Land and land tenure policies adopted over the years 
                                                 
14 See Frantkin, E, op.cit.236. 
15 Lund, C (2000) African Land Tenure: Questioning Basic Assumptions, IIED, Issue Paper no.100; Meek, C.K 
(1949) Land Law and Custom in the Colonies;  
16 Salih, M.M.A (1990) Pastoralism and the state in East African Arid Lands: An Overview. Nomadic Peoples, 
pp.7-18. No.25-27; Gilbert, J (2000) Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to Nomadic Peoples’ 
Land Rights, Human Rights Law Review 7;4, p.681-716;  Fratkin, E(1997) Pastoralism: Governance and 
Development Issues. Annual Review of Anthropology, pp.235-261, Vol.26; Kituyi, M (1998), Kenya in Lane, 
C.R (ed) Custodians of the Commons: Pastoral Land Tenure in East and West Africa,pp.27-45; Campbell, 
D.J(1981) Land Use Competition at the Margin of the Rangelands: An Issue in Development Strategies for 
Semi-Arid Areas, in Norcliffe,G (ed) Planning African Development, pp.39-61), Adhi,G.D (2003) Land Tenure 
and Needs for Reform in Pastoral Areas of Kenya. Posted at www.cbnrm.uwc.ac.za/papplrr/docsPAPPRr-
Godana.pdf. Accessed on 28 August, 2008. 
17 See Frantkin, op.cit.FN.8 
18 Garrett, H (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons, New Series, Vol. 162, No.3859, pp.1243-1248 7 
 
failed to appreciate the importance of pastoralism in shaping the future of a segment of 
Kenyan society.
19  
The northern pastoralists such as the Boorana did not experience direct land alienation to 
the same extent as their southern counterpart, the Maasai, who had to contend with European 
settlers as early as 1903. However, the Boorana and other northern pastoralists are today 
facing an uncertain future due to inappropriate land tenure policy imposed by the state.  The 
root cause of current tenure insecurity is linked to colonial policy that divested communities 
of their land. However, the turning point was when a Commission appointed by the colonial 
government singled out pastoral areas as unexploited resources to be utilised in future for 
non-pastoral purposes. This took place in 1933 when the Kenya Land Commission made a 
proposal to ‘set apart’ the land in northern Kenya to preserve its ‘undiscovered’ wealth for 
private investments by non-pastoralists.
20 The ‘undiscovered’ wealth is increasingly 
becoming a reality in the form of ecotourism, mining, and other rangelands resources that 
have steadily attracted external investors and speculators. Although customary land tenure 
systems have survived government policy onslaught for decades, the new wave of resource 
re-colonisation based on ecotourism is likely to break that resiliency. The well organised and 
aggressive investors in ecotourism euphemistically branded as ‘conservancies’ are growing 
rapidly, affecting pre-existing land use such as pastoralism. Some major investors in 
                                                 
19 Perhaps one of the key failures of development approaches and strategies in pastoral Kenya emanates from 
ignoring or misunderstanding the role of climate, environmental and ecological variability and the role they play 
in influencing pastoral land tenure and institutional arrangements. 
20 See Paras 800-805 Kenya Land Commission, Cmnd KLC 8 
 
‘conservancies’ have set up camps, sanctuaries, nature walks, bird shooting and other ventures 
in  pasturelands with little or no benefit to local communities.
21  
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Controversies and dilemmas surrounding land have been the most critical concern in 
Kenya before and after independence and yet remain as an unresolved question to date. This 
study addresses land as one of the important factors that underlies social and economic 
struggles in Kenya. This factor is a legacy that pervades contemporary land tenure regimes in 
Kenya, especially among the pastoral communities who have been on the periphery of the 
Kenyan state.
22 Reforming the entrenched policy which relates to land tenure frameworks has 
posed the greatest challenge in Kenya since the early 1990s following the introduction of 
multi-party politics. Non-government Organisations and other civil society movements have 
played a key role in pushing for legislative and policy reforms but the government has 
squandered many opportunities including constitutional reform.
23 In the midst of this 
confusion, communities such as pastoralists continue to face social and economic instability 
as the scramble for land resources escalates. On many occasions, communities have used 
violence as they attempt to regain possession of ‘lost land’ or secure access to other land 
resources.  
                                                 
21 See Martha H (1998) Ecotourism and Sustainable development: Who Owns Paradise? The author supports the 
concept of ecotourism generally but laments about skewed nature of benefits derived from the land use, claiming 
that the local communities are in most cases ripped off by outsiders who control the industry. 
22 Minority Rights Group (2008) Pastoralists in the Horn of Africa. Report of a Workshop on Social and 
Economic Marginalization; Goldsmith, P (2006) Social Policy and the Underdevelopment of Marginalised 
Pastoral Communities 
23 Simel J (2008) The Reality Behind Kenya’s Political Stalemate. Mainyoito Pastoralist Integrated Development 
Organization (MPIDO) 9 
 
Land has been and continues to be the most important asset of every human society 
since the beginning of time. Pre-colonial societies in Africa had organised their social, 
political, cultural, economical, and spiritual lives around land and natural resources for many 
centuries until they were disrupted by the colonial wave of the 19
th century. The most potent 
consequence of the European colonization was the formation of state structures based on alien 
legal and institutional frameworks. Over the many decades of its rule, the colonial power 
systematically established new institutions and administrative systems that led to the erosion 
of indigenous land tenure organisations and land rights. Although the levels of contact with 
the colonial rule might have differed from one community to another, the impact on their land 
was significantly visible.  For example, among the pastoral people, the Maasai had a direct 
and most controversial relationship with the Europeans which led to intensive loss of land. 
The pastoral Boorana had a weaker link with the colonial administration but today they are 
facing serious challenges to their traditional land due to the entrenched policy of land 
alienation known as the adjudication process.
24 There is a similarity between the old direct 
alienation by the colonial authorities and the new administrative land allocation. The 
consequence is the same for the communities who are largely dependent on land resources for 
their livelihood. Both the Boorana and Maasai are struggling to hold onto the ‘last frontier’ of 
their rangeland resources as the government continues to alienate their land through 
bureaucratic land adjudication and registration processes. 
The study puts in greater perspectives the general patterns of colonial and post-
independent land policy development. It interrogates the overall content of agrarian policy 
                                                 
24 In most cases, the government does not comply with laid down procedure of ‘setting aside’ land for public 
purposes in pastoral areas as stipulated under Trust Land Act, Chapter 288. When government ‘allocated chunk 
of grazing land in chirrup areas of Isiolo District for Chinese oil exploration, the local council, the local NGOs 
and the community  complained to the government officials about the anomaly without success. See American 
Chronicle, 23 June, 2008, an article by Abdikadir Gumi, Oil Exploration in Isiolo: Fears and Fortune.  10 
 
that effectively excluded and continues to undermine pastoralism as a form of production. The 
thrust of the arguments advanced in the study are, that because of failure by the successive 
post-independent governments to reform existing land tenure, pastoralists face serious 
challenges to maintain their way of life. The institutionalised discrimination against the 
pastoralists and subordination of the pre-existing indigenous land rights gives a compelling 
reason for land tenure reforms. For Kenya, the experience has never been so poignant than in 
recent years as land-related conflicts threaten the stability of the state and its long-term 
security.  
1.2 Approach and Objectives 
This study adopts a ‘historical land question’ approach in addressing the issue of land 
tenure reform, which is a critical question in Kenya but often overlooked by government and 
mainstream agencies. The current land tenure approaches in Africa overemphasise market-
based redistribution, regulatory frameworks, administration and management programmes, 
survey and cadastral systems, registration mechanisms; institutional capacities; and land 
information service.
25 Looking back 100 years since the British colonial authorities 
formulated land tenure laws and institutions, their character and objectives have largely 
remained the same, except for what Ahmed Mohiddin, a Tanzania political scientist calls 
‘changing of the guard.’
26 So long as the status quo is maintained by the state, opportunity to 
                                                 
25 See for example, Pinckney, T.C., and Kimuyu P.K. (1994) Land Tenure Reform in East Africa: Good, Bad or 
Unimportant. Journal of African Economies, Vol.3, No.1. Augustinus, C., Deininger, K. (2005) Innovations in 
Africa: Pro Poor Land Approaches. A paper presented at the african Ministers for Housing and Urban 
Development(AMCHUD), Durban, South Africa. Land Tenure and Sustainable Development in Southern Africa 
(2003) ECA-SA Office, Lusaka, Zambia. The World Bank (2003) Land Policies for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction. A World Bank Policy Report. U.N-HABITAT( 2003)  Handbook on Best Policy Practices, Security 
of Tenure and Access to Land. Implementation of the Habitat Agenda. UN-HABITAT (2001) Land Information 
Service Service in Kenya. 
26 Mohiddin, A (1981) African Socialism in Two Countries, p.4. He is referring to replacement of colonial 
personnel by the Africans, though the structures of colonial institutions almost remained intact. 11 
 
redress the historical land question will remain elusive and unfulfilled. From the beginning, 
political choices made by the African leaders during the decolonisation process in the 1960s 
was to safeguard policies and laws inherited from colonial administration. Kenya today, as 
with other African countries, has been beset by myriads of land-related conflicts between 
communities in many parts of the country. The land problem has become the most dominant 
social and political issue of the day and government appears ineffective, even when it 
attempts to intervene during violent flare-ups.  Legal and institutional structures designed by 
government are similarly dormant in responding to land-related conflicts.  
As I have indicated, my focus is mainly on pastoral Maasai and Boorana and it is 
therefore important to outline some aspects of terms used in relation to these communities. I 
have largely adopted current working definitions as used by scholars, government policy 
documents, and legal and development consultants. 
1.2 Pastoralists and Pastoralism 
Available historical accounts indicate the presence of pastoralists in Kenya and the 
region dating back to the third millennium BC when herding livestock became the dominant 
part of their economy.
27 The region was historically a melting pot of various cultures and 
social diversity where different communities had occupied particular ecological niches, 
developing distinct dominance over the past centuries. The Eastern African pastoralists 
represent at least one-half of the world's pastoral people where thirteen million are 
predominately pastoral and another nine million are agro-pastoralists. They occupy arid and 
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semi-arid rangelands keeping and breeding domestic animals including cattle, camels, goats, 
sheep and donkeys. The animals were used for milk, meat, transport, and trade. 
 In Africa, some of the pastoralists whose economic mainstay is pastoralism include 
Tuareg, Fulani (Fulbe), Somali, and Boorana-Oromo, Nuer, Turkana, Karamanjong, Maasai, 
Samburu, and Rendile amongst others.  Kenya’s drylands constitute about 80% of the total 
land area and are mostly inhabited by pastoral societies supporting at least 20% of the total 
national population.
28 Like other indigenous populations across the globe, the pastoralists 
share land and utilise kinship ties for mutual social solidarity. Pastoralists are generally 
defined as people who rely heavily on production of domestic herds whose sustainability is 
based on mobility and the availability of pasture and water. In Kenya, the pastoral climatic 
conditions are in general terms similar to those prevailing in other African drylands.  Low and 
variable precipitation, high evaporation rates, sparse vegetation and shallow soils are the main 
features that define the landscape. However, the lands are well suited for extensive rangelands 
production such as livestock.
29 
 Frank Bernard, a Geographer who carried out ecological survey in pastoral areas, 
asserts that the climatic conditions have not been deterrence to those who are keen to exploit 
drylands resources.  He observes: ‘In spite of the harshness and ecological limitations, these 
drylands are now the destination of a substantial stream of migration.’
30 Although such 
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migration has traditionally involved other pastoral groups in search of water and pasture, 
especially during drought, the contemporary practice is formalised through allocation and 
registration.
31 As shown in Chapters Six and Seven, pastoral communities like Boorana, 
Maasai and Samburu are currently facing stiff competition from increasingly expanding 
private conservancy projects. This has a critical implication for the future of pastoralists as a 
people and pastoralism as a production system. The reason for this is that livestock 
production, the mainstay of their economic activity, depends on ‘extensive grazing of native 
pastures’
32, without which the future of pastoralists will be in jeopardy. The prevailing 
scenarios are reflective of a situation in many pastoral settings where a combination of factors 
have eroded land tenure systems and hence the quality of livelihood. Elliot Fratkin describes 
the current situation as follows: 
Pastoralist societies face more threats to their way of life now more than any previous time. 
Population growth; loss of herding lands to private farms, ranches, game parks, and urban 
areas; increased commoditization of livestock economy; outmigration by poor pastoralists; and 
period dislocation brought about by drought, famine, and civil war are increasing in pastoralist 
regions of the world.
33   
Lord Hailey, a British land tenure expert observed, “The extent of the appropriation of 
indigenous lands has depended more on factors of climate or soil than on juridical 
argument”
34. This in essence means that the issue of legitimacy of the colonial action was not 
considered as paramount in determining how the settlement and alienation of land would be 
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carried out in African territories. The pre-existing customary rights and institutions governing 
management of land resources were overlooked and deliberately undermined. As indicated in 
the preceding chapters, the British Protectorate policy during settlement in the early 
nineteenth century was heavily influenced by demand made by the settlers. Relationships with 
the African societies were heavily informed by their desire to access productive agricultural 
land for the European farmers. It was also the foundation upon which historical prejudices, 
stemming from the negative attitude towards the drier areas, such as those occupied by 
pastoralists was built. As I have discussed earlier, in comparison to the Maasai, the Boorana 
had little direct contact with the colonial government, and were able to enjoy some level of 
undisturbed land management. However, the legal and policy framework put in place by the 
authorities eventually caught up with the Boorana and other northern pastoralists. The 
Boorana had a long history of preservation of cultural and social systems within which 
communal resources were governed. 
The Boorana who live in their ancestral land in southern Ethiopia have largely maintained the 
core traditional resources management systems, although Ethiopian state policy of land 
appropriation for commercial ranching is fast approaching. In Kenya multiple factors such as 
colonial rule, post-colonial state control, social and educational influence, have greatly eroded 
many aspects of ancient resource governance. 
1.4 The Maasai  
The Maasai belong to Maa-speaking groups who consist of the Maasai of southern 
Kenya, north-central Tanzania as well as the Samburu and Chamus in Central Kenya. They 
are related to the Eastern Sudanic sub-family of the Nilo-Saharan phalanx such as the Bari 
and Lotuko of southern Sudan, Karamanjong and Teso of eastern Uganda, and Turkana of 15 
 
northwest Kenya. According to anthropological records, the cradle land of the early Eastern 
Nilotes was probably situated east of the present-day Juba in Southern Sudan.
35   
It is recorded that the first Maa-speaking immigrants reached the Rift Valley region by 
the end of the ninth century and probably the territories that became Tanzania to the south, by 
the mid-sixteenth century at the earliest. 
36 The groups in Kenya began a whirlwind of 
movement across the region and moved into the ‘Nakuru-Naivasha area, south-westwards 
across Loita, Mara, Serengeti and south-eastwards to Ngong and across the Athi and 
Kaputieni plains as far as the foothills of Kilimanjaro.’
37 Although they are organised in 
territorial sections, the Maasai have shared socio-cultural and ritual organisations based on 
age-sets and age-grades, similar to Boorana and other Cushitic communities. Age-grades are 
status-based identities to which individuals are ascribed in the course of their lives. Age-
grades comprise all those within a broad range of ages who are formed into a group of peers 
with their own separate identities. This socio-cultural organisation has immense implications 
on the community’s socio-economic wellbeing and political stability.   
 Through this organised structure, the community had protected their land, territory  
from any external aggression. According to David Campbell, the most fundamental 
characteristic of the Maasai economy is its concept of land.
38 Similar to other pastoral 
communities, Maasai perceived land as communal territory to be accessed by all its members 
rather than for absolute exploitation by individuals. Land and land-based resources were 
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managed through social and political conventions designed to reduce the risks associated with 
the unpredictable climate and environment. Nonetheless, one risk that was predicted by the 
eminent Maasai leader, Laibon Mbatian, and which Maasai was unable to stop, was loss of 
their land to the European settlement. The period coincided with the advent of the colonial 
rule, which radically transformed the pattern of land tenure systems and consequently 
diminished Maasai land rights significantly. 
1.5 The Boorana  
Boorana (sometimes spelled as Boran, Borana or referred by an old historical name 
Galla) community is a branch of the larger Oromo people who are one of the most populous 
language groups in Africa.
39 The Oromo, who predominantly live in Ethiopia are one of the 
most widespread ethnic groups in Africa  and are estimated to number between 25-30 million 
people.
40 The Boorana live in the southern part of Ethiopia, as well as northern Kenya, 
straddling the borders between the two countries. The scholars of Oromo history and 
ethnography have placed a great premium on the Boorana as the repository of the gada 
system. In contemporary Oromo political, social and cultural dispensation, the concept of the 
gada plays the central role as an indigenous and egalitarian form of democracy.
41  
                                                 
39 Melbaa, G (1988) Oromia: An introduction to the History of the Oromo People, p.8. The most recent available 
statstics derived from 1994 Ethiopian Popualtion Census show that Oromo number 24.5 million people. See 
Refworld/World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous peoples online data, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2d823b,49749d2620,0.html . Accessed on 01/03/2009. 
40  See Refworld Web at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2d823b,49749d2620,0.html. 
Oromo population is stated to be 24.5 million. Accessed on 28/02/2008.  
41 See Legesse, A.( 2000) Oromo Democracy: An indigenous African Political System; Marco, B(2005) 
Decisions in the Shade: Political and Juridical Processes among the Oromo-Borana; Baxter, P.T.W, Hultin,J, 
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Unlike the Maasai, the Boorana contact with the colonial administration was minimal; 
however, today the prospect of their pastoral livelihood system is in jeopardy because of the 
incompatible nature of statutory laws that facilitate alienation of land for non-pastoral 
purposes.  The Boorana are struggling to hold onto the ‘last frontier’ of their rangeland 
resources as governments heavily bureaucratised arrangements of land adjudication and 
registration are perpetuated.  As I will illustrate later, such concepts such as trust land have 
mainly succeeded in transitioning land from indigenous communal systems to private 
ownership, thus consolidating extinguishment of pastoralists land rights.  
During the partition of Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, Boorana were divided between 
Abyssinian (later Ethiopia) and the British East Africa Protectorate (later Kenya). Today the 
Boorana in Kenya predominantly live in the Upper Eastern districts of Moyale, Isiolo and 
Marsabit. 
1.6 Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) 
Reference to Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) or Northern Frontier Province (NFP) 
is made frequently in this study. It is therefore important to give a synopsis of the historical 
background of this region, which was widely referred to NFD. The northern and northeast 
region of the British East Africa Protectorate (Kenya) was not clearly defined until 1925. The 
region became a theatre of rivalry between the Europeans on the one hand, and Europeans and 
Abyssinian (Ethiopian) Empire on the other. Between 1884 and 1897, Britain had secured 
control over Somaliland and East Africa Protectorate (Kenya). This included the Somali-
inhabited area of the Juba and the parts that later became the Northern Frontier Districts. The 
north-eastern boundary extended up to the River Juba in what was under the Italian sphere of 
influence. In 1925, the Jubaland Province (12,000 square miles) was transferred to Italy in 18 
 
conformity with the 1915 Treaty of London.
42 The remaining part was clustered with the 
northern part, which bordered the Abyssinian Empire. By 1891, Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia 
had extended his domain over the region, which was initially called Northern Frontier 
Province. It was inhabited by Somali, Boorana, Rendile, Sakuye, Gabbra, Turkana, Samburu 
and other smaller communities. These communities were predominantly nomadic pastoralists 
who practised livestock rearing, relying on seasonal grazing and other shared resources such 
as water, pastures, and saltlicks.  
1.6 Why Maasai and Boorana? 
This study focuses on two communities who have many commonalities in their lifestyles. 
Both communities are pastoralists and like other pastoral people, are perceived by the 
mainstream policy makers and development agencies as irrational and anti-development, 
practising ‘outdated’ occupation.
43 The differences are more geographical location than status 
of development and socio-political conditions. Land and livestock are the backbone of the 
Maasai and Boorana economy as well as an expression of their identity. The Maasai live in 
southern Kenya, on the fringes of ‘developed’ highlands, while the Boorana live in the drier 
north, on the margin of the distant state. Both had a glorious past. The Boorana was a thriving 
nation in the eastern African region until the 18
th century. Referring to the decline of Boorana 
Oromo Norman Leys had this to say: “About a hundred years ago the Galla thus rose to power 
in Eastern Africa only to sink again before any exact knowledge could be got of them.”
44 
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43 See Goldsmith, P (2003) Perceptions of Pastoralisms in Kenya. Meru, Kenya. Challenging the Myths: A 
Workshop on Perceptions of Pastoralism in East Africa,  Reconcile/ IIED. 
44Leys, N (1926) Kenya, p.103  19 
 
 The Maasai roved and ruled the great expanse of land in the East Africa region until the 
19th century when a combination of diseases, internal strife and colonialism dealt a blow to 
their national identity. Norman Leys again said this of the Maasai: “Not a tribe of importance 
between Vaal and the sources of the Nile holds the position and occupies the area it held and 
occupied a hundred years ago.”
45 The Maasai have retained the vibrancy of its cultural milieu, 
which sometimes becomes lost in the abyss of the romanticised world of the tourism industry. 
The future of Boorana is uncertain as their famed rangelands increasingly recede in the face of 
encroachment by other land users. The Maasailand is being turned into a large ‘community 
park’
46, while some part of the Boorana pastureland has been transformed into fledging gas 
and oil fields.
47  
This study describes the north-south pastoral rangelands to demonstrate the fact that the 
legacy of colonial land tenure does affect communities, whether they have had direct contact 
like Maasai or less dramatic relations like Boorana. Not even the celebrated Gada system of 
Boorana or the oracles of the respected Laibon Mbatian of Maasai saved their respective lands 
from the enduring ravages of the state policy of alienation. 
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1.7 Contextualising the Concept of Land Tenure 
At the root of the indigenous African encounters with the European colonial powers in 
the nineteenth century, was the question of land. Before that historical contact, every 
community had its established ways of relating to land. The pre-colonial communities also 
shared some common features that reflected several dimensions of land as economic, social, 
political, cultural, intrinsic, and spiritual attachment. Land was an integral part of a 
community, serving its individual and collective needs.  It meant not only physical soil but 
also all that grew on it, what was beneath its bowels, flowed on its surface and underground. 
Its soil was tilled for food, trees and grass for building homes.
48  Minerals, crystals and stones 
deposits were excavated for use as temples and tombs, ornaments and monuments, tools and 
pigmentations. Grass and fodder shrubs were used for livestock and construction of hamlets, 
huts and kraals. Wildlife was used for supplementary food and intrinsic significance. The 
community used labour as a means by which these resources were made available to members 
of a household. Social and political institutions were crafted to protect and preserve those 
resources.
49 Members were expected to abide by rules and norms regulating use, access, 
control and management of resources. Disputes over use and access were resolved through 
judicial systems often manned by wise elders.
50 Above all, communities knew their territorial 
resource borders and protected them from hostile neighbours. In spite of differentiated needs, 
dependable social structure operated to facilitate peaceful co-existence within and between 
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communities. Among pastoralists, those institutions and norms played important roles in 
regulating acceptance of social behaviour and served as the basis for rewarding compliance or 
repudiating deviance. 
During the colonial era, land was primarily conceptualised and perceived through the 
colonial spectrum, thus undermining the local and indigenous values. Perhaps, no aspect of 
Kenya’s history had been more misunderstood than the concept of land rights and land, as 
practised by various communities in the pre-colonial territories. A misconception that the 
indigenous peoples did not have inherent rights to land was eventually legislated.
51 The 
argument advanced was that most of the land was unoccupied or vacant space referred to as 
‘tabula rasa’, which according to the early colonial authorities, could legitimately be alienated 
to European settlers. The pre-existing economic activities such as farming or livestock 
keeping practised by Africans were perceived as inferior and therefore untenable. Liz Alden-
Wily, a renowned land tenure expert,  observes that as far as the coloniser’s mind was 
concerned, Africans land was ‘un-own-able’ and did not attain the level of tradable 
property.
52  
The contradiction about such attitude was more real than it seemed. The colonial 
mentality made it difficult for even the most reasonable colonising authorities to accept the 
fact that African communities did have their own way of life before the coming of the 
Europeans.  For example, the territories that later constituted Kenya, were occupied by 
autonomous communities that had practised egalitarian systems. Those systems, had 
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effectively ensured security and social and economic wellbeing of members of their society. 
To ensure fair and just access to resources, individual and collective use of land was regulated 
by customary norms.  The communities had their own terms of expressing land used for 
different purposes and at different seasons such as dry and wet periods. The pastoral 
communities have systematically developed mechanisms of sharing fuzzy or contested 
resources where land borders had not been clearly demarcated. Niamer-Fuller, an academic 
who has written widely on pastoralism, describes the measures used to resolve potential 
conflicts that arose because of contested tenure rights as follows: 
Overlapping territories, as managed jointly by neighboring groups, allow some room for 
expansion and function as fallback areas in difficult years. Buffer zones between groups, 
maintained for similar reasons, are more extensive and often used by more than two groups. The 
latter require ad hoc negotiations over use between the different groups when the need to use 
these areas arises. 
   In Boorana, land reserved for calves called ‘kaloo’ near the homestead cannot be used 
for grazing of other mature herds.
53 Such a concept may not have made any sense to a 
dominant agrarian economy that did not take into account subsistence practice. Such an 
arrangement might appear unpalatably confusing in a society that had a different worldview.  
In other words, different communities held land under different conditions. As Paul 
Bohannan, a well known critic of western concept of land tenure,  observes, ‘the term ‘land 
tenure’ in its widest sense covers several implications and presents even more difficulty 
because it contains a more tangled ambiguity than does ‘land.’
54 Krishnan Maini argues that 
the lexicon used such as ‘own’, ‘sell’, ‘rent’, ‘lease’, ‘hold’, ‘mortgage,’ ‘easement’, ‘fixture’, 
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and ‘encumbrance’ did not have African equivalent or denote the same thing under African 
customary systems.
55 A close examination of African customary aspects of tenure shows that 
there was as no distinction as such between property and possession, the sort of division 
known in English law.  The scholars accustomed to English land tenure systems often 
perceive African customary practices as ambiguous and complex. For example, Daniel 
Biebuyck commenting on the nature of African land tenure stated as follows: 
The analysis of the clusters of rights and claims, privileges and liabilities which are related to the 
ways in which African hold and work the land, live on it and use its products, is complex, on one 
hand, because of difficulties in evaluating the exact nature of the rights and claims, and on the 
other hand, because of the implication of economic and social, political and religious factors. It 
is, therefore difficult to characterize African systems of land tenure in terms of familiar legal and 
linguistic concepts.
56 
It is obvious that some scholars preferred to engage in misleading characterisation of the 
indigenous tenure systems, terming them ambivalent instead of owning up to their own 
knowledge gap. In the context of colonisation, it was not surprising for the authorities to 
distort the reality in order to justify expropriation of indigenous peoples’ land. Such 
misconceptions could as well be deliberate, considering the fact that settler and locally based 
colonial officials intended to entrench their monopoly to control and alienate land. In Kenya, 
pioneer settlers and administrators aggressively pushed for legislations that declared the 
acquired territories as ‘vacant’ and ‘wastelands’.  Other confusing terms such as ‘public land’ 
were used to camouflage the intention of the colonial authorities. It was deliberately adapted 
to create a twisted sense among the purported ‘beneficiaries’ that there was need for a trustee 
or custodian. In reality it meant exclusive access to land resources for the ruling elites to 
enrich themselves at the expense of ordinary people. 
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1.8 Current Debates and Dilemma 
Kenya has been literally ‘hooked’ on an endless debate for two decades now without 
much progress in terms of legal and institutional reforms. Before that, it took about three 
decades since 1963 when Kenya became independent, for government to free up political 
space for Kenyans to engage in any sort of public debate. Kenyans were optimistic that their 
social, political and economic conditions would change for the better, especially in the 
aftermath of the 1992 General Elections. The political landscape looked promising with new 
crops of opposition leaders popularly known as ‘Young Turks’, many of them the doyen of 
the so-called “second liberation.”
57 The political euphoria did not last long as the fractious 
opposition parties failed to ensure the ancien régime of  KANU (Kenya African National 
Union) undertook comprehensive legal and institutional changes in Kenya. Like 1963, the 
transition became a failure.
58  In his writing on multi-party transition in Kenya and other 
African countries, Julius Ihonvbere attributes the failures to leaders’ exploitative culture.
59  In 
Kenya, the early 1990s afforded politicians and policy-makers the best window of opportunity 
to address many unsettled issues. At that point, no agenda would have been more urgent and 
critical than land reform.  
With the unresolved colonial and post colonial land question, many parts of the 
country continued to experience land related conflicts. Many observers agree that the 
unresolved land grievances date back to the colonial period, especially among the pastoral 
                                                 
57 See Ogot, B.A (1996) Transition from Single-Party to Multiparty Political System, 1989-1993, p.255, in Ogot, 
B.A.; Ochieng, W.R, Decolonization and Independence in Kenya 1943-1993. 
58 Ibid, p.255 
59 Ihonvbere, J.O (2006) Where is the Third Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa’s non-transition to 
Democracy in Mbuku, J.M., Ihonvbere, J.O (eds.) Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to 
democratization in Africa. Africa World Press, Trenton, N.J. 25 
 
communities such as the Maasai.
60 There exist visible tensions and conflicts between the 
imposed colonial systems and the pre-existing customary rules that often result in overlap and 
competing source of legitimacy. In relation to pastoralists, the root cause of current tenure 
uncertainty and insecurity in common with the rest of the country is traceable to the legacy of 
colonial land policy. Nevertheless, the turning point came with the proposal made to keep the 
northern pastoral region as a ‘reservoir’ for future use. This was in 1933 when the Kenya 
Land Commission under the leadership of Morris Carter, made a proposal to ‘set apart’ the 
land in northern Kenya, purportedly, to preserve its ‘undiscovered’ wealth for private 
investments by non-pastoralists.
61 Between these protagonists, which includes the state, itself 
a competitor for land resources, stands important but as yet unfinished business, the task of 
land tenure reform which successive Kenyan governments have failed to address. This is 
inspite of the fact that land related conflicts remain an important factor in socio-economic and 
political stability. The experience of the last two decades has shown that unless the 
government and other players make a significant move to address land issues, the political, 
social and economic security of Kenya will continue to deteriorate rather than improve. 
Since the early 1990s, some leaders have been accused of exploiting emotive electoral 
environment in organising ‘land clashes’, especially in politically volatile Rift Valley 
Province.
62 During these periods, Kenya continues to experience orgies of killings, rape, 
mayhem and massive displacement of people that is a mirror image of a war-torn country. 
The last inter-ethnic conflict, following the bungled 2008 General Elections, was deadly in its 
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gravity as well as effect on national psyche.  The ominous sign was quite clear in 1991 when 
hot spots areas like Rift Valley, Coast and Western Kenya were gripped by ‘land clashes’ that 
had left many dead and displaced. The New York Times reporter captured one episode of 
flight from land clashes as follows:  
Nowhere are those tensions more evident than in the Rift Valley of western Kenya, which has 
some of the most fabled and productive land in Africa but recently has been turned into a 
scene out of “The Grapes of Wrath,” with tens of thousands of desperate people fleeing in 
battered pickups piled high with beds, chairs, blankets and children. Some trucks are so 
overloaded their bumpers hang just millimeters above the road.
63 
Even in the face of such horrors and relentless campaigns for land tenure reform by 
civil society groups, the government is still reluctant when it comes to kick starting the 
process. Although the Kenyans had a high expectation of the ‘opposition’ governments that 
ended the KANU’s unbroken rule of 40 years, the hope has since dissipated as internal 
wrangling continue to rock the two-term Kibaki government since 2002. The land review 
process that began in 2004 has yet to be completed. Not even the political eruptions that 
followed the botched presidential election of 2007 and subsequent orgy of killings blamed on 
pent-up land grievances, seems to send any message to the ruling class. The National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation, chaired by Kofi Annan, placed the issue of land at the top of the 
agenda of political settlement.
64  The team that was appointed to mediate the post-elections 
political issues between the conflicting parties put the land and other issues in a broader 
perspective as follows: 
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...we recognize that poverty, the inequitable distribution of resources and perception of 
historical injustices and exclusion on the part of segments of Kenyan society constituted the 
underlying causes of the prevailing social tension, instability and circle of violence.
65  
Since the signing of the accord signed, in which land and other pending reform issues were 
agreed to be instituted, the government has not taken any legislative step to deliver on its 
promise. This has become the norm rather than the exception. Even with former opposition 
‘stalwarts’ in the government since 2002, numerous efforts Kenyans  have put in place to 
jumpstart stalled reform processes have not produced the expected result.  The same old 
paternalistic and self-serving interests seem to have crept into the way of reform agenda. The 
situation is even grimmer as far as land question is concerned. 
1.9 The Structure and Scope of the Thesis 
The issue of land is as old as human civilisation. The historical land and tenure 
continue to dominate the socio-political sphere of Kenyan society today. The situation goes 
back over 100 years and involves a constellation of ethnic groups that is highly diverse in its 
composition, culturally and socially. Their lands were variegated geographically and 
ecologically with communities adapting different livelihoods systems amenable to their 
environment. The spontaneous ‘scramble and partition’ of territories by the European imperial 
powers who subsequently occupied the acquired territories, disrupted the lives of those 
communities. The colonial authorities introduced new laws and institutions that gave them 
powers to control people and their resources. The most intensive transformation was in 
relation to land and conditions attached to ownership, control, access and management of land 
resources. Whoever exercised the power to spell out those conditions arguably controlled the 
land.  The lives and land tenure systems of the hitherto independent indigenous communities 
changed forever. This long and deep-seated issue cannot be exhaustively covered by this 
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study. It however attempts to trace the important historical milestones that have manifestly 
affected and continue to affect the contemporary land tenure arrangements in Kenya. From 
the pedestal of historical legacy, the land tenure challenges and dilemma mirrors reflectively 
through every segment and section of the study. The objective is simple. Land and land tenure 
is intricately trapped in the cobweb of colonial history upon which contemporary land tenure 
policy and law is built. The central thesis of the study is that the historical land question is not 
yet settled and its socio-economic and political implications on the livelihoods of 
communities, especially those like pastoralists who depend on land resources for their 
livehoods. The remainder of the thesis is divided into seven chapters. 
 Chapter 2 illustrates socio-political institutions deployed by the Boorana and Maasai to 
ensure good governance of land and other land-based resources. The contemporary challenges 
facing these pastoral communities in the wake of colonial and post colonial political and 
economic order are also illustrated.  
Chapter 3 broadly traces the historical evolution of land tenure systems in Kenya beginning 
with the advent of the colonial rule and conversion of indigenous land tenure systems. The 
supplanting Western legal system and jurisprudence, aimed at justifying imperial power over 
territories and land in the early phase of colonial state, is discussed in detail. 
Chapter 4 describes the contact between the Maasai and the British colonial authorities. The 
two Maasai agreements that led to evictions of the Maasai and the subsequent case by the 
community to reclaim ‘lost’ lands are discussed in details. 
  Chapter 5 examines the role of the Kenya Land Commission, whose proposals in 1933 
became the foundation upon which much of pastoral land policy has been predicated and 29 
 
perpetuated. It formed a critical turning point on pastoral land tenure, where the question of 
productivity of pastoral land and reservation for other non-pastoral uses was entrenched.  
Chapter 6 addresses the major land policy and legislations made as part of post-independence 
transitional arrangements.  It demonstrates how the introduction of statutory land tenure 
frameworks has influenced the overall land rights of the pastoral Maasai and Boorana.   
 Chapter 7 revisits current statutory laws and policies and their impact on land rights of 
pastoralists are examined. The focus is on some of the emerging land conflicts because of 
increasing volatility of relations between land users and compelling incidents of competing 
interests. The question of whether the post-independent government had any strategy to 
transform the colonial land tenure regimes or was happy to continue with the inherited legacy 
is discussed.  
 Chapter 8 is a general summary of this study and points out some of the dominant 
assumptions that have influenced pastoral land tenure,  which I believe is now a dominant 
notion in land laws in Kenya. 
The scope of this study is in some respect limited by the nature of the subject of the research 
itself.  Colonial and contemporary data on pastoralists, particularly those that are of legal 
nature dealing with land issues are not easily available. There are only a few administrative 
reports, which even when available have been scourged by poor storage in local repositories 
such as archives and museums. Furthermore, study on legal and institutional history of land in 
pastoral areas is hardly a trodden path. Anthropologists, ethnographers, ecologists, 
geographers, and other such social scientists have fairly covered their various areas of 
expertise extensively. However,  the legal aspects of land and natural resource tenure have not 30 
 
had such coverage. This study lays a foundation for further research that will explore many 
the untouched legal facets.    
The next  chapter will examine some of the important features in customary 
governance of land and natural resources of the Pastoral Boorana and Maasai. It is important 
to deepen our understanding of how the pastoral communities governed their land resources 
before discussing the historical and colonial background of land tenure regimes in Kenya. In 
spite of rapid land policy changes since the end of the nineteenth century, pastoral land tenure 
practices have remained resilient. However, the twenty-first century has been challenging as 
successive governments fail to reform land policy, which in the long run is expected not only 
to redress unresolved land grievances but also strengthen land tenure rights. The chapter deals 
more with land resources management system of the Boorana while land issues of the Maasai 
will be elaborately discussed in chapter 4.31 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Pre-Colonial Land Tenure Arrangements 
2.1 Boorana system of managing resources   
The Boorana are among some of the indigenous East African peoples such as Maasai, 
Turkana, Somali, Barabaig, Karamanjong, and Pokot who have maintained their ancient 
social and cultural practices in spite of profound transformations since the formation of 
modern states. In contrast to the agriculturalists in central and western highlands who have 
been integrated into contemporary political and economic systems, the pastoral peoples still 
maintain much of the indigenous lifestyles, especially in management of their land resources. 
As I shall illustrate below, the Boorana have maintained their unique system of socio-political 
and economic organisation for over five centuries since the dispersal of the Oromo people in 
the sixteenth century.
1 Referring to this system, Abdi Umar commented as follows: 
The Borana have elaborate indigenous rituals that have been admired by neighbouring people. 
They include Gada System, which is an age-grade generation system for organising 
society...The Borana have well established conflict resolution mechanisms that include 
organized courts, as well as an indigenous natural resource management system.
2 
Central to these well-organised social and political activities of the Boorana, including 
critical issues of land and resources governance, lays the system, or more precisely the 
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institution of Gada. Boku Tache, a pastoralist resources management expert, asserts that 
‘Boorana social structure provides the framework for resource management at two broad 
levels of traditional administrative structure.’
3He defines the two levels as ‘administration 
from above’ and ‘administration from within.’ The administration from above is by gada and 
from within by clan arrangements. He quotes a Boorana maxim that enunciates this principle: 
‘Booranii gubbaa gadaan fidamaa, kessaa gosaan fidama.’  The reference to gadaa as ‘above’ 
may conjure up an image of a superstructure that governs using ‘top-down’ approaches. 
However, as many studies illustrate this is not the case.  Gadaa in its socio-political 
framework is an institution based on consensus and egalitarian processes.
4 As a diffused and 
decentralised system, the two levels coordinate affairs of the community through 
representational structures that go to the lowest units. Gudrun Dahl presents gadaa structure as 
follows:...a large number of officers are appointed by election or inheritance: a senior council 
consisting of the major Abba Gadaa, two Abba Gadaa Kontoma and three other senior councillors 
(Hayyu) plus four ritual officiants: the councillors are supported by voluntary deputy councillors 
(jallaba) and a large number of junior councils conscripts. For each of the two Abba Gadaa Kontoma 
there is an additional junior council consisting of a number of Hayyu Medicca councillors, who 
represent all Boraana clans and Hayyu Garba representing the clan as the Abba Gadaa Kontoma 
himself.
5  
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5 Dahl, G (1996) Sources of Life and Identity, p.171, in Baxter, P.T.W., Hultin, J., Triulzi, A.(eds.) (1996) Being 
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The dividing lines between the two levels appear to exist in all but name. The gadaa system, as 
opposed to feudal /monarchical systems in other African societies, does not have dominant rulers at 
the top making rules and enforcing them through multiple layers of subordinates. Rather, a horizontal 
structure holds collective mandates for a limited period of eight years for the reigning council. Gadaa 
has a cardinal responsibility of overseeing Boorana land and resources (water, pasture, salt minerals, 
etc.) and ensure that laws, seera and customs, aadaa that regulate their source are respected.
6 
Equitable access of resources by all members of the community is an important cornerstone of 
regulatory framework which individual clans or territorial units are expected to comply with.  
  The Boorana have conceptualised and developed institutional and regulatory 
frameworks to manage resources in their spatial and temporal conditions, using explicit rules 
and regulations concerning grazing patterns, water use, territorial and settlement planning. 
The concepts of madda, dheeda, ardaa, reera and ollaa, which are often used in the sense of 
administrative functions, play an important role in defining land tenure rights. The defining 
features of Boorana range management institutions are indigenous knowledge, equitable 
access, and decentralisation of governance, principles of subsidiarity, distributive and 
redistributive mechanisms and environmental sustainability.  Development consultants in 
pastoral rangelands such as Watson argue that the Boorana indigenous institutional 
frameworks have been successful in the management of community-based natural resources. 
Referring to his seminal work in Boorana, Watson states that, ‘Boorana Zone in southern 
Ethiopia became the focus of this work because it is well known for its indigenous 
institutions...’
7 
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In spite of significant social, political and economic changes that have taken place 
over numerous generations, sometimes shaking the core attributes of the community; the 
Gada system has shown profound resilience. Difference of opinions may exist among scholars 
as to the nature and scope of Gada as a source of authority and governance but there is a 
general agreement that it plays a central role in social and cultural identity of the Oromo 
people as a whole.
8 There is no doubt that with the partition of Boorana into two colonial 
states, the Abyssinian-controlled Ethiopia and the British East Africa, the influence of Gada 
has gradually been on the wane. Gada system is institutionally challenged because of complex 
and interwoven social and political conditions that have occurred in the past one hundred 
years. The British and Abyssinian imposition of their hegemonic rule changed the power 
balance in favour of new rulers.  
However, the role of gada in regulatory and institutional management of land 
resources, especially in the recent past decades where competitions over declining range 
resources have caused perennial conflicts, the residual power of gada leadership is more real 
than apparent. The Boorana continue to organise their range resources and adhere to laws and 
customs that preserve resources rather than waste them through uncontrolled extraction. 
Historically, the Boorana land and land-based resources management strategies were noted 
for their appropriateness and effectiveness. Johan Hellland, who has widely written on 
pastoral  Oromo development issues, observes that: 
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Compared with other pastoral areas in East Africa with similar natural conditions, the Borana 
rangelands have usually (i.e upto to quite recently) been assessed to be exceptionally good. Given that 
the Borana have occupied these areas for at least four hundred years, the implication is that the Borana 
pastoral production system contains a mechanism to solve the problem of growth in pastoralism , 
brought about by the natural propensity of animal populations to grow, particularly in response to 
favourable conditions.
9   
The reference to the period of four hundred years, has been alluded to by other writers, who 
specifically trace it to the ‘reign’ of Abayii Baabboo Horoo, who was Abba Gada (the gada 
leader ) of Boorana from 1656 to 1664.
10 
According to scholars and oral historians, the Gada of Abbayyii Baabboo coincided 
with a massive dispersal of Oromo in different directions in Northeast Africa which was said 
to have been  triggered by overpopulation and environmental decline. The expansion and 
migration led to the separation of the Oromo into various ‘independent’ groups. 
Contemporary Oromo historians such as Mohammed Hassen trace the period of separation to 
the sixteenth century.
11 The Boorana have since established the sub-region as the ‘last 
frontier’ of the pre-colonial indigenous Oromo form of governance and ritual practices.  
2.2 Boorana and Concept of shared resources  
Historically and recently, access to land and water resources have been extended to 
non-Boorana émigré who settled in Booranaland. Those who willingly desired to be part of 
Boorana were often co-opted into kinship and clan systems of the Boorana. For example, 
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Professor Gufu Oba, who is an authority on pastoral resource conflicts, traces and explains 
how a complex migration and co-option mechanism was used to allow such neighbouring 
tribes as Garri, Gabra and Rendile to access grazing and watering resources. He describes one 
of the ways in which a non-Boorana family is incorporated into Boorana as follows: 
...by clan or lineage, gosa, is when a family or a group of related families affiliate themselves 
to particular Boorana clan or sub-clan, in order to acquire access to its resources. The applicant 
must accept aada seera Boorana while they are utilising those resources but may go back to 
their own way of life when they recross the resource border. Some such groups however may 
settle among their hosts and become entirely integrated; as did the Rendile of Bach’eelo 
blacksmiths, waar’ ilmaani Bach’eelo, during the gada of Guyo Gedo (1753-1761).
12 
These institutional arrangements broadly include settlement patterns and structures 
(madda, dheeda, olla etc), laws and regulations (seera), customary principles and practices 
(aada), and the whole range of socio-environmental, political-economy considerations and 
strategies that influence policy and decisions regarding access to land resources. Traditionally 
and functionally, land and range resources in Boorana are organized in the following 
territorial and tenurial order. Madda, literally refers to aquifer, indicating permanent water 
source.
13 In the case of Boorana, it normally refers to clusters of wells such as Tula Sagalani 
(the ancient nine wells complex in Boranaland, southern Ethiopia, well known for their rich 
source of water) or springs in the bed of seasonal rivers, which provide adequate access to 
water for human and livestock consumption. 
   In the context of Boorana land tenure, madda encompasses collections of villages that 
not only have access to well clusters and other range resources but also contain some 
significant bundles of rights and claims, privileges and liabilities, which emanate from how 
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the resources are used. In other words, madda is a sub-set of the national structure, with 
distinct, autonomous territorial infrastructure that extends its scope of resource governance to 
a wider population. Each madda regulate the utilisation of water, pasture and other communal 
range resources through well organised institutional structures based on that particular 
madda’s sanction subsidiary administrative regulations which in normative principles must 
conform to the ‘higher’ aada-seera Boorana. Each sector has distinct laws that are 
promulgated at a national level by the Legislative Assembly or Gummi Gaayoo (it sits every 
eight years to review laws and other important affairs of the Boorana nation) which cannot be 
altered by madda or other sub-national structures until and unless the Assembly sanctions the 
changes as amendment. For example, a sectoral law and custom, aadaa-seera bisaani, 
regulates utilisation and management of water resources. 
2.3 On the Periphery of the Empires 
Boorana colonial contact, compared to that of the Maasai, was remote and less 
dramatic.  The two experiences were in marked contrast to each other, especially in the early 
part of colonial establishment. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the Maasai’s initial contact with the 
colonial administration in the early twentieth century turned out to be intensely enmeshed in 
controversies over land. Under the guise of mutual agreements, Maasai were removed from 
their homeland in the sprawling central Rift Valley and ended up in drier areas reserved for 
their resettlement.
14 Boorana, like other northern pastoralists, did not face such drastic 
measures as the Maasai. For the most part of the colonial period the northern pastoralists such 
as Somali, Boorana and Turkana, who were early in the colonial period lumped together as 
Northern Frontier Province (later renamed Northern Frontier Districts, NFD), remained as 
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outlying colonial stations. The Northern Frontier District Commission vividly captured the 
situation as follows: 
Until the agitation for secession began there was hardly any political activity in the Northern 
Frontier District. The population was mainly preoccupied with the struggle for existence and 
was largely unaffected by Kenya politics in the south.
15 
The Boorana, in common with other Oromo-speaking groups such as Orma and Wardai, who 
currently live in the coastal district of Tana River, were sometimes known as “Galla” during 
the colonial period.
16 The Boorana’s first contact with the European and other foreign 
travellers coincided with the partition of Africa. The Boorana were by that time also drawn 
into the enraging competitions between the British, Abyssinians and Italians.  
  Before the British colonial administration was established in the area, a number of the 
Boorana had already settled in the adjacent lowlands of Kenya, locally known as golbo (the 
lowland grazing areas). However, the majority of people were entrapped eventually in   
Menelik’s side of the borders where the occupying army made it difficult for the people to 
interact between the two evolving states. The Abyssinian rulers instituted a system called 
naftanya gabar (lord-serf) which was a patron-client relationship where the indigenous people 
paid tribute to the armed settlers.
17 The Boorana recall that the Menelik conquest took place 
during the gada  (reign) of Adii Dooyyoo Jiiloo.
18 Menelik granted the whole of the 
Booranaland to his famous military general and later Minister of War, fitawrari Hapte 
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17 Ta’a T (2002) Bribing the Land: An Appraisal of Farming Systems of Macca Oromo in Wallagga, pp. 97-113. 
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Georgis, as reward for his successful execution of the battle of Adua against the Italians in 
1896.
19 It was purely a military outpost appended to the empire, with no civil administration 
or respect for communal civil rules. Many Boorana had to cross to British East Africa in order 
to escape what was described as harsh and repressive Abyssinian rule. Wilfred Thesinger 
wrote about what he had witnessed in 1913, a decade after the Boorana conquest by the 
Menelik army: 
... the government divided all Boran as serfs or bondsmen among the soldiers, giving each 
officer and man so many families to support him...The native is obliged to pay a definite 
amount yearly in cash, kind and labour to his master, he is master, he is forbidden to leave his 
village, and consequently ...from being a freeman he has sunk to be the slave of Abyssinians.
20  
In the early period of the Protectorate administration the focus was on securing the 
boundary with the Abyssinians to form a bulwark against the southern expansion of the 
Abyssinians and  Italians in the area. The region was annexed to the protectorate with the 
conclusion of Anglo-Abyssinian boundary agreements
21. The administration conducted 
reconnaissance expeditions with the aim of ascertaining areas to be added to the protectorate. 
For example Major C.W.Gwynn undertook a long exploratory journey in 1908 from the  tip of 
the Gulf of Aden through swathes of land in Somali and Galla (Oromo) countries, to the shore 
of Lake Rudolf ( Lake Turkana)  and the border of the Sudan. This particular episode signifies 
the rudimentary ‘hands-off’ strategy used to deal with pastoral areas. One such  boundary 
delimitation journey was elaborately described as follows:  
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It will be remembered that in the year 1902-3 Mr. A. Butler...organized an expedition to 
explore the southern frontier region of Abyssinia. Captain P. Maud....was attached to the 
expedition to carry out survey operations, and to make recommendations for the future frontier 
line.... A treaty based on Captain Maud's recommendations was concluded in 1907, defining in 
general terms the boundary between Abyssinia and our colonies of British East Africa and 
Uganda. It also provided for the settlement of the boundary in detail by a delimitation 
commission; and in May, 1908, I was appointed to carry out the work of delimitation. The 
frontier to be examined and marked out extended from the junction of the rivers Ganale and 
Daua in the east, to the southern terminal of the Sudan-Abyssinian boundary...
22 
The British colonial authorities in practice divided the territories into ecological zones, 
where the settler commercial farming activities were given preferences over the African 
subsistence economies. The other reserves that were contiguous to European settlement, later 
attracted the attention of the authorities and plans for agricultural development were put in in 
place. The pastoral areas were ignored and even suppressed on the basis of existing policy 
that favoured  agriculture based economy. 
2.4 Conflicts and Shrinking Land resources  
Many historical accounts have referred to the widespread presence and influence of the 
Boorana or Galla in the East African region before the advent of European powers in the region.  
Norman Leys, a colonial civil servant who wrote about Maasai during the early colonial period had 
this to say: “About a hundred years ago the Galla thus rose to power in Eastern Africa only to sink 
again before exact knowledge could be got of them.
23 Elspeth Huxley, an influential settler, wrote a 
detailed account about the Boorana contact with Lord Delamere during his 1896-1897 journeys 
through their land.
24  However, with the partition of territories between the colonising powers, 
including the Abyssinians, the Boorana found themselves under two or more competing powers. By 
the turn of the nineteenth century, Boorana had begun losing their grip over their land resources as 
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European weaponry proliferated in the region. Imposition of colonial rule on the Boorana compounded 
the increasing pressure from westward Somali expansion at the beginning of the second half of the 
nineteenth century.
25 The situation became worse with the proliferation of arms, which mainly 
empowered the Italian supported Somali pastoralists. The British administration did not take as keen 
an interest in the area as the Italians did.  
Lord Delamere and an American traveler who was the first to traverse the region, Dr. 
Donaldson-Smith, blamed the British for allowing Ethiopians and Italians to unleash havoc in the 
region.
26 The British colonial rule was established among the Boorana around 1905, when 
Philip Zaphiro opened British posts in Moyale and later at Marsabit in 1919.
27 The British 
took control of the Boorana that lived on their side of the border.  Such administrative control 
contributed to further weakening of the Boorana in managing their rangeland resources. The 
Protectorate administration was mainly preoccupied with law and order on the borderlands that had 
hosted various competing interests both at local levels and between colonising powers. Locally, 
Boorana were disadvantaged by the British policy that stopped them from using mounted horses to 
ward off the rival groups that encroached on their land.
28  
The imperial powers did not involve the already subdued Boorana community when 
the British and the Ethiopians demarcated the boundaries between themselves. However, 
when they signed the agreement in 1907, provision was made for the partitioned Boorana to 
have unrestricted access to resources on either side of the frontier. Unfortunately, the 
Ethiopians flouted the spirit of the agreement by stopping Boorana from the British side to 
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access pasture and water on the opposite side.
29 The restrictions not only diminished drought 
coping strategies of the pastoral Boorana but also disrupted the pre-existing communal land 
tenure practice that was premised on shared resources and social networks. This marked the 
beginning of the diminishing pastoral resources of the Boorana. Access to resources was the 
bedrock of their livestock based economy, which in turn was the source of livelihoods. The 
partition of the community under the Ethiopia and British territorial superstructure altered 
their resource governing system, as the decision no longer resided with them. The acclaimed 
territorial powers affected the local institutions and governance systems, especially weakening 
the responses to such issues as conflict between antagonistic ethnic groups. 
However, the most challenging factor, which had an enduring impact on the Boorana 
resource borders, was the rising power of the Somalis in the 19
th century. With acquisition of 
modern weaponry from the Italians, the balance of power in the region among the local 
pastoralists shifted in favour of Somali. Unlike the Abyssinians, they fell under the control of 
three Europeans powers. However, the Abyssinians, shrewdly made use of the Europeans 
powers to gain access to weapons. The influx of the Somali in the region began with 
migration to the south of the river Juba after 1860. According to Gufu Oba, the expansion of 
the Somali was largely triggered by internal clans and sub-clans conflicts and competition 
over access to grazing land. He suggested that the pastoralists devise a control mechanism of 
grazing access by ensuring effective occupation of an area, which gave a particular group a 
head start over the others.
30 Subsequent conflicts regarding grazing resources by neighbours 
                                                 
29 Oba, G (2000) “Where the bulls fight, it is the grass that suffers the impact of border administration on 
drought-coping strategies of the Obbu Booran during the 20th century. Journal of Oromo studies 7(1&2) 87-108. 
30 Oba, G (1996) op.cit,p.127 43 
 
was countered either by invocation of prior investment in other labour-intensive assets such as 
wells and salt mines or alternatively by mounting organised defence. To emphasise the point 
that proliferation of arms played a critical role in the reconfiguration of resource borders, Oba 
quotes Ian Lewis, a renowned scholar on Somali, who stated as follows: 
Thus in all cases of contested ownership, claimants lay stress upon the energy, labour and 
expense involved in their construction. And when not in use wells which are the sole property 
of individuals are usually covered over...Yet despite their existence and wide recognition, 
specific rights to water can only be upheld by force of arms...While pasture is thus not owned, 
and clans do not occupy determination territories at all seasons of the year, usage backed by 
effective fighting potential... creates some degree of customary association with particular 
areas.
31 
The conflicts between Boorana and the expanding Somalis was bound to occur in the 
borderlands  between the lowlands escarpment of Golbo and Wajir areas where Boorana had 
established symbiotic relations with Ajuran in developing grazing settlement. The presence of 
numerous wells with an abundance of water attracted the Somali in the area. In the face of 
impending conflicts, the British administration was faced with the dilemma of how to deal 
with claims by the Somali over the area. The British, bogged down by the Somali resistance 
in the British Somaliland from 1893 to approximately 1920, were wary of engaging the 
Somali in another costly war. In the end, the authorities, on the pretext of grazing control, 
decided to move the Boorana out of the area and enforced strict compliance to redrawn 
boundary they called the Somali-Galla line.
32 The British Government had earlier moved the 
Orma from Wajir District across the Tana River to avoid clashes with the Somalis. The 
British conveniently overlooked the decree it had made in 1909 forbidding the Somalis from 
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crossing the Somali-Galla line after the pressure from Somalis changed the course of their 
grazing regulation.
33 
Matters became worse for the Boorana when the Italians defeated the Ethiopians in 
1935-1936 and occupied the region. Castagno suggests this unexpected turn of event 
motivated the Italians to plan for the absorption of the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD) into 
a ‘Greater Somalia’ scheme that would have made it the supreme power in the region.
34 In 
what looked like a strategy towards that goal, the Italians recruited irregular local forces 
known as ‘banda’ (or bandits) to force the Boorana and other local groups to submit to their 
rule. The Boorana were particularly perceived as being sympathetic to Ethiopians and 
therefore singled out for harassment.  ‘Banda’ outstations were put up in several settlements 
on the Ethiopian side to enforce orders that were made to restrict Boorana movement.
35  
The Italian geopolitical strategy that was aimed at the Ethiopians and the British 
caught up with Boorana. This had two major implications for the Boorana. Firstly, they 
Boorana virtually lost their grazing land to the now powerful Somalis who had the backing of 
the Italians. The British policy of security control favoured the Somalis whom the British had 
pacified rather than stretch their limited personnel to ransack the vast region. Secondly, as a 
result this weakened position of the Boorana resource management institutions became less 
relevant as government usurped the role of enforcer of laws.  In the absence of clear land 
policy by the colonial powers, violence became an established norm in the northern region. 
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The Boorana, who until much later did not have access to modern weaponry, were unable to 
defend their land. Conflict and warfare has since become an instrument that defines land 
tenure rights in northern Kenya as the state, in most cases appears to be overwhelmed or not 
seriously committed to intervene. 
 One of the features of African customary land tenure systems, including that of the 
Boorana, was the possibility to exclude those without access rights.
36 However, with the 
declined powers of custodians of commons, confusion reigned in many pastoral areas during 
the colonial time. As discussed in Chapter 2 the colonial project was centred in the 
agriculturally established highlands. In reality the government was exclusively focused on the 
so called high potential areas and did not pay much attention to Boorana and other 
pastoralists. What indeed became the paramount concern of the government was the policy 
aimed at containing pastoralists. Colonial garrisons and administrative outposts dotted the 
northern regions as a bulwark against the pastoralists’ movement. The assumption was that 
‘national’ security of the Protectorate was paramount in the administration of the region. For 
example, the Northern Frontier District was declared a ‘closed area’ under the Outlying 
District Ordinance in 1926.
37 Movement in and out of the northern region was restricted and 
those who were permitted to travel had to carry special passes.  
The Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance of 1934, and Stock Theft and 
Produce Ordinance of 1933 gave the provincial administration extensive powers to arrest, 
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detain, and seize property of ‘hostile tribes’ in the northern region and other pastoral areas.
38 
This detached and seemingly ‘separate’ policy approach made an American writer, James 
Negley Farson, whilst travelling in the region in 1950, to comment that the northern region 
was “one half of Kenya about which the other half knows nothing and seems to care even 
less.”
39    
2.5 Maasai Socio-political Transformation. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Maasai began their migration from the lower Nile 
Valley around the fifteenth century. Much of the historical and ethnographical accounts refer 
to their predominant presence in East Africa by the eighteenth century.
40 Without access to 
‘collective memory’ of their primordial cultural and political organisations, much of what we 
know today is a complex web of many transformations that the Maasai went through since 
their arrival in the region. Sutton argues that usable oral traditions of the Maasai relating to 
the period before 1800 A.D did not exist.
41 Many writers, mainly European ethnographers and 
anthropologists, agree that Maasai’s expansion in the region was assisted by their conquest 
and assimilation with the neighbouring communities. Above all their incredible assimilative 
strategies contributed to the contemporary identity of the Maasai. In their seminal work many 
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social anthropologists, linguistics and ethnographers described the process of Maasai cultural 
and social transformation as ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ Maasai.
42  Spears and Waller observe 
that the early history of Maasai migration into the Rift Valley was based on accommodation 
and adaptation. The Maasai, according to them, produced “successive groups establishing, 
themselves beside, and intermixing with existing populations to produce the palimpsest of 
pluralist communities...”
43 Richard Waller vividly describes the Maasai integration process 
not just as assimilative, but also ‘replicative’, which showed a high level of interaction with 
other tribes or clans.
44  
The Maasai, in common with the Boorana and other pastoral communities had been 
defined and shaped by their ‘movement’ in search of better grazing land and other ecological, 
climatic conditions that provided for their livestock. During the formative years of the Maasai, 
settlement in the Rift Valley was thus interpreted as “rapid social, institutional and ritual 
development of self-conscious ethnicities as much as actual territorial expansion.”
45 The 
expansion coupled with a pastoral production system that involved hundreds of thousands if 
not millions of livestock, came to define the Maasai identity. The movement, which was not 
just a linear physical process of migration but involved many elements of settlements, 
conquests, displacement, and intermarriages with other ethnic groups ensured continued 
reconstruction of Maasai identity. In other words, the evolutionary nature of the Maasai 
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identity that of ‘Becoming’ took centre stage in the development and consolidation of pastoral 
systems in areas that later became the theatre of colonial land crisis.
46 By the nineteenth 
century, Maasai had developed formidable military and social organisation to secure land 
resources in the expansive Rift Valley and contiguous areas. Their way of life depended on 
maintaining military superiority in comparison with their neighbours that formed the basis of 
their defence as well as a threat to others.
47 The Maasai territorial units were gradually 
coalesced in the central Rift Valley where the combination of undulating ranges and savannah 
plains that were traversed by dependable streams provided the Maasai with immortalised and 
unrivalled pastoral sanctuary. It was here in the Great Rift Valley, that the Maasai developed 
what John Galaty calls “specialized pastoralism.”
48 He observes the fact about the centrality 
of the Rift Valley, which not only provided a north-south axis of Maasai settlement but also 
created easy access for future expansion in any direction.
49 Galaty further recognises the 
diverse ecological and economic attributes of the Rift valley when he states that; “It is 
transacted by the actual semi-arid valley but includes highland forests and plateaus, and it is 
integrated into a single system through mobile resource use or trade.”
50 Until their removal 
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from the Rift Valley by the colonial authorities, the Maasai played an important role in the 
evolution of the Rift Valley as a regional economic and political hub.  
The Maasai, unlike Boorana and many other pastoral groups (with partial exception of 
Somali and Gabbra) are divided into autonomous sectional and territorial units. Galaty 
contends that in the past, the divisions were based on larger alliance with prominent sections 
forming a sort of confederacy.
51 The four major alliances were the Kisongo, Loitai, Kaputiei, 
and Purko ‘clusters’, generated and regenerated by assimilation, expansion and migration. It 
was asserted that by the middle of the eighteenth century, two expanding vanguard groupings 
reflected the political and economic spectrum of the Maasai in Rift Valley. The first group, 
included the Damat, Keekonyoike, Loitai, and Matapato in the central Rift and the second 
group were comprised of Kaputiei, Loodokilani, Dalalekutuk, Salei, Loitayiok, Serenget and 
Siria.
52 The first group had concentrated their settlement in central Rift Valley where they 
became the dominant force for at least a hundred years until the advent of the colonial rule. 
The second group were more dispersed and dominated the plains adjacent to the other 
sections. There was also a third group who were referred to as ‘frontier Maasai’ because of 
their distance from the rest of the other sections.
53  They included the Loogolala/Parakuyo, 
Uas Nkishu, Losekelai, Laikipiak and Samburu. These sections occupied areas that lie deep in 
northern Kenya and central Tanzania.   
 
                                                 
51 Galaty, supra, p.70. 
52 Ibid, p.72. 
53 Ibid. 50 
 
2.6 Maasai Land Resources 
Maasai, as we have indicated above, were organised in territorial units based on 
sectional and clans alliance. I have also mentioned that Maasai migration and expansion over 
the years was underpinned by the need to access better pasturage and water for their livestock. 
The social and political structure of the Maasai was therefore influenced by an ethos of self-
reliance and protection of land rights. The territorial unit formed the most important basis for 
land tenure rights and tenure access. The Maasai, through their livestock production system 
and the assertiveness required to manage overlapping interests associated with pastoralism, 
had inculcated collective behaviour of land protection based on age-sets organisation.
54 In 
congruence with other pastoral communities, the Maasai practised communal land use. 
According to Naomi Kipuri, a scholar who has done extensive research on pastoral 
development, states that “… defined community assumes usufructuary rights to a given 
territory.” She further explains, “Each Community knew its boundaries although access to 
territories belonging to others was mutually negotiated.”
55 As a precaution against the widely 
held misconception about ‘communal’ land tenure arrangement, she points out that it is 
different from ‘open access,’ which unlike communal tenure may not confer discrete rights 
and obligation on users.
56  Garret Hardin is blamed for having confused the difference 
between the two tenure practices, hence coming up with a theory that postulates “the tragedy 
                                                 
54 See Galaty (1993) supra, p.80. 
55 Kipury, Ole, N (1991) The Scramble for Maasailand: Age, Gender and Class in the Case of No Precedents 
56 Ibid. 51 
 
of the commons,”
57 which is widely believed to have influenced governments’ policy towards 
pastoral communities in the region. 
John Galaty further argues that age-sets are critically important in responding to 
exigencies of pastoral subsistence production systems, which were and still are prone to 
resource-based conflicts.
58 The Maasai age-sets are constituted over time. A new age-division 
(Olporror or olporo) is opened every seven years, a successive pair of divisions forming an 
age-set (Olaji) on a fourteen-year cycle.
59 Alternative age-sets form ‘streams’ which link 
older and younger in relation to authority and political affinity.  Age-sets, based on time, cut 
across units of residential organisation from neighbourhoods to sections and territorial 
boundaries. The most pronounced age-sets that were bound by obligations to protect Maasai 
land and property are the Morans (ol murran) whose lives were engaged in camps 
Imanyat).and scouting. 
The Maasai were in the league of other pastoral communities as far as social and 
political organisation was concerned. The pastoralists were an autochthonous society 
practising highly decentralised form of social and political organisation before the advent of 
colonial rule, which eroded the systems. Perhaps, to emphasise the centrality of the system in 
pastoral set up, Navaya Ole Ndaskoi, states that Maasai Laibon were viewed by the 
community as leaders but not rulers.
60 He outlines that for every sub-tribe each group had a 
leader, Olaigwanani (pl.Olaigwanak) ‘elected’ by the majority of the members in an assembly 
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of that particular group.
61 The leaders of each group assume the role of spokespersons and not 
rulers, who are mandated with coordinating activities of the groups for the purpose of the 
community welfare. Land and secure access to resources is one of the major obligations of the 
group leaders and the members. They are the appropriate channels to deal with weighty issues 
that impinge on critical communal assets such as land. Ndaskoi argues that it was wrong to 
engage mediceman (Iloibonok) like the British did with Oloibon Lenana during the removal 
of Maasai from central Rift valley in early Twentieth century.
62 
The following Chapter will examine how the imposition of the British colonial rule 
and subsequent policy and institutional changes has radically affected the indigenous land 
tenure relations. The chapter traces the historical path of the colonial land tenure regimes and 
how the dominant position of the settlers has influenced land policy direction beyond the 
colonial period. With the exception of the brief period between 1903 and 1913, when Maasai 
land was alienated to the settlement of Europeans, the pastoral communities did not feature 
prominently in colonial administrative affairs. The government focus was on sedentarised 
agricultural reserves.
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CHAPTER 3 
Kenya: A Colonial Construct and its Land Legacy 
3.1 The Scramble and Sphere of Influence 
 Contemporary grievances and crises about land in many societies in Africa are rooted 
in indigenous peoples’ encounters with European colonialism in the nineteenth century. The 
dominant European powers of the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese had already 
occupied other parts of the world such as the Americas, Asia, and Pacific countries before 
extending their venture to Africa. Many of those territories and regions fell under the British, 
whose imperial expansion reached its zenith of power and prestige during the reign of Queen 
Victoria.
1 The European nations, led by Britain were motivated by relative economic 
developments that began towards the end of the seventeenth century that in turn bolstered 
their military, communication and diplomatic strategies to expand their imperial ventures 
across the world.  
The so-called ‘partition of Africa’ was in fact fragmenting Africa into separate 
political entities of indigenous societies under the control of European powers.   Colonial 
occupation was preceded by commercial companies formed in Europe and chartered for the 
purpose of administering acquired territories, called ‘sphere of influence’ on behalf of their 
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governments.
2 The ‘sphere of influence’ eventually came under the grip of established 
authorities based in territories that were gradually demarcated to avoid conflicts between 
European powers. The process that began in 1884 and 1885 at the Berlin Conference saw 
powerful European powers, namely; the British, Germans and French acquiring the largest 
shares of land.
3 The political map as we know it today did not exist before imperial powers 
had set  foot in indigenous peoples’ territories. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg observe that, 
“the borders were usually defined not by African political fact or geography, but rather by 
international rules of continental partition and occupation established for that purpose.”
4  
Ralph Austen further states that “Africa is perhaps the most ‘mapped’ of the world major 
regions.”
5 
The nineteenth century British colonialism, dubbed as the ‘Late Victorian acquisitions 
of new dependencies’ in Africa, saw a policy shift from an earlier period when the Imperial 
Government opposed any formal expansion in the continent.
6  Government officials and 
prospective European migrants later realised that the territories were important for their 
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economic benefits. Africa, contrary to what was earlier thought, as “inhospitable obstruction... 
for unhealthy quick profit, became target for permanent occupation.”
7 The perception that the 
continent was not worth investing in was rife even among the policy makers at the Foreign 
Office before the 1880s.  To many policy and political advisors, Africa was but a ‘worthless 
possession’ that could not pass the test of a rigorous economic rational. The sceptics gave 
advice to the government not to make serious political and commercial investment in Africa.
8 
Many theories have been postulated to explain Britain’s sudden change in attitude but the 
main one was international rivalry, which ultimately led to the partition of Africa among the 
European powers.
9 The early colonial architects, including Frederick Lugard, had fiercely 
supported linking of the new acquisitions to the British economic system once it was opened 
up for settlement. Reports from explorers and missionaries who did extensive investigations 
on the social, political and economic conditions prevailing at the time contributed to the 
policy shift, especially in Britain.
10  
Like many of its African colonial acquisitions, the British Imperial Government’s 
involvement in Kenya was initially slow and tentative. Although the policy-makers had 
agreed to safeguard their interests in the new acquisitions, they preferred to restrict their 
involvement to the bare minimum to avoid a costly administrative structure. A few pioneering 
parties of colonial administrators and expeditionist military bands were sent to man strategic 
                                                 
7 See Mungeam, G.H.(1966), The British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912, p.7 
8 For a comprehensive understanding of the debates by the British officialdom,  see The Cambridge History of 
the British Empire, Vol.III, 1959 ( in particularly chapters IV, V and VIII). 
 
9 Palley, C (1966) The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 with Special Reference 
to Imperial Control, pp 2-4. 
10 Ibid, Introduction, xx. 56 
 
camps, outposts and stations from where outreach to ‘native tribes’ were made. From those 
garrisoned camps and stations the Company and Protectorate agents made exploratory trips to 
find inland routes and navigational waterways, to enhance trade and administration.
11   
Although for Britain, some of these activities sent signals to other European powers, 
of its intentions to keep the ‘sphere of influence’, it was still unclear about the form of 
jurisdictions it wanted to exercise. It was also undecided on the nature of political structures it 
was going to establish. The British were well aware, based on their previous experiences in 
other dominions, that the nature of governance employed would determine the level of its 
political and financial commitments. M.P.K. Sorrenson, one of the leading historians on the 
European settlement in Kenya, broadly observed the government dilemma at the time as 
follows: 
Because of its peculiar geography and variations in climate Kenya seemed to represent a 
confluence of several streams of colonial development, temperate and tropical.  This was to be the 
cause of many of the troubles, which beset the country. No one was sure whether it was a temperate 
colony of settlement, which would become self-governing like Australia, New Zealand and South 
Africa, or tropical plantation colony with a handful of Europeans planters dominating the economy.
12 
It was clear from the start that climatic and ecological patterns of different parts of the 
acquired territories were going to influence land policy direction to be adapted by the 
occupying British authorities... What mattered to the government and settlers were the 
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potentialities of land resources. From their early activities it was apparently evident that their 
intention was to establish the parts of the ‘country’ that would be strategic to their long-term 
economic interests. The pioneer administrators were set to play the leading role in 
determining what kind of legal and institutional framework was going to be put in place. The 
combined efforts of the explorers, missionaries, settlers and imperial builders later paid off as 
a territorial entity gradually evolved to one of the hubs of the colonial ventures in Africa. 
3.2 Kenya as Planters’ Frontier 
British travellers and explorers saw the interior of territories that later became Kenya 
as a potentially important agricultural colony suitable for settlement. By the mid nineteenth 
century, the pioneer travelers’ had traversed the territories from the coast to Lake Victoria and 
from the north to the southern highlands.
13 Their reports enthusiastically presented the region 
as important for commercial centres, large scale agriculture and pastoral production. The 
government was still keen to confirm the situation before taking steps to act on the numerous 
reports coming from the interior. Frederick Lugard was among the trusted lieutenants whose 
experience in Africa was recognised among his peers. He travelled throughout the region and 
confirmed that the highlands of East Africa were reliably conducive to commercial 
agriculture, emphasising the fertility of the soil and adequate rainfall.
14 For example, he 
described the areas that were later to be known as ‘White Highlands’ to have unlimited room 
for the location of agricultural settlement or stock-rearing farms....the new industries in 
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government theough such organisations as Royal Geographical Society to carry out investigations of these areas. 
They had filed reports that covered all aspects of climatic conditions to soil, vegations, wildlife and mineral 
resources.  Anthropoligists and sociologists historiographers were uses to stady African social and cultural 
behaviours nad possibility of ‘taming them’. Pioneer travellers like Lord Delamere were convinced about 
economic prospects of the regioned and decided to settle, thereby attracting thoussands more to follow suit.   
14 See generally Lugard, F.D (1929) The Rise of Our East Africa Empire. Frank Cass. London. 58 
 
coffee, tea, indigo, fibre, tobacco, wheat, cotton and a hundred other tropical and sub-tropical 
products could be inaugurated here....and their success should rival or eclipse that of the Shire 
Highlands.
15  
 Lugard, as one of the pioneer architects of colonial administration, was well aware of the 
economic opportunities these territories could offer Britain and its citizens.  Economists and other 
experts have long provided empirical evidence, to support economic rationale of imperialism and 
colonisation.  Richard Wolff provided statistical evidence, which showed that the British imperial 
intervention in the region was triggered by economic consideration.
16 He contended that changing 
international trade in the nineteenth century forced Britain to seek further expansion of its market.  The 
British sources of raw materials, particularly those required for textile and steel industries, had been 
subjected to increased competition from other European countries and North America. Wolff argues 
that American or American-controlled sources of supply became unreliable because of hostile tariffs 
and speculative practices of intermediaries making import costs for Britain inordinately high. Wolff 
observes that, “…after 1870s the acquisitions of the new Empire commended itself to British 
statesmen as an economically reasonable course of action.”
17 Africa and other parts of the continent, 
including East Africa thus became a strategic option for British investors and policy makers if they 
had to maintain the momentum that was spurred by the Industrial Revolution. 
Lugard in his writing clearly confirmed the argument made by Wolff that Britain was 
forced to re-evaluate their international trade after facing stiff competition from America and 
the European countries like Germany. He tried to justify why the shift from America was 
important in financial terms when he specifically gave an example of coffee supply, which he 
                                                 
15 Lugard, F.D. (1893), The Rise of our East Africa Empire, p.421. The Shire Highlands were in Malawi, then 
known as Nyasaland. 
16 Wolff, R.D (1972) British Imperialism in East Africa Slave Trade: Science and Society, pp28-29, Table 1: 27. 
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said could be obtained in East Africa. He summarised the benefits accruable from the new 
acquisition as follows: 
It has been stated that we pay forty millions yearly to America for our supply of raw cotton 
and yet confronted by hostile tariffs and fluctuations of supply. If it should be proved that 
throughout East Africa...cotton of the best quality can be grown, it would be a very great gain 
to Lancashire trade.
18  
Determined to convince the policy makers that the highlands of East Africa could rival 
any of the British traditional markets across the globe he emphasised that there would be no 
shortfall, including the possibility of a fruit export similar to that of New Zealand and 
California.
19  
It did not take long for Britain to venture into the acquired territories of the indigenous 
communities. Although the nineteenth century imperial and colonial move was radical and 
massive in its scope, covering the unknown interior of Africa, the concept was not new. Small 
nations such as Portugal, Spain and Holland had already experimented with occupation of 
foreign lands for hundreds of years before they were joined by British and French  in the 
‘New World’ in the seventeenth century. The British, probably having learned a lesson from 
their own Anglo-American colonies, were careful in its occupation of acquired territories in 
East Africa, lest financial and administrative costs became too demanding.  However, the 
pioneer administrators and settlers were in a hurry to stamp their authority over land and 
indigenous people. They did not want or even expect to be constrained by their own rules of 
jurisdiction.  Proponents of the settlement argued and convinced the British government that it 
was essential to prioritise effective control over territories to ensure that their strategic and 
                                                 
18 Lugard, Supra,, pp.408-409. 
19 Ibid, p.419. 
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economic interests were secured.
20  Norman Leys, a colonial civil servant who was critical of 
the settlement policy had this to say: ‘It seems quite incredible to us that Europeans were invited to 
Kenya as planters and farmers without investigation beforehand of native rights in land and without 
making of any arrangements for their settlement.’
21 
It was quite evident that Britain was more concerned with establishing its foothold in the area, 
rather than musing over the implication of its action and the long-term impact on the 
indigenous people. The only worry it had was about the extent and nature of its commitment, 
financially and administratively. That was why Britain decided, notwithstanding its apparent 
unpreparedness, to send a company to acquire and manage tribes and territories on its behalf.  
 3.3 Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC), 1888-1895 
As stated, the dilemma that faced the British government was not whether to venture 
into the region or not but what form of administration it had to deploy. The reason for this was 
simple. Whatever intervention Britain had decided was determined by any financial 
commitment it was going to make. According to historians, the government’s lukewarm 
approach was not wholly surprising.  The parliament and public opinion was oblivious of 
government massive investments in overseas colonial ventures whose returns were 
guaranteed.
22 The parliament emphasised the need to keep the expenses to the minimum and 
did not allow increases in the estimates.
23 This consideration largely explained why the 
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p.9. ACT Press. African Centre for Technological Studies. Nairobi. 
21 Leys, N (1926) Kenya, p.113. Third Edition, Leornard and Virginia Woolf. 
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Reference to Imperial Control  
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government ‘delegated’ its sovereign powers to a chartered company, the Imperial British 
East Africa Company (IBEAC).
24  
The company immediately assumed its delegated role of an administrator of the 
British territories by signing treaties with the Sultan of Zanzibar in which ‘all rights to land in 
his territory excepting private land were ceded to the company.’ The company signed a fifty-
year lease with the Sultan, and in principle, the areas along the 10 mile coastal strip and the 
hinterland came under the Company ‘rule’.
25 According to the Founders’ agreement, the 
Company was  
to acquire from rulers, chiefs, or others, within, the districts reserved for British sphere of 
influence and elsewhere in Africa (with due observance of international obligations) lands, 
territories, and stations, with or without sovereign rights, by concession, purchase, or 
otherwise, and to administer and govern the same and to exercise all the powers and rights 
incidental thereto...
26  
.From the content of the Royal Charter
27 petitioned by the IBEAC, it is quite clear that 
its role was entangled in overlapping interests, that of a profit-making entity and of an empire 
builder. There was no fine line drawn between the dual mandates of the company. The 
Company was ‘to carry into effect... grants, concessions, agreements, and treaties within the 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
24 IBEAC was chartered on 3 September 1888, to operate in terrotories which were within the sphere of British 
influence acknowledged by an Anglo-German Treaty 1886. 
25 See Mungeam, G.H(1970) Kenya:Select Historical Documents1884-1923, pp.60-62; Singh, C(1965) The 
Rupublican Constitution of Kenya: Historical Background and Analysis. The International and Camporative Law 
Quarterly, pp.878-879. As we have noted earlier the Company’s interactions with the Sultan appeared to have 
been consummated by their  past relationships based on extensive business dealings.  
26 I.B.E.A. Co. Founders’ Agreement, April 18, 1888. 
27 I.B.E.A. Co. Royal Charter, September 3, 1888. The pettition which was granted by the Government in 
October of the same year was a long and ambivalent document that gove the Company  extensive powers to 
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districts already reserved for British sphere of influence and elsewhere...with view to   
promoting trade, commerce, and good government in the territories and regions’
28  There was 
apparently no legal framework that explicitly and systematically guided the IBEAC to 
concurrently carry out those duties.  As it subsequently happened, the Company was within a 
short period overwhelmed by its role of an empire builder and forced to revert the territories 
to the government in 1895.  
The company also went into numerous treaties with the local chiefs to allow it to 
assume occupation and management of resources in their respective areas. The actions were 
also pre-emptive in the sense that once the British government agent entered the area, other 
competitors, especially Germany was expected not to interfere with those areas in which the 
Company had its operation. The Company was ideally pushing the frontier of the sphere to 
the north, towards the interior, which later proved crucial to the British colonial settlement. 
The groundwork by the Company had brought many different areas occupied by indigenous 
communities together with the aim of creating a territorially integrated ‘country’ built on the 
foundation already laid by the leased coastal strip. The company, with the support of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar, drew the future architecture of the colonial structure. The 10 miles Coastal 
strip, which was recognised in international law as part of Sultan’s suzerainty, was ceded to 
the Company in 1888. The territories that laid between Tana delta and Juba in the semi-arid 
northern part was also explored and retained by the company.  
The other region which was generally referred to as the ‘interior’ constituted large tracts of 
land stretching from the coast to Lake Victoria basin in the west. The Kikuyu, Kamba ad 
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Maasai countries and the Rift Valley covered the central regions, which were linked to 
surrounding areas. The Imperial British East Africa Company began the process of treaties 
with local chiefs in the interior, paving the way for the expansion of the territory and formal 
occupation by the government.
29  
3.4 Controversies of Jurisdictions 
The most contentious question at the time in other British dependant territories was, how did 
the concept of chartered company and its delegated executive powers to ‘govern’ come into 
being?  When the question of legitimacy arose in 1884 in relation to the role of the Royal 
Niger Company, the Law Officers of the Foreign office in London advised that the Crown 
must enjoy jurisdictions in an area before it was competent to charter a company exercising 
governmental powers and operating within such an area.
30 In other words, the British Imperial 
Government could not justify any action claiming to have vested powers to a third party while 
it was aware that it did not posses such powers. That was why Britain made it clear to the 
Dutch Government in 1879 that by chartering the British North Borneo Company, it had no 
‘present intention’ of assuming dominion or protectorate.
31 The Foreign Secretary Lord 
Granville, made the Government position on the matter unequivocally clear. He stated that the 
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British Government had assumed ‘no sovereign rights whatever in Borneo’ and the Company 
would administer the territories under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Brunei and Sulu.
32  
The international law dimension as to the legality of sovereign powers being exercised 
by the European nations or their appointed agents such as chartered companies became as an 
important aspect of domestic debates. In Britain, Parliament and the Foreign Office went to 
great lengths to discuss the validity of their own Government action in relation to acquired 
territories, which were not yet declared protectorates. In addition to questioning the validity of 
governmental powers granted to a chartered company, the Law Officers went further and 
queried whether the declaration of protectorate would ipso facto confer jurisdiction.
33 In 
territories that became Kenya, this question was not very prominent and it did not deter the 
colonial authorities from undertaking an extensive land alienation policy. Having realised the 
inevitability of its responsibility to keep the territorial possession, the Government worked out 
an arrangement with IBEAC to safeguard the sphere of influence by engaging other rival 
groups such as Germans and Italians. Nevertheless, as John Mugambwa, a land and property 
law scholar has observed, the legal position of the company was not clearly settled, even by 
the time it had handed over the administration to the government.
34 He was of the opinion that 
the clearest exposition surrounding the question of legality was the one made by Sir William 
Harcourt, who argued that: 
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A sphere of influence confers no rights, no authority over the people,...or authority over the 
land of any kind...Every act of force you commit against a native within a sphere of influence 
is an unlawful assault; every acre of land you take is robbery; every native you kill is murder, 
because you have no right and authority over these men, except as in any particular spot may 
have been given you by treaty with any particular Chief
35 
3.5 IBEAC Land Regulations, 1894 
In spite of a cloud of doubt hanging over the company’s legal validity to exercise 
‘governmental’ authority over the sphere of influence, for about seven years it exercised 
powers over land and other resources. Even though there was no significant amount of 
European settlement during the Company’s tenure, it did set the pace for the policy of land 
alienation. Some Indians and a few Europeans were granted land around trade stations and 
garrisons protected by the Company. An English missionary and settler, James Stuart set up a 
fruit farm near Machakos, which became successful and later attracted the attention of other 
Europeans to move into the area.
36 Hundreds of acres were also allocated to the East Africa 
Scottish Industrial Mission at Kibwezi.
37 The Company, which had by 1894 commenced 
surveying land for a proposed railway line, for which it failed to attract funds from the 
government, began to grant land to individuals who applied for purposes of farming or 
building. Some officials became uncomfortable with the policy of haphazard allocations 
which had caused many untold sufferings to the indigenous communities. Some were even 
openly opposed to such policy, arguing that it was not in the best interests of the natives. They 
probably shared the original stance taken by pioneers like Lugard, who once maintained: 
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It has been laid down as a principle from which no civilised government would think of 
departing, that in countries acquired by conquest or cessation, private property, whether of 
individuals or communities, existing at the time of cessation or conquest, is respected.
38 
The Company reacted to this notion of respecting pre-existing rights of the Africans 
by formulating a land policy that would enhance predictability of the actions of agencies. The 
company also wanted to avoid legal complication in future that might put it on a collision 
course with the government.  It came up with a policy contained in Land Regulations, 1894. 
The Regulations provided that: 
For ‘country plots’ on lease not exceeding twenty-one years, but renewable, no fixed rate 
being specified. For grazing leases, not more than 20,0000 acres could be had in one block, 
and the annual rent was one half anna  or ½ d an acre. On agricultural land, leases of not more 
than 2000 acres might be had at a rent of ½ anna an acre for the first five years... Homesteads 
were of 100 acres at a rent of 4 annnas an acre for the first five years, during which occupation 
was compulsory.
39  
Although there was no specific legal authority being vested in the Company to make 
laws and regulations, it might have taken advantage of the broad mandate it was given under 
the Charter to manage land in the area. Unfortunately for the Company and for those who had 
wished to use the regulations for purposes of land accumulation, time was not on their side. 
The Company lasted only a few months and ceased trading before it could implement the 
policy. 
   The Company did not manage to attract European settlement in the region having 
been bogged down by resistance and competition from the Germans. However, as stated 
previously the Imperial British East Africa Company played a pivotal role in the consolidation 
of Britain’s interests in the territories. The Company managed to enter into agreements with 
the Sultan of Zanzibar and acquired interests in land in the coastal strips that provided the 
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base from where further expansion was made into the interior.
40 Although the Company was 
principally a commercial entity, it exercised executive and legislative powers which had 
enabled it to deal with sovereign powers, such as the Kabaka of Buganda to advance the 
British interests in the area.
41  
3.6 Protectorate and Land Policy Debates 
The IBEC officially transferred the territories that were under its control to the British 
government in 1895. The territories came to be known as the East African Protectorate, which 
technically meant that the ‘sphere of influence’ was now under legal authority and protection 
of the British government.
42 However, the government was handicapped to deal with land 
because the Concession that was entered into between the Company and the Sultan of 
Zanzibar was only extended to the ten-mile coastal strip of mainland. Technically, it had no 
power to deal with land outside these areas, particularly since the many treaties concluded by 
IBEAC with indigenous groups did not give rights in land.
43 This was a difficult situation for 
the government because the objective of the administration was to access land and other 
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resources. The government was well aware, through the advice of the Law Officers of the 
Crown that the only option at the time was to make appropriate treaties with indigenous 
peoples.
44  
The option of negotiating treaties or sales with the Africans did not appeal to the 
Protectorate authorities at the time. It was seen as laborious and a waste of time. His 
Majesty’s first Commissioner, Arthur Hardinge, complained to the Foreign Office, under 
which the affairs of Protectorate fell, that making treaties was a mockery, requiring signatures 
of ‘several thousand petty chiefs and headmen.’
45 The possibility of sales was also dismissed 
with the claim that Africans did not have individual titles to land but only occupational rights 
that could be transferred to others. Hardinge had made up his mind not to engage the 
indigenous community in discussing about land and instead made forceful arguments that 
government needed to exercise its power regardless of the consequences it might have on the 
locals. His response to Salisbury, his boss in London, who in March 1896 asked him to obtain 
treaties from the African chiefs, was quite telling of his firm position. He bluntly stated that: 
...abandon altogether, at any rate in Ukamba [Province], the fiction of our acting under 
delegation from, or treaty with, the native chiefs, and simply lay down the principle that her 
majesty, having taken these people under her protection, enacts, in their own interests, that no 
alienation by them, collectively or individually of any lands or other rights, shall be recognised 
by her as valid unless ratified on her behalf by officers to whom she committed the 
Government of the country.
46  
This actually laid down the foundation of the colonial policy in Kenya as the question of 
alienation and control of land became the single most important preoccupation of the government.  
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According to Hardinge and other Protectorate officials, the only way around this 
entanglement was for the Foreign Office to abandon its legalistic approach to the status of the 
Protectorates and assert unlimited powers of the Crown to deal with land.
47  The anticipation 
was that once such powers were asserted, the authorities would formulate legislation that 
would facilitate compulsory acquisition of land to be granted for settlement and agricultural 
purposes. The demand of the local officials in Nairobi at first was not popular with their 
superiors in the Foreign Office who preferred a more cautious approach in dealing with the 
vexing land question. For a while, a heated debate ensued between London and Nairobi over 
not only land policy direction but also treatment of indigenous people.
48 For the local 
authorities, there was another front to deal with. Pressure on them was increasing as potential 
settlers demanded land for commercial and agricultural purposes. 
The Foreign Office was in a quandary and did not have a concrete policy plan. 
According to Sorrenson, it “had little idea of the most appropriate policy and legislation to 
adopt’, other than ‘wanting to sell and lease land’.
49 The debate was often triggered by 
demand made by the few Europeans who had planned to settle in the Protectorate to be 
allocated some free land. For example, in April 1897 Charles Kitchen, an employee of Smith, 
Mackenzie and Company, applied for 10, 000 acres of land at Donyo Sabuk, thirty miles 
north of Nairobi. His intention was to conduct coffee growing experiments on behalf of the 
                                                 
47 The legal term used to refer to Crown power was ‘original title’ or ‘radical title’  which connotes ultimate form 
of ‘dominium’ or effective jurisdiction. 
48 Even before controversial encounters with Africans which included many expenditions and removals such as 
that of the Maasai, the early colonial officials debated about land and settlement without any consultations with 
indigeneous inhabitants. For example, the discussion about settling Indians, Europeans or even Jews in occupied 
territories had not in  one moment mentioned the implications of such actions on the Africans.See Sorrenson, 
M.P.K (1968)  Origins of Euriopean Settlement in Kenya, pp.31-40. 
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firm. He made it clear that he was not going to accept anything less than a freehold. The 
Commissioner of the Protectorate, Sir Hardinge, stood by his position, arguing that supporting 
such an application was necessary to attract bona fide capitalists.
50 The Secretary of Foreign 
Office, Lord Salisbury, allowed the Commissioner to make a special arrangement for Kitchen. 
In a way, this was a victory for Hardinge. He had been putting pressure on London to allow 
European farmers to take up land. To avoid spontaneous intervention on an individual basis, 
the government formulated legal framework that would ensure orderly administration of land, 
especially for future settlement of European farmers. 
  However, the nature and the extent of the Protectorate power to deal with land, 
especially in setting aside land for railways and other purposes was not clear. Furthermore, 
the local authorities were still unsure whether they were obliged to refer  to London whenever 
there was a need to dispose of land for private ownership as demanded by some potential 
settlers. The local officials understood that with legal backings they would have a free hand to 
deal with land without referring to London whenever a decision was required. 
3.7 Declaration of Radical Title. 
Having convinced the officials in London that the interest of the Crown was more 
important than moral indulgence about indigenous rights, the Protectorate authorities focused 
their attention to entrenchment of their power to alienate land. In 1896 the Indian Land 
Acquisition Act, which had been used in Zanzibar, was extended to the interior. As discussed 
earlier, the interior had not been explored extensively compared to the coastal region, which 
had been a bastion of Arab trade for many centuries. The extension of the Act had a political 
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ramification for both the Protectorate authorities and the indigenous communities. The 
indigenous groups who had lived separately and independently in their own territorial borders 
were now under one dominant state power. The Protectorate authorities interpreted the 
extension of political jurisdiction to mean an assumption of ownership of land.
51 There was 
clearly a deliberate shift from the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, which envisaged a limited 
sovereignty as far as land and communities in the acquired territories were concerned. 
Hardinge actually argued that in any case the administration had acquired enormous leverage 
that the territory was His Majesty’s sovereignty except in name.
52 The officials in Nairobi 
strongly propagated the notion that Africans did not own land but only held occupational 
rights, leaving the rest of unoccupied and waste land as property of the Crown.
53 
The Foreign Office eventually pandered to the demand of the Nairobi-based 
protectorate officials and agreed that in accordance with the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 
Her Majesty was empowered to control and dispose of ‘waste’ and ‘unoccupied land’ in the 
Protectorate. The Act provided that, ‘Her Majesty might, if she pleased, declare them to be 
crown lands, or make grants of them to individuals in fee or any term’
54  The underlying 
motive was to pave the way for the settler economy to succeed and, as officials argued, pay 
for the construction of a railway. The role of legislative and institutional frameworks thus 
became the keg in the engine of imperial land administration.  The thinking among the Crown 
law officers was that in the absence of specific legislations, the authorities could apply the 
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Foreign Jurisdiction Act. According to them, the Act allowed agents of Her Majesty to 
exercise power over ‘waste and unoccupied land in protectorates where there was no settled 
form of government and where land had not been appropriated either to the local sovereign or 
to individuals.’
55 This viewpoint heralded the beginning of land tenure regime based on the 
notion of the domain power of the Crown during the colonial period. 
  Under the English doctrine of tenure, the Crown owned all land in England. There 
was no land which was allodial or owned by a subject and not held either directly or indirectly 
by the Crown. The Crown’s title is variously described as the ‘radical’ or ‘absolute’ title.
56 
The doctrine of tenure was introduced in England following the Norman invasion in 1066, 
when William 1 declared all lands in England as his by conquest.
57 Although the English 
Revolution of 1688 abolished much of the outdated system that ended the privileged status, 
the Imperial Government used the notion of ‘radical title’ or ‘Crown ownership’ to alienate 
indigenous land rights.
58 Using the notion of crown land rights, the pioneer agents of the 
government in the acquired territory occupied and expanded the territory to cover large 
swathes of land that later became Kenya.  
3.8 Legal Frameworks, 1897-1901 
To avoid further confusion, the government embarked on formulating some form of 
legislation and regulations that gave the authorities in the Protectorate powers to take control 
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and management of land. The first in a series of laws that empowered the Commissioner of 
the Protectorate as agent of the Crown was the Land Regulations of 1897. It gave the 
Commissioner the power to grant any person a certificate of occupation, authorising him to 
hold and occupy a prescribed land for a term not exceeding twenty one years.
59 The settlers 
were not happy because the certificate was an administrative act, which gave right to occupy 
but not power to transfer title.  They concluded that the certificate of occupation was 
unsuitable and demanded freehold titles.
60 This demand resurrected the earlier debate about 
the extent of Protectorate power over land. The legal advisers had repeatedly insisted that ‘the 
acquisition of partial sovereignty in a protectorate does not carry with it any title to soil.
61 The 
Colonial Office reiterated this view when it informed the Foreign Office that: 
While Her Majesty the Queen acquires powers of control and rule, more or less complete, the 
property in the soil and minerals does not necessarily pass to her by the act of extending Her 
protection. So far as the natives had the enjoyment of the land they continue to enjoy it, 
subject to any laws which Her Majesty may subsequently make for public good, and subject of 
course to any transfer of their title in the land to Her Majesty which they make as a distinct 
act.
62   
However, by the end of the nineteenth century it was quite clear that Nairobi-based 
officials did not understand or deliberately ignored the principle that the Crown power was 
limited in an extra-territorial jurisdiction such as a protectorate. Their relentless pursuit of 
power and glory made the policy makers in London almost redundant as their orders and 
advice failed to make any impact. Although technically Kenya was still a protectorate, the 
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policy practice of the local officials had given it all the attributes of a colony. Ghai and 
McAuslan, in their observation of evolution of the colonial administration stated that ‘in the 
East African Protectorate such complete sovereign rights were asserted over land that when 
title to the country was finally claimed in 1920, it made no difference at all to indigenous 
rights to the land or lack of them ...’
63    
  East Africa (Acquisition of Lands) Order in Council, 1898
64vested in the 
Commissioner a special power to acquire land, in trust for Her Majesty, which made it legally 
possible for the Commissioner to sell land in the railway zone.  The Protectorate authorities 
expected to use the Order to resolve the now profuse demand of settlers for freehold titles. 
Some of these powers had already been exercised as land was compulsorily obtained from 
Africans under the Indian Land Acquisition Act.
65  
3.9 Crown Land Ordinances, 1902 and 1915 
  According to the East African (Lands) Order-in-Council of 1901, ‘Crown Lands’ were 
defined as; 
All public lands within the East Africa Protectorate (Kenya), which for the time being are 
subject to the control of his Majesty by virtues of any Treaty, Convention, or Agreement, or of 
His Majesty’s Protectorate, and all lands which have been or may hereafter be acquired by His 
Majesty under “the Land Acquisition Act, 1894” or otherwise howsoever.
66  
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The Power to expropriate land in areas already occupied by Africans was also defined and 
given to the Commissioner (later renamed as a Governor), who was the top government 
administrator in the Protectorate. The Order provided that, ‘The Commissioner, or any other 
such trustee or trustees, may make grants or leases of any crown lands, or he may permit them 
to be temporarily occupied, on such terms and conditions as he may think fit...’
67 
These and other questions preoccupied the colonial administration during the early 
part of its rule. Some of those questions did not appeal to some of the local colonial officials 
in the Protectorate who were prepared to use any means to avoid legal or moral responsibility 
for the consequences of their actions. In fact, they had dismissed any attempt by other 
officials who were inclined to seek protection for native communities.
68 As far as they were 
concerned, the Africans had no system of land tenure and could not therefore be considered as 
rightful owners of land. In his own words, Charles Eliot declared that “The interior of the 
Protectorate as a white man’s country...it is mere hypocrisy not to admit that white interests 
must be paramount, and that the main object of our policy and legislation should be to found a 
white colony.”
69  Ewart Grogan, one of the pioneer settlers who later amassed thousands of 
acres of land had no qualms in thinking that indigenous Africans deserved no protection at all. 
He dismissively responded to those officials and even missionaries who raised the issue of 
indigenous land rights as follows: 
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I will ignore Biblical platitudes as to the equality of men, and take as a hypothesis that the 
African is fundamentally inferior in mental development and ethical possibilities to white 
man...There was no need for ‘mawkish euphemisms’ to wrap up European land grabbing 
scheme.
70 
The colonists, especially the hawkish luminaries like Lord Delamere and Ewart 
Grogan, encouraged by powerful government officials led by Charles Eliot, had not hidden 
their agenda to dispossess the indigenous peoples of their land. With the Foreign Office, 
brow- beaten into accepting the inevitability of the settlers’ power and privilege, the question 
was no longer the legality but the length of the landholding in the areas favourable for 
agriculture. The first in the series of legal mechanisms to consolidate the power of the Crown 
to alienate land in the Protectorate was the East Africa (Lands) Order 1901,
71 which 
effectively vested crown lands in the Commissioner as a trustee of Her Majesty. The 
Commissioner was empowered ‘to make grants or leases of crown lands on such terms and 
conditions as he may think fit, subject to the directions of the Secretary of State.’  Crown 
Lands were defined as  
all public lands within the East Africa Protectorate which for the time being are subjects to the 
control of his majesty by virtue of any Treaty, Convention, or Agreement or by virtue of His 
Majesty’s Protectorate and all lands which have been or may hereafter be acquired by Her 
Majesty under the Land Acquisition Act or otherwise howsoever.
72  
The Crown Land Ordinance, 1902 was evidently the most predominant piece of 
legislation adopted by the authority to assume the overall control and management of land in 
the Protectorate. With the promulgation of the Ordinance any veneer that existed about 
protection of native land rights was brought to an end. For the first time the Crown took full 
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charge of disposal of indigenous land. The demand by the settlers for speedy alienation was 
addressed by the Ordinance. The Ordinance ‘gave the Commissioner the power to grant just 
the sort of interests that the settlers were clamouring for.’
73 While the Ordinance did not go 
further than the 1901 Order-in-Council in defining the crown lands, the Ordinance gave the 
Commissioner of the protectorate substantial powers to deal with land. With this legal 
provision the authorities assumed the overall ‘sovereign power’ to alienate land in what was 
becoming an expanded but unified territorial entity. Until 1920, when the protectorate was 
declared a colony by the Kenya-Order-in-Council
74, the local British officials used 
assortments of land laws and regulations that made the ‘sphere’ as Charles Eliot liked to call 
it, ‘practically an estate of His Majesty’s Government.’ Once the claim of ‘crown title’ was 
made legal, procedural and institutional changes were incrementally put in place with the 
objective to radically alter land tenure rights of indigenous communities. The Commissioner 
and later Governor of the protectorate and colony had been a ‘law unto himself’ and made the 
laws that mainly affected the indigenous population. A government publication which 
recorded some of the official actions of the colonial authorities’ in the British East Africa 
Protectorate stated that: 
The Commissioner was the sole law making body, but in 1906, a Legislative Council was 
established and from then on Ordinances were enacted by the Governor "with the advice and 
consent of the Legislative Council". In fact, of course, since until 1948 the Government had an 
official majority in the Legislative Council, any measure which the local and home 
governments were determined to have enacted could not fail to be brought into law. In 1957 
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the form of the enacting words was changed to "enacted by the Legislature of the colony and 
the Protectorate.
75 
3.9.1 Crown Ownership 
Indigenous ownership of land became the hotly contested subject for the rest of the 
period during the colonial rule. Charles Eliot, who aggressively promoted European 
settlement in the Protectorate, fired the first salvo. In his determination to realise a policy of 
land alienation, he created the notion that land was ‘vacant’ and that Africans could not make 
any claim over it. In his own words, Eliot stated that: “We have in East Africa the rare experience 
of dealing with a tabula rasa, an almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where we can do 
all as we will, regulate immigration and open or close the door as it seems best.”
76 
The concept of land ownership was dramatically altered when the Crown Land 
Ordinance was promulgated to give enormous power to the representative of the British 
Government to take charge of land alienation in the protectorate. The Ordinance was 
instrumental in dismantling African customary land jurisprudence and imposed a colonial 
notion of land ownership. It stipulated that the Commissioner had no power to “sell and lease 
land in the actual occupation of the natives.”
77Although the meaning of the phrase ‘actual 
occupation’ was undoubtedly vague in the absence of any further explanation, the intention of 
the authority was implicitly clear. It was a deliberate statement to defeat the pre-existing 
customary land rights of the indigenous people and to radically change land tenure as always 
understood by the African people.  
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 Some scholars faulted the government authorities for distorting land tenure concept as 
understood by the indigenous Africans in order to suit their own interests. Mwangi Wa-
Githumo, a Kenyan historian, is very critical of colonial land policy for the confusion it 
created. He wrote: ‘It must be remembered that before the conquest of Kenya there was no 
distinction between the ownership of the country and the ownership of land...
78   It was clear 
that the government policy was to divest the indigenous peoples of the power to deal with 
land. For example, the Commissioner of the Protectorate was vested with power to 
appropriate crown land settlers as freeholds.
79  
The Crown Land Ordinance, 1902 was the pre-eminent piece of legislation which, in a 
sense, was the turning point in terms of consolidating the way the colonial authorities 
assumed the overall control of land in the Protectorate. The Ordinance ‘gave the 
Commissioner the power to grant just the sort of interests that the settlers were clamouring 
for.’
80 The gap which the settlers felt was created by the East Africa (lands) Orders-in-
Council was presumably filled by the promulgation of Crown Land Ordinance. While it did 
not go any further than the 1901 Order-in-Council in description of the crown land, the 
Ordinance made a substantial and radical change as far as the tenure rights of the indigenous 
people was concerned. 
The significance of this extension is that it completely transformed the structure of 
property in relation to the protectorate. A new and essentially alien perspective in state land 
relationship began to emerge. It was asserted that the protectorate as a political entity owned 
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land, while based on English property relations, the land users merely held certain former 
rights constituting property in the land
81.  The official view as expressed by the Attorney 
General of the Crown was that the indigenous land had ceased to exist as soon as the 
Crown assumed territorial control.  
The Protectorate Attorney-General, R.M. Combe, explained that the definition of 
crown land was extended “to remove any doubt as to the power of the government to legislate 
the occupation of such lands occupied by native tribes”
82 The proposal made in the Bill 
caused some anxiety among the opponents of the British Imperial land policy. T.E. Harvey, a 
Labour Member of Parliament, called the Bill, “a monstrous act of theft.” Drawing the 
experience of the Maasai evictions and the subsequent decisions by the courts, he went on to 
state that: 
As the court at present hold that the Masai are not even British subjects, they could 
have no redress if, under this new ordinance, the Governor, decided to reduce their 
reserve, or change the terms of the treaty or agreement under which they held it.
83  
The opposition notwithstanding, the Bill was enacted in 1915 with the proposed 
definition of crown land unaltered in the redrafted 1913 Bill. The process that began in the 
1900s culminated into what Okoth-Ogendo called ‘legal organisation of the reserves’ whose 
objective was “simply to make way for European settlement.”
84 After all the rhetoric about 
African land rights, the concern of the 1915 Crown Land Ordinance and all the contributions 
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to the debates on the Bill, the bottom-line was to protect the interests of settlers as the report 
by the committee of the Legislative Council stated its intention as follows: 
The extension of this definition so as to include native reserves having been criticised in 
England, the committee wish to record emphatically their opinion that the definition as drafted 
should stand. It must be remembered that many if not most of the native tribes have no 
individual or even tribal tenure of land as tenure in generally understood in England, and it is of 
the utmost importance that the land in the reserves or occupied by native tribes should be 
definitely vested by statute in the Crown, thereby giving the Crown power to afford the natives 
protection in their possession of such land...if such lands are vested in the Crown it will be 
possible for the Crown to regulate their occupation in the interests of the natives and finally to 
evolve a system of tenure for the natives thereon giving them real and definite right to the 
land.
85  
The Crown Land ordinance of 1915 marked the beginning of the second major 
historical development as far as African land tenure was concerned. Any pretence of 
protecting African land rights was absolutely buried in the sand of this legislation. It was the 
turning point in the way African affairs were reshaped by the government. The implication 
was soon illustrated by the government approach in deciding whether or not Africans owned 
their pieces of land. A few years later, the government intervened in a case between two 
Kikuyu families to perhaps demonstrate that land was now under its absolute control. The 
court interpreted the ordinance as having sealed the radical title of the crown and Africans’ 
claim to ownership of land was not tolerated. The case of Wainaina Wa Githomo was a clear 
demonstration of how African interests in land and tenure rights enjoyed under the African 
customary law had been systematically undermined. The facts of the case were as follows: 
One Wainaina wa Githomo and another, both Kikuyu, claimed that they were entitled to 
possession of a piece of land in Kabete, which they alleged had been subject of a trespass by 
one Murito Wa Indangara, and another, also Kikuyu. The plaintiffs’ claims rested on 
derivation of title by purchase from the Ndorobo before colonial settlement. In the alternative 
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the plaintiffs’ alleged that the defendants had been tenants at will on the shamba and that such 
tenancy had been determined by notice.
86  
The 1915 Land Ordinance insidiously countenanced rather than defused the growing 
tension, as the government appeared to have left no room for Africans to hold any land rights, 
making them utterly divested of any claims to land in the protectorate. At the peak of this 
controversy, a person of significance, Chief Justice Barth, the head of judiciary, made the 
surreal proclamation that African right to land was literally dead and buried. He, with a sense 
of finality declared: 
In my view the effect of the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1915 and the Kenya( Annexation) 
Order-in-Council, 1920 by which no native private rights were reserved, and the Kenya colony 
Order-in-Council, 1921...is clearly inter alia to vest land reserved for the use of a native tribe 
in the Crown, if that be so then all natives in such reserved land, whatever they were 
...disappeared and natives in occupation of such Crown land became tenant at the will of the 
Crown of the land actually occupied which would presumably include land on which huts 
were built with their appurtenances and land cultivated by the occupier-such land would 
include that fallow....
87  
Although such a decision would naturally trigger a new wave of land alienation, it did 
not create any excitement in the settler-community or within the officialdom. This was 
understandable. Without legal sanctions, much had been achieved to enhance European 
settlement and this particular court decision would do little or nothing to change the status 
quo. With all the institutions aggressively encouraging colonial land policy, the Africans, 
particularly in the central highlands became fidgety and there were signs of resistance, 
especially in Kavirondo and Kikuyu.
88 There was a heightened level of political 
consciousness among the Africans, hence clear opportunity for organising nascent political 
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movement. Some of the colonial officials viewed the emerging situation as a harbinger for 
instability and social upheaval. 
The authorities might not have publicly admitted that their actions were mainly 
influenced by growing restlessness in African reserves. The colonial government apparently 
realised that it was obliged to initiate reform programmes aimed at winning confidence among 
certain groups of Africans. In 1924, the government appointed the East African Commission 
under the Chairmanship of W.G.Ormsby-Gore to investigate, among other things, African 
land grievances. The Commission looked at the problems in a broader perspective and 
recommended that the solutions lay in accelerating the economic development of East Africa 
and addressing social conditions, labour and taxation issues among the native communities.  
More importantly, the Commission admitted that ‘there was probably no other subject 
which agitated the African mind more continuously than the question of their rights in land.
89 
In response to the Committees recommendation, the government began to review the situation 
in African reserves. An amendment was made to the Crown Lands Ordinance to demarcate 
boundaries of the African reserves and put a stop to further alienation of land in there.
90 In 
other words, the government officially gazetted African reserves for over twenty years since 
1904 when the idea of reservation was mooted in response to the eviction of the Maasai. In 
1927, the Hilton-Young Commission began its inquiry and like the Ormsby-Gore 
Commission before it, recognised the squalid conditions in African reserves. It recommended 
that the government needed to formulate a policy that would ‘guarantee the African sufficient 
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land to maintain themselves through programmes to be created by the government.
91 The 
government again published the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, which was enacted in 1930. 
The Bill was dismissed as a half-hearted attempt to restore the land rights of the Africans, but 
it turned out to be a legislative instrument to control African reserves without excluding 
possible future expansion of settlement. The Board, which was obligated to limit the power of 
the Governor in the allocation of land in reserves, would be constituted by government and 
settler representatives with only one African to be included ‘if a suitable one could be 
found.’
92   The court once again offered its unflinching support to colonial land policy. 
The notion that the protecting power had the noble goal of protecting the native tribes 
in her jurisdiction came to a grinding halt as the Imperial Government capriciously gave in to 
the protracted demand of the settlers. According to Okoth Ogendo, the Ordinance was seen as 
‘a secure foundation for the organisation of the settlement.’
93 The most salient provision of 
the Ordinance was the creation of almost a perpetual ownership of land by a lessee because of 
the inordinately lengthy period of leasehold that was capable of keeping a particular land 
within a family for hundreds of generations. It gave the settlers 999-year leases.
94 The holders 
of agricultural lands under the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 were permitted to convert 
their land titles from the 99-year leases into the now longer terms of 999-years.
95 The 
ordinance had added a new pitch to the political influence of the settler groups as they now 
took control of land and economic enterprise that was to be driven for the remainder of the 
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colonial tenure in the East Africa Protectorate and colony. The settlers’ voracious demand for 
more advantage in the political and administrative affairs of the government seemed to have 
paid off through the enactment of this law.  
3.9.2 The Birth of Reservation Policy,  
An amendment to the 1902 Crown Land Ordinance was ostensibly made to address 
the excesses of the Crown power in alienation of African lands. The idea was to entrench the 
notion of African reserves so that the continued expansion of the White Highlands was at least 
minimised. The Bill was passed by legislative council in 1909 to enable the Governor to set 
aside for the “Aboriginal natives tribes” of the Protectorate any crown land which, in his 
opinion, was required for their use or support. The Bill provided for the concept of a ‘trustee’ 
who would manage reserves on behalf of the Governor. One of the key features that among 
others the drafters brought on board was the ‘non-alienability’ principle. This was included in 
case it was retained in the approved law, to offer a radical departure from the pervasive 
practice of the last decade, where expropriation of land was the top agenda of the government 
policy.  
However, even this was watered down by a qualification that “unless made with the 
consent of such person or persons as the Governor may appoint.”
96 The Bill had other 
weaknesses, for example, it provided for a clause that hampered legal and institutional 
arrangements proffered to protect the indigenous peoples’ rights to land. This was again 
blamed on the settlers whose influential position swayed the Legislative Council to insert 
specific provision which required prior consultation of their representatives before reserves 
were established.
97 After sustained back and forth debates between Nairobi and London, and 
some alterations, the Bill was redrafted in 1913. The redrafted version made yet again one of 
the most controversial aspects of land governance that arguably took the debate backwards 
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rather than forward. The government was vested with “all lands occupied by the native tribes 
of the Protectorate and all lands reserved for the use of any members of any tribe.”
98 
The government policy of establishing reserves was generally presented as an 
interventional measure to protect Africans from further alienation of land. It was actually 
touted as a strategy to protect African land rights.
99 The Foreign Office had constantly used 
the notion of ‘reserves’ since the policy of settlement was aggressively pursued in the early 
1900s, including the massive evictions of the Maasai pastoralists from central Rift Valley. 
While the Maasai treated the move as a vicious disruption of their lives, the government and 
settlers saw it as a resounding success. Sir Lansdowne of the Foreign Office was upbeat about 
the policy when he commented that: “definite acceptance of the policy of native reserves 
implies.....an absolute guarantee that natives, will, so long as they desire it, remain in 
undisturbed and exclusive possession of the areas ‘set aside’ for them.
100 
The idea regarding reserves appeared quite prominently in discussions that followed 
the hasty decisions made by Governor Donald Stewart to move the Maasai despite the 
Foreign Office’s initial resistance. The London imperial bureaucrats were forced to accept 
Stewart’s position as “the right one.”
101 However, the Foreign Office later organised an ad 
hoc committee meeting to discuss the pros and cons of reserve policy.
102 The meeting 
curiously agreed to further eviction of the Maasai as proposed by the Nairobi officials who 
manipulatively convinced their superiors in Britain that the Maasai were “willing and anxious 
to move.”
103 The Foreign Office thought that the move would benefit the Maasai. Hobley, 
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who was a senior administrator and an ardent supporter of settlement policy, once remarked 
that, as a rule, settlers were “ very antagonistic to the natives and convinced that it was 
imperative that they should be pushed out to make room for the Europeans.  The more rabid 
of the opinion that they should...be blotted out, at the first opportunity.”
104 The alienation of 
indigenous communities’ land was viewed as a response to ‘claims’ made by the settlers, 
especially along the railway line. It was evident that whatever formula the government was 
going to adopt in response to such ‘claims’ would result in a favourable outcome for settlers 
rather than the ‘native’ Africans. The inevitability of removal was ideally difficult to fathom 
even among the local administrators and was difficult to either defend or implement. Hobley 
observed that unless a structured system was put in place to carry out reservation policy the 
administration would be ‘in an unenviable position of having to drive out a tribe who had 
entrusted implicitly in the word of various officers-entrusted with their administration.”
105  
A few officials went out of their way to support retention of the pre-existing rights of 
the Africans, particularly in resisting the settlers whom they accused of “trying to seize the 
pick of the Masai grazing grounds.”
106According to Jackson, the Sub-Commissioner for the 
Naivasha Province, the European settlers believed they could ‘stake out huge areas embracing 
all the very best grazing grounds on both sides and for the greater part of the length of four 
out of five rivers that run into Lake Naivasha, Elementaita, and Nakuru, regardless of the 
established…claims of the Masai, and sublimely indifferent as to how and where they are to 
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feed their enormous flocks.”
107 Hobley actually predicted that once the settlers established 
their own herds, they would inevitably demand the removal of the Maasai and their stock. 
Charles Eliot had persistently argued that for the settlement to succeed, the Maasai had to give 
way. Even those who initially showed some sympathy for the Maasai eventually became 
inconsistent.  For example, Jackson and Hobley changed their minds when it became clear 
that the imperial home government was supportive of the policy. The pro-settlement coalition 
in Nairobi was equally a force majeure that could not be easily resisted. 
In the next Chapter, the focus is on the Maasai pastoral people whose proximity to the 
seat of the colonial state (the areas that became White Highlands) made their encounters with 
the British the most controversial and consequential in Kenya’s history. Their encounter was 
relatively brief (between 1903-1913) during which two of the most devastating moves (which 
can also be described as evictions) took place. The Maasai attempts to seek redress in the 
courts did not succeed. Tucked into the inferior reserves away from the settlers who occupied 
the land from which they were removed, the Maasai tried to reclaim their rights through the 
courts of law which as shown in the next Chapter remained not only nonchalant but deeply 
identified themselves with political decisions made by the colonial authorities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Maasai  and the Enduring Land Question 
4.1 The ‘Coming of the Black Rhino’ 
  
I have no desire to protect Masaidom. It is a beastly, bloody system, founded on raiding and 
immorality, disastrous to both the Maasai and their neighbours. The sooner it disappears and 
unknown, except in books of anthropology, the better.
108 
                                                                              Sir Charles Eliot 
...the conflict between nomads and settled society is fundamental to humankind. Civilization, 
from Latin civis, a townsperson, means the culture of those whose homes do not move. The 
horde, from Turkish ordu,  a camp and its people, is its antithesis, which both defines 
civilization and threatens it. We the stayers, detest the movers, be they Huns, Monguls, Kurds 
or Gypsies. This is partly because we feel they threat us or our property. But I have come to 
believe that there are more substantial reasons for our disdain. We hate them because they 
remind us of who we are.
109 
                                                                               George Monbiot 
 Tradition and oral history of the Maasai people would not be complete without the 
mention of the famous Laibon, Mbatiany Ole Supet, a most respected mediceman and 
charismatic leader. Mbatiany was said to have ‘lived at the dawn of the white man’s entry into 
central Africa, at a time when the Maasai were perhaps at the peak of their formidable 
strength.’
110 Mbatiany had a premonition, which unlike many leaders was not about mourning 
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his own infirmity or death but rather about a terrible episode that was going to threaten his 
community, the Maasai people. According to oral historians, Mbatiany called a meeting of the 
Maasai elders and in a hushed gathering revealed the terrible visions he had dreamt of saying, 
‘I am about to die. I see a large black rhino cutting a line across the land. I see the end of my 
children and of the land. Do not move from your land, for if you do you will die of a terrible 
unknown disease, your cattle will perish, you will fight with powerful enemy and you will be 
beaten’.
111   
Mbatiany died seven years later and was succeeded by his son, Lenana, who promised 
his people that by giving some of their best land to the white man, they would appease the 
invaders and avoid further tragedy. He was wrong. The ‘black rhinos’, carriages and caravans, 
did arrive and they were ‘filled with fire , panting and bellowing plumes of smoke as they 
rolled on iron rails into the heart of the Maasailand.’ On the back of the rhinoceros were 
‘strange pink people.’
112 It was just a matter of time before the strangers who ‘visited’ them 
demanded their hosts to be removed to pave way for European settlement. This part of the 
history is hardly mentioned in the mainstream narrative of land tenure discourse in Kenya. As 
we have pointed out in Chapter 7, the policy makers could go to the extreme by dismissing it 
as a ‘myth’. As far as pastoral Maasai is concerned, land has always been part of the socio-
cultural, economic, and spiritual aspects of their life.  
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4.2 The Maasai’s ‘Splendid Pasture’ 
The early contacts of the Maasai were not colonial officials or settlers in a hunt for 
land. They were unsuspecting nineteenth century travelers, missionaries, and explorers who 
had happened to pass through Maasai land on their way to other destinations, particularly the 
Lake Victoria basin and Uganda. However, seductive reports they wrote played a significant 
role in attracting the attention of their fellow Europeans who had required eyewitness 
accounts about the regions in Africa that might suit them for settlement. The initial survey of 
the area found that the land was ‘high, green and sweet, its climate a cool relief from the 
humidity of the coast and a great deal healthier.’
113 
Among those early travelers, none had left more impressions than Joseph Thomson, a 
geologist who was sent by the Royal Geographical Society on an expedition in 1883-1884 to 
find a direct route between the eastern coast to the northern shores of Lake Victoria.
114 The 
Society was in essence doing the survey on the bidding of the Imperial Government. The 
early traders had demanded a route that would avoid the allegedly fearsome Maasai and the 
hostile Germans who were competing for trade in the area. The expedition set out a few 
months after the rival German expedition of Guestav Fischer, who was forced back by the 
Maasai.
115 After difficulties experienced in penetrating the Maasai country, Thomson still 
managed to discover the great Rift Valley, which was graced by exotic panorama of Lake 
Nakuru, Lake Naivasha and Lake Baringo, Elementaita and other scenic features. 
116 His 
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accounts painted a glowing picture of the Maasai country. “A more charming region is 
probably not to be found in all of Africa.” Drawing a parallel to his home country, Scotland, 
he described the Maasai land as a ‘park-like’ country complete with ‘flowering shrubs’, 
‘noble forests’, babbling brooks and streams’, and ‘pine-like woods [where] you can gather 
sprigs of heath, sweet-scented clover, anemone, and other familiar forms’.
117 
Nevertheless, what had really captured the imagination of the settlers and government 
officials was more than the description of the landscape. Thomson and other travelers 
reported that the land was ‘vacant’. The potential settlers therefore could easily occupy 
‘uninhabited’ land without facing resistance.  Thomson, as if stoking the already burning 
desire of those Europeans who intended to find new land within Britain’s sphere of influence, 
gave selective information about the Maasai people and the country. Writing on the situation 
in Laikipia (Lykipia) where civil war among the Maasai had occurred about a decade before 
his venture in Maasailand, Thomson asserted that the land was ‘empty’ because the Maasai 
have had suffered self-inflicted decimation.
118 The Iloikop war, as the Maasai conflicts was 
referred to, probably took place between 1874 and 1876.
119 Thomson was right about the war 
and the devastating effect it had on the original inhabitants of the area, the Laikpiak Maasai. 
The combined force of the Purko-Kisongo Maasai attacked their tribesmen in the 1870s and 
inflicted heavy losses on them, to the extent that some of the remaining survivors had to flee 
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to distant and unknown territories. Bernd Heine and Rainer Vossen, two German linguists, 
who wrote about Kore, a small tribe who now live in the Kenyan coastal town of Lamu, 
reveals the story behind their migration from Somalia to current residence in Kenya as 
follows: 
...Laikipia Maasai fleeing their homeland eventually reached their presentday Sampur-Rendile 
area, where they were taken prisoner by the Somali and sold as slaves in the Kismayu area of 
Somalia, at the mouth of Juba River.
120 
However, Thomson had exaggerated the fact about habitation of the Laikipia after the 
civil war. The survivors of the Purko-Kisongo internal warfare assimilated with the powerful 
clans that had maintained their presence in the area.
121 While there was low population 
density, it was not entirely true that the land was uninhabited. In any case, Thomson’s own 
accounts indicated ‘great herds of cattle or flocks of sheep and goats are seen wandering knee-
deep in the splendid pasture’.
122 Lotte Hughes, in her latest contribution to Maasai history, 
pointed out the contradiction in Thomson’s accounts, when she stated; “There are no herds 
without the herders, but unwittingly or otherwise Thomson seemed to overlook transhumant 
pastoralists’ seasonal occupation and use of land.’
123The notion expressed by the travelers 
was later carried forward and reinforced by the agents of the British Imperial Government 
who were tasked with the inaugural duty of setting the pace for colonial establishment. 
Fredrick Lugard, one of the foremost architects of the colonising mission in Africa had a 
similar view as that of Thomson about another part of Maasai rangelands, the Mau 
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escarpment. “This area is uninhabited and of great extent: it consequently offers unlimited 
room for the location of agricultural settlements or stock-rearing farms.”
124 In the Sphere of 
Influence that became the British East Africa (and later Kenya Colony), the notion was 
aggressively operationalised by Charles Eliot, a pioneer administrator (he was the second 
Commissioner of the Protectorate, 1900-1904). Eliot openly proclaimed that: “We have in 
East Africa the rare experience of dealing with a tabula rasa, an almost untouched and 
sparsely uninhabited country, where we can do as we will...”
125 
By 1902, the period in which the settlement of Europeans was picking up tempo, the 
Maasailand had become a prime target. The Maasai power in the region had waned 
significantly and their land sparsely populated. According to Sorrenson, other major factors 
had led to this decline.
126 First, the rinderpest and bovine pleura-pneumonia epidemics of 
1889-1890, almost wiped out Maasai herds. The drought of 1891 was severe and almost 
wiped out the remaining herds. This was followed by the smallpox outbreak in 1892 which 
reduced the Maasai population by half. And finally, a consortium of other sub-tribes waged a 
bitter war against the Loita and Siria sub-clans over the feuds that pitted two brothers, Lenana 
(Olonana) and Sendeyo (Sedeu) over succession of their deceased father’s (Mbatian) ritual 
leadership. To crown it all, the Maasai who were previously feared by the neighbours as fierce 
warriors became subservient and even sought assistance from the Kikuyu , Kamba and other 
tribes.
127 
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Maasai was at its weakest point at the onset of colonial settlement. However, that was 
not to say that the settlement was any more spurred by the situation of the Maasai than the 
overall situation. The colonial occupation was taking place irrespective of political or 
economic power of the occupied people. The point made above was just to contextualise the 
interplay of factors that might have facilitated speedy settlement. In any case, the recovery of 
the Maasai from the social and economic infliction was reported to have accelerated fast 
enough by the time settler occupation was taking place. The Maasai had actually became the 
trusted ally of the British and even joined the British expeditionary raids against other 
allegedly recalcitrant native tribes such as Kikuyu and Nandi and restocked themselves with 
‘proceeds’ from looted stocks.
128 But it was not long before the Maasai found themselves on 
the wrong side of colonial venture as settlement policy began to roll. 
A more complex and intractable set of challenges faced the Maasai from 1903 
onwards. The Europeans had, according to Fredrick Jackson, one of the moderate Protectorate 
administrators, began demanding the best of Rift Valley pastureland inhabited by the 
Maasai.
129 By 1903, it was established that there were 9,000 Maasai with 45,000 cattle and 
750,000 sheep in the Rift valley. The settlers and Protectorate officials had cast their eyes on 
Maasailand and the mechanics was put in place to carry the plan to completion. Moving the 
Maasai from the Rift Valley to create room for the Europeans settlement became the major 
preoccupation in the next decade from 1903. The Maasai land was found to be suitable for 
farming, especially large-scale ranching preferred by the pioneer colonists like Lord 
Delamere. As S.S. Bagge stated in his official report, it had taken ‘many years and large 
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flocks to have brought the pasture into its present condition which has proved so alluring an 
attraction to the land hunter.’
130  
Some of the settlers saw an early opportunity to stake a claim to Maasai land both 
individually and through dummying companies. For instance, Major Burnham and some other 
settlers formed the East Africa Syndicate (EAS) and applied for hundreds of thousands of 
acres in Maasai land. “The EAS got 500 square miles of land at Naivasha, in the heart of the 
Maasai grazing ground.”
131 In short, a micro-scramble for Maasai had begun in earnest by 
1903. Lord Delamere, the scion of the settler community, applied for 100,000 acres. Initially 
his application was rejected on the ground that it violated the Maasai land rights.
132 He led 
other settlers in pushing the government to grant them land in the Rift Valley for freehold or 
long leases. The local administration was soon under pressure to respond to their demand. 
Delamere’s application was eventually accepted and in November 1904, he was granted a 
lease for 99 years at Njoro, west of Nakuru.
133 In addition to encouraging swift settlement of 
the Europeans in the highlands, Lord Delamere advocated for the removal of the Maasai from 
Rift Valley. He asserted that conflicts were bound to happen between settlers and warriors, 
the Maasai.
134 He had the support of senior officials of the Protectorate such as Charles Eliot 
who did not hide his motive of creating European monopoly in the region. After considering 
several options, including intermingling between Maasai and settlers, it was decided that 
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Maasai had to give way. It was agreed that the ‘final solution’ was to move the Maasai to a 
reserve in Laikipia.
135  
Charles Hobley, who in 1904 was the Assistant Deputy Commission and acting 
Commissioner following acrimonious departure of Eliot, began to work on the modalities of 
moving the Maasai. He visited Laikipia and confirmed that it was suitable for relocation of 
the Maasai.
136When a new Commissioner, Donald Stewart, arrived in 1904, he was presented 
with what was virtually a fait accompli.
137  Stewart, accompanied by those seasoned 
administrators, John Ainsworth and Charles Hobley, organised a meeting with the Maasai to 
ostensibly elicit their support. However, the fact of the matter was that those meetings were 
intended to be eviction notices because the decision to evict the Maasai had already been 
made. A few ostentatious public baraza (gathering addressed by Protectorate officials) were 
hurriedly organized in Maasai areas of Ngong, Naivasha and other parts of Rift Valley. It was 
reported that the Maasai had accepted the idea of the impending move. Hobley reported that 
the ‘chiefs and elders ...expressed their acquiescence with the scheme, and was without any 
promise of bribe.’ Ainsworth met Lenana, the ritual leader, at Ngong and reported that the 
Maasai Oloibon agreed to ‘raise no objections.’
138 To formalise this ‘agreement’, the next step 
was to prepare a written document to be signed by all parties. 
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4.3 The Maasai Agreement 1904 
The widely reported meetings held with the Maasai leaders about their removal from 
their home in the central Rift Valley were in reality a cover up that were methodically 
organised by the top colonial administrators in Nairobi. What had appeared as prior 
consultative processes were then reported to London as negotiated accord approved of by the 
Maasai leaders and by extension, the Maasai communities. The leading architects of the plan, 
Charles Hobley and John Ainsworth carefully mobilised local officials in the Protectorate 
who were sent to different Maasai clans with distorted message that it was being done in the 
interest of the community,  to ostensibly protect them from further alienation land. Before Sir 
Donald Stewart took over the office as the acting Commissioner, Hobley and Ainsworth had, 
drafted  the main content of what was later to be known as the Maasai Agreement.
139 The so 
called ‘acquiescence of the Maasai was also stage-managed by the two officials.  Although 
most of the thinking and planning was done before the arrival of Stewart, he showed a lot of 
enthusiasm in joining the bandwagon. He  recommended to London that the ‘only thing to do 
was to move the whole tribe out of the Rift Valley, and away from the railway , and that as 
the area remaining to the tribe north of the Rift Valley was too small, and that to the south too 
poor watered ,two reserves should be created.
140  
The Foreign Office added a spin of its own by demanding from the Nairobi officials a 
drawn up agreement that would make the plan appear diplomatic, negotiated, and hence 
suggestive to an outsider that the Maasai actually moved out of their own accord. The 
secretive manner in which the Protectorate officials worked on the removal of the Maasai did 
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not allow full disclosure to London, especially the planning aspect. For example, Stewart sent 
a telegraph to the Foreign Office about the conclusion of the agreement a day after the signing 
and did not include much detail. “All the chiefs readily assented to these proposals which 
were really their own wishes.”
141  A provision was also added to the agreement that Maasai 
consent was sought and acquired with the pledge on the part of the government never to 
disturb the settlement again.
142 The Foreign Office went along with the Protectorate’s official 
decision. Lansdowne, the secretary of State for Foreign Affairs affirmed the agreement but 
was still perturbed by the speed with which Stewart had rushed it through.
143    
By 10th August 1904, the colonial officials had prepared for the signing of the 
agreement. Those who were chosen Maasai representatives by the  Maasai signatories were 
Lenana (Olonana) Ole Mbatiany, Masikonde, Ole Gilisho (Legalishu) and 17 others who had 
purportedly agreed with the content of the agreement and appended their signatures ( they 
were actually fingerprinted) as an  affirmation. It was signed in Nairobi on the 15
th August 
1904. It was not clear what criteria was used to pick the so called ‘chiefs and elders’ as 
representatives of the Maasai. Who had nominated them to represent the Maasai? Were they 
genuine leaders or imposters forced on the Maasai?  There was a generally-held assumption 
that they signed the document prepared by His Majesty’s representatives on behalf of the 
whole tribe and the individual clans or sections.  
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However, it is widely accepted that the ultimate objective was to benefit the settlers at 
the expense of the whole Maasai tribe. The created reserves were intended to keep away the 
Africans from the white highland, one in the north in Laikipia and the other to the south of the 
railway line.
144 According to the terms of the 1904 agreement, the designated two reserves 
were to remain exclusively in the ownership and occupation of the Maasai people “so long as 
the Maasai as a race shall exist, and that European or other settlers shall not be allowed to take 
up land in the settlement.”
145 The government made a solemn promise that once the Maasai 
agreed to move to Laikipia and the southern reserve, they would remain undisturbed, without 
further intrusion.  
This was not to be. Although there was doubt about the settlers’ wishes to settle far 
away from the railway lines, it soon became clear that they were overwhelmingly attracted to 
the rangelands. In fact, Stewart had forewarned that when the Maasai herds “grazed down the 
grass and got it sweet, envious eyes will again be cast on their lands.”
146 He expressed his fear 
when he wrote to the Secretary of State after the conclusion of the signing of the 1904 
agreement
147. He further suggested the need to make Laikipia an “absolute native reserve’ 
after the move in 1904 but there was no legal or administrative mechanism put in place to 
protect the Maasai from further encroachment by the settlers. The prying settlers, who saw 
another opportunity to exploit land resources, soon turned this failure into a boon. They 
demanded the removal of Maasai from Laikipia.  
                                                 
144 Buell,R.L(1928), The Native  Problems  in a,Vol.I, p.312. 
145 East African Protectorate, Correspondence Relating to the Maasai, Cmd No.20360, Received 28
th March, 
1910. House of Commons Parliament Ppers,1911 Volume LII 1 730-731 
146 Sorrenson, op.cit. p.195 
147 Ross, W. M (1927), Kenya From Within: A Short Political History, p. 135 101 
 
The colonial administration caved in and started working on the strategy to move the 
Maasai once again. Secretary of State Lansdowne and other senior officials in the Foreign 
Office anticipated a closure on the question of Maasai, and hoped that no further disturbances 
would occur.  Moreover, Lansdowne, “emphasised the fact that definite acceptance of the 
policy of native reserves implied an absolute guarantee that natives would, so long as they 
desired it, remain in undisputed and exclusive possession of the acres set aside for their 
use.”
148 The insertion of the phrase, “so long as Maasai as a race shall exist...” was an 
apparent attempt to protect Maasai from further evictions. 
The Agreement also provided some other developmental support to ease settlement of 
the Maasai in the two reserves and facilitate movement of their livestock. The Maasai 
requested a road to link the two reserves that would serve as a corridor for the movement of 
livestock. According to Norman Leys, this was a half-mile wide stock-track that would have 
linked the sixty miles distance between the two reserves.
149 The linkage was important not 
only to maintain the Maasai cultural and filial relationship but also facilitate sharing of 
common resources. Furthermore, the southern reserve, where the majority of the Maasai were 
moved had acute water shortages.
150  The authorities in principle agreed to facilitate the 
Maasai to access their cultural and spiritual sites in Kinangop (5 square miles) where annual 
circumcision rites took place. The Maasai also demanded to be compensated for land which 
was lost to European farmers in the vicinity of Nairobi and, finally, they proposed 
construction of a government station in Rumuruti to serve the Maasai in Laikipia.  
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The majority of the Maasai, except for a few pockets of clans who remained in the 
area, were removed to the two reserves.
151  There was no doubt among the Maasai and other 
observers at the time, that the deal utterly disadvantaged the Maasai. Both reserves were of 
poor quality compared to their original land. Norman Leys described the land from which the 
Maasai were to be evicted as an “ area, though small is as fine a piece of country as there is in 
Kenya, with rich soil and perennial streams, vastly superior in every way to the country south 
of the Rift Valley where it was now proposed to send the whole tribe.
152 Several years after 
the removal of the Maasai, none of those assurances provided for in the 1904 Agreement were 
respected. The connecting road was not constructed as promised because the settlers 
complained that Maasai livestock carried the risk of spreading diseases. In fact, since August 
1908, all movement of cattle between the two reserves was absolutely prohibited.
153 
Similarly, the Government forbade ritual ceremonies to take place in Kinangop for fear that; 
the animals they brought there for sacrifice might spread diseases to Europeans cattle.
154 No 
wonder, before the Maasai settled down in their new homes, especially the northern reserve of 
Laikiapia, another alarm bell was being sounded. Percy Girourd, the new Governor who was 
posted to the Protectorate in 1909 began to make overtures about the impending move. 
Rumours soon spread around that the settlers were again demanding the land in Laikipia. The 
Maasailand was once again gripped by fear and anxiety. 
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 Sorrenson asserts that two groups of settlers were involved in the plan to remove 
Maasai from Laikipia.  The first was a group of seven claimants who had applied for land in 
Laikipia before the 1904 Agreement and had their applications rejected.
155 The government 
rejected the application then, but when they reapplied again, the government listened to them. 
Among them were Lord Delamere and his brother-in-law, Cole. In April 1910, the Land 
Office recognised those claims.
156 The second group consisted of twenty-four settlers on the 
southern Guaso Nyiro, to whom the government intended to give land in Laikipia, close to the 
southern reserve occupied by the Maasai. By October 1911, when Harcourt instructed 
Governor Girourd not to grant land or promise European land in Laikipia, the land office had 
already prepared for the eventual removal of the Maasai to pave the way for further European 
settlement.
157 
4.4 The Maasai Agreement 1911 
The man the colonial administration hosted as the Paramount Chief of all the Maasai, 
Oloibon Lenana, played a critical role in the manoeuvres used by the authorities to evict the 
Maasai from Laikipia. It is important to note that since the first move in 1904-1905 (that 
divided Maasai into two reserves), Lenana’s power had waned and he had virtually lost 
control of the Maasai in the northern reserve, Laikipia.
158 Nevertheless, the Protectorates 
officials found him still useful in luring the Maasai to leave the remaining part of the southern 
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reserve. By 1908, the administration was ready to roll out the plan following the expected 
approval from the Colonial Office. The Officials, as shown by different dates on the 1911 
Agreement, had sought support from a few Maasai leaders to sign the document before it was 
officially unveiled. Actually, some of the leaders had signed the document by 1907.
159 The 
Colonial Office was initially kept out of the plan. The Protectorate authorities secretly 
handled the situation, but the matter came into the open and as a political embarrassment to 
the Government, when the budget they had prepared for the exercise raised the alarm in 
London. To shield his office and to galvanise support for the move, Sir Girourd informed the 
Colonial Office that Lenana had wished for the reunion of the Maasai in the southern 
reserve.
160 When Lenana died in March 1911, before the removal took place, it became the 
“wish of a dying man,’’ which according to the Maasai custom was supposed to be fulfilled. 
In preparation for the second eviction, the Protectorate authorities organised a series of 
meetings with the Maasai leaders, beginning with those in the circle of Lenana. Lenana was 
still influential among the southern Maasai, although he lived in Ngong, a short distance from 
Nairobi. On 24 February 1910 at Kiserian camp, in the neighbourhood of Lenana’s home 
Jackson, deputising in the absence of the Governor, convened a meeting. The leaders 
including Lenana, Legalishu, Masikonde and other prominent elders were informed that the 
northern Maasai had agreed to move. This was not true, as the subsequent meetings in 
northern reserve had shown. The administration was aware that Lenana and his supporters had 
been looking for an opportunity to ‘reinstate’ his rule over some of the recalcitrant clans, like 
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the Purko who were in the northern reserve. Jackson’s explanation of the reason for the 
second move was to keep Maasai ‘safe from cattle diseases’ and, according to him, the Loita 
country in the southern reserve was safe for all the Maasai.
161 Like the first move, this one 
was also being considered “in the best interest of the Maasai and not because (the 
government) wishes to take back the land already given to them.” The only leader who 
showed some level of dissatisfaction was Ole Gilisho (Legalishu) but the government was 
aware that as a recipient of government’s “subsidies” he and some of the leaders had no 
option but to support the authorities. Ole Gilisho and Masikondi, who had previously rejected 
government’s policy against the Maasai, capitulated soon after being threatened that their 
stipends would be stopped, if they opposed the plan.
162    
The second wave of the move began in April 1910. The Secretary of State stopped  the 
plan  through a cabled order on 20
 April 1910 before a full-scale eviction took place. By this 
stage, the Colonial Office did not treat the matter lightly. The Governor was rebuked and 
informed that no suggestion of any alteration would be accepted unless it came from the 
Maasai themselves.
163 That was icing on the cake for the local authorities who had already 
worked on propaganda about Lenana’s dying wish. However, in a meeting organised to 
‘inform’ the Maasai of the impending move, which took place in Laikipia on 27 August 1910, 
the Maasai said “they would leave Laikipia under compulsion but not otherwise.”
164 The 
Maasai had already expressed a strong opposition against any further removal in a meeting 
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held by the Governor in Nakuru on 10 March 1910, when he raised the question of opening 
up Laikipia for European settlement.
165 After that, the authorities met Lenana in Nairobi 
where he was severely sick to use the opportunity to influence his succession. As soon as he 
died, the officials hurriedly summoned Maasai ‘regents’ and elders from both southern and 
northern reserves and impressed on them the need to fulfill the wish of their departed leader. 
As it turned out, the Maasai leaders had to approve the move, or else they might appear to 
have invited the curse of their leader.   
After another meeting with Ole Gilisho and other leaders in April 1911 and final 
signing by the group, the Governor cabled the Secretary of State on 29 May 1911 briefing him 
about the final conclusion of the Agreement. The move was approved on the basis that the 
Maasai had agreed to it. The move, which had been stopped in 1910, resumed at the 
beginning of June 1911. Due to poor logistics and haphazard mass evacuation, the move 
became a disaster. Thousands of cattle died as they were trapped by heavy rains and muddy 
tracks. Weak men and women and many children reportedly died of hunger and exhaustion. 
The medical officers sent to investigate the situation estimate the loss of life at two to four 
percent of the population that was being moved.
166  
In the 1911 Agreement, the government dropped any pretension that it owed the 
community protection from further interference in their land as it had in the 1904 agreement.  
The controversial clause stipulated that the agreement was binding “as long as the Maasai as a 
race shall exist”, was not repeated in 1911. Laikipia reserve was a well-endowed area with 
adequate water and pasture compared to the more arid southern reserve where all the Maasai 
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were supposed to re-converge. From the text of the Agreement, the Maasai voluntarily agreed 
to vacate Laikipia. For example, part of the 1911 Agreement categorically stated: “We agree 
to vacate at such time as the Governor may direct the Northern Maasai Reserve which we 
have hitherto inhabited and occupied and to remove by such routes as the Governor may 
notify to us, our people, herds, and flocks to such area on the south side of the Uganda 
Railway as the Governor may locate to us...”
167  
   The two historical evictions not only altered the pre-existing customary land tenure 
rights but changed the course of Maasai political economy as a community, with issues of 
land occupying the central place in their lives to the present day. It was definitely hard to 
believe that any community anywhere in the world could deliberately bring upon itself such a 
huge burden with devastating consequences. The assertion by colonial authorities that the 
Maasai willingly participated in their removal and that they were happy to relocate was 
contradicted as propaganda to sanitise illegitimate policy.  Lotte Hughes, one of the leading 
authorities on Maasai encounters with British colonialism, contends that the Maasai had 
always protested about moving from their ancestral land to other areas, which were not 
suitable for their livestock. ; “Thousands of Maasai were forcibly moved from the Rift Valley 
and Laikipia, a territory they called Entorror, to a Southern Reserve; it was an inferior 
substitute.”
168  
The government employed what Okoth-Ogendo described as a quasi-legal mechanism 
to enforce a pre-planned strategy of removing the Maasai from the expansive and fertile Rift 
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Valley sub-region they had been occupying for generations
169. Initially when Lord Delamere 
applied for concession, he was denied because of what was argued as the need to protect the 
Maasai.
170 This fundamental raison d’être which was used to forestall unjust allocation of 
land in the pastoral Maasai area soon fell apart and it was difficult to fathom why something 
which had appeared to be a subtle cause was suddenly consigned to the backwaters. 
Some observers saw the removal of the Maasai as unjustified and one of them, John 
Staffacher, wrote the following about the removal of the Maasai: “The Government officers 
are intolerably cruel with the natives. They are driving the Maasai from the favourite pasture 
grounds which were always theirs to a little barren strip of the country on which their large 
numbers of sheep and cattle cannot possibly live, simply that a few wealthy snobbish English 
lords may buy up the land for their own selfish interests.”
171 The physical movement of 
people and livestock from Laikipia was described as a bewildering episode. Charles Miller 
described it as follows: “Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow may have been a dress parade by 
comparison. Planned routes were forgotten as 10,000 Maasai, 175,000 cattle and over one 
million sheep sprawled out across the Rift and its two escarpments like nails spilled from a 
giant’s keg.’
172   
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4.5 The Maasai Case: The High Court
173   
The decision by the Maasai to go court arose out of the frustrations of the Maasai 
community following the two agreements they had entered into with the British Imperial 
Government. On both occasions the agreements required the Maasai to vacate the land they 
inhabited in order for the government to settle European farmers. After the conclusion of the 
second agreement in 1911, some Maasai leaders sought intervention of the court, claiming 
their right to return to Laikipia, the Northern Reserve from which they had been moved when 
the 1904 Agreement was concluded. Led by Legalishu (Gilisho) who had asked his son-in 
law, Murket Ole Nchoko (Ol le Njogo) to be the main plaintiff, the Maasai filed a civil suit at 
the Supreme Court to claim that the 1911 Agreement was a breach of 1904. The Case was 
presided over by Justice Hamilton (later Chief Justice of the Protectorate).
174 
Although the validity of the so called ‘Agreement’ was questioned by the Maasai, the 
main plea put forward by  Ol le Njogo and others was that the government had ‘breached’ the 
1904 Agreement by removing the Maasai from Laikipia. The plea rested on the argument that 
the signatories to the 1911 Agreement did not have consent of the Maasai tribe as whole, and 
therefore were not representatives of the community. They pleaded that the government was 
still bound by the 1904 Agreement and as such, their rights to Laikipia should be restored. 
There were other subsidiary pleas, which were related to the main one; a claim for £5000 
damage for the government failure to construct a road linking the two reserves; a claim for 
losses of livestock while being removed from Laikipia. They also contended that the 1904 
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Agreement was a legal contract and government purported annulment by 1911 Agreement 
was a breach.  They further claimed that the 1911 Agreement was obtained under duress. 
The court did not appear to be interested to hear the case in its own merit but rather 
allowed the executive to meddle in the matter, thus through the Attorney General. Justice 
Hamilton instead allowed the counter-plea raised by the Attorney General, which stated that 
claims made by the Maasai could not be heard by a municipal court. The  Attorney General 
argued that both agreements were entered into by the representatives of the Crown in the East 
Africa Protectorate, in which the King exercises powers by virtue of the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act, 1890, and from the advice of the Privy Council, His Majesty ordered in 1902 that- 
The Commissioner shall administer the Government of East Africa in the name and on behalf of 
His Majesty, and shall do and execute in due manner all things that shall belong to his said 
command, and to the trust thereby reposed in him, according to the several powers and authorities 
granted or appointed to him by virtue of this Order and of his commission, and according to such 
instructions as may from time to time be given to him under His Majesty’s Sign Manual and 
Signet, or by Order of His Majesty in Council, or by His Majesty through a Secretary of State, and 
according to such laws as are or shall hereafter be in force in the Protectorate." (Order in Council 
1902(3).) 
The Attorney General further argued that claims against government officials for breach of 
the 1904 Agreement could not stand because, according to him, they acted on behalf of the 
Crown. According to him the agreement they entered into were treaties and treaties being the 
Acts of State, were not recognisable in the court of the Protectorates. 
He further contended that the Maasai tribesmen, living within the limits of the East 
Africa Protectorate, were not subjects of the Crown. He stated that the territory was a 
protectorate in which the Crown had a jurisdiction, which in essence rendered the Maasai as 
protected foreigners owing allegiance to the Crown (in return for protection) but not subjects 
of the crown.  The Attorney General made a broadly brushed statement that created more 
confusion than clarity in the Maasai case. He tried to argue that the Maasai were a sovereign 111 
 
people who willingly signed a treaty with the British government. This was issue which even 
by a modest standard did appear contestable in a colonial context where the colonized people 
were treated as subject of ruling authorities. As to the controversial legal status of a 
protectorate, the Attorney General retreated to usual legal cascade. In explaining the 
circumstances leading to acquisition of the Maasailand, the A.G referred to the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act as to the meaning of Protectorate. This presupposed that acquisition of 
Maasai land was separate from the rest of the Protectorate, a sui generis. To his mind, Maasai 
land “... has never been acquired by settlement, or ceded to, or conquered, or annexed by His 
Majesty, or recognized by His Majesty as part of his dominions."  
The court was in total agreement with the Attorney General and it upheld the counter-
plea made by the Attorney General on behalf of British East Africa. The merits of the issues 
raised by the Maasai were thus not heard by the court. Furthermore, all the other subsidiary 
pleas they made were also dismissed. As to the claims of civil contract, Justice Hamilton had 
this to say: 
In my opinion, there is here no legal contract as alleged between the Protectorate Government and the 
Masai signatories of the agreements, but the agreements are in fact treaties between the Crown and the 
representatives of the Masai, a foreign tribe living under its protection.) I will now consider the 
plaintiffs’ claims and the acts of which they complain. 
The Maasai appealed the verdict of the High Court. As it turned out, the appeal also did not 
succeed as the superior court took a similar stance to the High Court. However, it is important to 
briefly interrogate the arguments of the Court of Appeal as well as the general aspects of judicial and 
executive interventions in the Maasai case. 
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4.6 The Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa
175 
  The Bench that constituted Morris Carter, C.J. Uganda, Bonham Carter J and King 
Farlow, J.J. heard the appeal in December 1913. Alexander Morrison appeared for the 
Appellants; R.M Combe, Attorney General, for the Government. Mr. Morrison made strong 
rebuttals of the defence counter-claims to which the High Court showed unrestrained 
acquiescence. In a well-articulated opening statement, he brought to the Appeal Court’s 
attention the changed circumstances in the Protectorate since the passage of the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act. He asserted that the British rule and British courts had been fully established 
which applied to the Maasai as the subjects of the Protectorate. 
  Morrison argued that a treaty could only be entered into with an independent 
sovereign state, which the Maasai, according to him, had ceded when the East African Order 
Council 1902 came into operation in the Protectorate. He further illustrated that with the 
creation of the Legislative Council, the laws that emanated from it applied to the Maasai as it 
did to all other subjects.  He rebutted the High Court reliance on Rex v. Crewe
176 to support 
the argument that the Maasai were not subjects of the Crown. Morrison argued that the 
circumstances between Bechuanaland and East Africa Protectorate were different and in the 
case of Sekgome the issue of whether he was a British subject did not arise.  
On the question of treaty or agreement, he cited many cases from India ( a country that 
had provided many benchmarks for various land laws in Kenya) where he stated that the 
governing principle the courts applied was that government had jurisdiction to make   
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agreements but not enter treaties with protected tribes or nations. Here he referred to several 
precedents; inter alia, Huri Sadashir v. Shaikh Ajmuddin
177, Nawab of Carnatic v. East India 
Company
178, Forrester and others v. Secretary of State for India
179, Rajah Saligram v. 
Secretary of State for India
180 and Cook v. Spring.
181 Morrison argued it was not open to the 
Crown to reorganise any part of the territory as exempt from the jurisdiction of the court by an 
arbitrary action. He criticised the lower court for refusing to take evidence from the witnesses 
and making decision the status of the Maasai as sovereign state. That was a powerful 
restatement of facts and law from the Maasai lawyer but the Attorney General and the court 
stood their ground. They insisted that the Maasai were not subjects of the Crown and that the 
court was not competent to force the authorities to acquire territory and subjects.  However, 
the unanswered question was, why did the government choose to go into agreements it never 
intended to respect? Was it just naive or morally constrained to go it alone? Ghai and 
McAuslan agree that the government had actually unimpeded authority over land and did not 
need to enter into a treaty. They captured the contradiction of the colonial land policy that 
used both ‘carrot and stick’ in stripping people of their land rights.  “There can be no fuller 
exercise of sovereignty over the land than to compel, by legislation, a people to vacate their 
own traditional lands.”
182 The assertion by the government was that those who signed the 
agreement were not only assumed to be  but also treated as “persons whom the Commissioner 
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and Governor, acting on behalf of the Crown chose as representatives of the Maasai with 
whom the Crown could enter into such agreements”
183 The implication was clearly unsettling. 
The government did its business with those it had hand picked and therefore rendered the 
outcome of any task performed by such individuals as wanting. The lawyers attempted to 
demystify the girded wall erected by the court in respects of what it described as ‘subjects’ 
and ‘foreigners’ by arguing that at that point in time the Protectorate had assumed every 
characteristic of a colony.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the question of jurisdiction, particularly the nature and 
extent of powers of the protectorate authorities had not been settled. In the early phase of the 
settlement, lawyers and officials in London had sent different signals in respect of powers of 
the authorities to alienate indigenous land.
184 The situation that ensued at the time was 
described by Morris and Read in their book, as a ‘constitutional anomaly’ because there was 
not a fine line drawn to differentiate a protectorate from a colony.
185 The court was correct in 
arguing that protection of the Maasai was tied to the status and jurisdiction of the protectorate. 
However, what it did not mention was the fact that many questions that would have impact on 
the lives of the indigenous people were not resolved because of indefinite legal and 
constitutional framework at the time.
186 The Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, 1843-1890, had in fact 
given the British authorities an open-ended power to deal with the native communities and 
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their land. Although powers conferred upon protectorate authorities were limited under the 
Act, it was argued that this limitation did affect certain measures in use for effective control 
over the native population.
187 The Act further expanded the parameters of the powers of the 
Crown in a protectorate, which clearly encompassed many facets of social, economic and 
political affairs, which arguably transcended all ‘subjects’ of Her Majesty.  
The spirit of the Act captured the fact that the judicial function of the Protectorate was 
not mutually exclusive, considering the extant power of His Majesty at the time of the Maasai 
Agreement. This was confirmed by the 1889 Africa Order in Council, which provided that 
within a local jurisdiction, Her Majesty had power and authority over British subjects. 
‘Subjects’ by definition of the Order included ‘persons enjoying Her Majesty’s protection, 
foreigners who submitted themselves to this jurisdiction.’ The Maasai, who were said to be 
‘foreign subject’ by the court, still should have enjoyed judicial protection or at least fair 
hearing within its precincts.  The British Government had power over the Maasai as far as the 
Order was concerned. The supposedly  ‘foreign subject’ like Maasai were further defined as 
people ‘with respect to whom any state, king, chief or government has treaty or otherwise 
agreed or consented to the exercise of power or authority by Her Majesty.’ In the context of 
the Maasai, there was, at least conventionally, an agreement to cede sovereignty to the British 
Government.
188 The complete repudiation of the Maasai as foreign subject, therefore, created 
doubts with respect to both the terms of Foreign Jurisdiction Acts and in the context of the 
Maasai Agreements that removed them from their land. In a broader sense, the situation for 
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the communities in the British East Africa was the same. By the turn of nineteenth century the 
Crown had, in effect, exercised unlimited jurisdiction of the indigenous people.
189 It is 
therefore ludicrous for the British Empire to hide behind a nebulous claim that the Maasai 
were not subjects of His Majesty and as such were precluded from seeking justice in a British 
court. 
From the beginning, there was clear inclination by British commentators towards the 
argument that the British Government did not exercise full powers over ‘foreign subjects’ or 
‘state’ like Maasai, unless such jurisdiction was transferred to the crown by treaty.
190 Hall and 
Jenkyns for example, belonged to the school of thought that the British did not extend its 
jurisdiction beyond its subjects.
191 The Law Officers of the Crown were veritable disciples of 
Jenkyns and Hall in the 1880s, until a decade later when there appeared to be a change of 
mind as to the indivisibility of ‘country’ once it came under the  jurisdiction of the British 
Crown. Sir S.T. Reid and Sir Frank Lockwood contended that unlike the 1880s, Britain had 
changed its approach in the later decades. France and Germany, who believed “that the 
existence of a protectorate in an uncivilised country imparts the right to assume whatever 
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jurisdiction over all persons may be required for its effectual exercise,”
192 had been pushing 
the British to adopt that position. The position was subsequently strengthened by case law, as 
the courts maintained the notion of unlimited jurisdiction.  In the Bechuanaland case of R v. 
The Earl of Crewe, ex parte Sekgome, Vaughan Williams, L.J. dismissed as untenable any 
suggestion that British jurisdiction was limited to its subjects.
193 The unlimited jurisdiction of 
the crown power was similarly restated in the case of Sobhuza 11 v. Miller.
194 In this case, the 
court actually introduced the notion of plenary power of the Crown, which among other things 
exercised unlimited jurisdiction to legislate retrospectively.
195 The notion of plenary power 
was extensively invoked by the courts in the United State of America. Nevertheless, in the 
American situation the invocation of plenary power of the federal government or congress 
was to emphasise their accountability as trustees of the indigenous people’s rights in land, not 
to repudiate it. Chief Justice Marshall was very influential in the 1830s as his opinions in such 
cases as Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
196 and Worcester v. Georgia
197 became important dicta 
in understanding relationships between Anglo-American dominated government and the 
indigenous people, and in the process laying the foundation of the doctrine of trust.  
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Looking at the Maasai case, one might ask whether the court allowed its decision to be 
influenced by political considerations or was only concerned with judicial probity. The court 
did not hide the political imperative of the case when it clearly alluded to the fact that the 
objective of the law in the Protectorate was to protect the interest of the settlers rather than 
native rights.  One of the presiding judges of the court of appeal, King Farlow had this to say: 
It was obvious that the Masai, with their roving habit, and warlike traditions, were not 
desirable neighbours for whites settlers, and that their pleasure along the vacantly constructed 
railway was hardly consistent with public interest...
198  
Failure by the court to dispense justice in the Maasai case was an important issue of a 
historical and monumental proportion. The court had the opportunity to establish a test case, 
which could have set authoritative legal principles that went beyond the narrow confines of 
Maasai and clarified the nature and scope of protectorate government and indigenous peoples’ 
relationship.  The protectorate officials overstepped their powers by undermining the promise 
they made to the Maasai. It was not enough to declare an act of state, which was one of the 
‘other lawful means’ mentioned in the preamble of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. The 
inevitable consequence of such a blanket application was to render the whole indigenous 
peoples without recourse to justice. If the legal basis for moving the Maasai was the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act, 1890, which provided for an ‘Act of State’, why then did the Crown bother 
to enter into agreements with the Maasai? In a ceded territory like that of the Maasai, the 
Crown had unfettered powers of every kind. It was then imprudent and actually an exercise in 
futility for the Protectorate authorities to organise all those meetings in Maasailand.  On the 
question of treaty, the contention that Maasai was a sovereign entity was a legal fiction. Carter 
CJ, in an attempt to justify the court’s decision, found that “a remnant of sovereignty still 
remain(ed) in Masai…”
199 to enter a treaty with the British Government. He did not explain 
the nature and scope of powers a ‘remnant sovereign’ carried vis-a-vis the Imperial British 
Government. 
                                                 
198 Ol le Njogo & Others, op cit, see note 33 p. 55  
199 See Ol le Njogo case. 119 
 
The next chapter discusses one of the most important historical milestones in colonial 
land policy, which was an attempt to classify land tenure into different and hierarchical 
categories. The Kenya Land Commission (popularly known as Carter Commission) which 
was appointed to investigate the land crisis, made recommendations that had long-term 
ramification, especially on pastoral land rights. 
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Chapter 5 
Classification of Land Tenure and its Effects on Land Rights 
5.1  Intervention in Reserves Land Crisis 
The colonial land policy of expropriation of African land substantially increased 
political resistance by the Africans, especially those living in the overcrowded reserves. The 
government’s determination to maintain the status quo continued unabated into the1920s and 
1930s leaving the African divested of any claims to land rights in the protectorate. Although it 
was apparent that resistance to this policy was obvious after the First World War, the colonial 
government still appeared oblivious to the emerging land crisis. It was surprising that in the 
midst of the emerging crisis the Africans land rights were declared non-existent. Chief Justice 
Barth delivered a ruling that dealt a blow to native land rights.  
In my view the effect of the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1915 and the Kenya( Annexation) 
Order-in-Council, 1920 by which no native private rights were reserved, and the Kenya colony 
Order-in-Council, 1921...is clearly inter alia to vest land reserved for the use of a native tribe 
in the Crown, if that be so then all natives in such reserved land, whatever they were 
...disappeared and natives in occupation of such Crown land became tenant at the will of the 
Crown of the land actually occupied which would presumably include land on which huts 
were built with their appurtenances and land cultivated by the occupier-such land would 
include that fallow...
200  
With all the colonial institutions marshaled against indigenous land rights, the 
Africans, particularly in the central highlands became frustrated and low-level resistance 
started in some areas in Kavirondo and Kikuyu.
201 The political landscape was changing as 
peasants’ resistance to colonial land policy, compounded by the agrarian crisis causing food 
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shortages in African reserves, gained momentum. Some of the colonial officials viewed the 
emerging scenario as a harbinger for instability and social upheaval. 
It was in view of this growing restlessness in African reserves that a prospect for 
change was anchored. There was genuine desire in some quarters to initiate reform 
programmes aimed at the pacification of Africans. In 1924, the government appointed the 
East African Commission under the Chairmanship of W.G.Ormsby-Gore to investigate, 
among other things, African land grievances. The Commission looked at the problems in a 
broader perspective and recommended that the solutions lay in accelerating the economic 
development of East Africa and addressing social conditions, labour and taxation issues 
among the native communities. More importantly, the Committee admitted that ‘there was 
probably no other subject which agitated the African mind more continuously than the 
question of their rights in land.
202  
In response to the Committees recommendations, the government began to work on a 
flurry of activities whose objectives were to facilitate changes in African reserves. First, it 
promulgated the Crown Lands Amendment Ordinance
203 to specially demarcate and secure 
the African reserves from further land alienation, ostensibly to protect indigenous land rights. 
In 1927 the Hilton-young Commission began its inquiry and, like Ormsby-Gore, it was 
stunned by the squalid conditions in African reserves. It recommended a policy that would 
‘guarantee the African sufficient land to maintain themselves through programs to be created 
by the government.”
204 The government again published the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 
that was enacted in 1930. The Bill was criticised as a half-hearted attempt to restore the land 
rights of the Africans, but it turned out to be a legislative instrument to control African 
reserves without excluding possible future expansion of settlement. The Board, which was 
expected to limit the power of the Governor in the allocation of land in reserves, would be 
constituted by government and settler representatives with only one African to be included ‘if 
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a suitable one could be found.’
205   The court once again offered its unflinching support to the 
colonial land policy. 
5.2 Kenya Land Commission  
In April 1932, the Secretary of State for Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister appointed 
the Kenya Land Commission (otherwise known as the Carter Commission (and herein the 
Commission). The Commission was chaired by Sir Morris Carter, who had served as Chief 
Justice in Uganda and also sat on the bench that heard the Maasai appeal case.
206 The other 
members of the Commission were R.W.Hemsted, Capt. F. O’B. Wilson, and S.H. Farzan as 
the secretary.
207 The Commission’s work marked an important milestone in the legal and 
administrative evolution of land tenure systems in Kenya.  
From an historical point of view, the Commission stands at the centre of two important  
colonial eras. The first one,  which for the purposes of this analysis, can be termed as phase 
one, was from 1895-1932, representing the single-minded determination of the Btitish 
Imperial Government to consolidate its rule in the acquired territories. Phase two, which   
could be said to have taken place between 1933-1963,  could be discerned as a ‘wake-up’ 
period when the colonial government realised the futility of continued suppression of the 
indigenous Africans in reserves that were sagging under demographic and economic pressure. 
Many keen observers of political development in the colony had recognised the fact that since 
the end of the First World War, Africans’ agitation for political changes was becoming 
increasingly visible, especially among the Kikuyu squatters. The government felt threatened 
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by the political awakening among the African peasantry and thus expected the Commission to 
lay a firm foundation for future land policy.  
 The first phase was mostly defined by what happened between 1902 and 1915. During 
this period, the British colonial authorities were largely preoccupied with creating policies and 
laws aimed at altering land tenure relationships in the occupied territories. The Protectorate 
pioneer administrators’ first assignment, in addition to securing the geographical borders and 
setting up administrative structures, was to mobilise European settlement. The Imperial 
Government conveniently vested itself with unlimited power of sovereignty to alienate land 
and other land resources. 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, as soon as the European settlement in the White Highlands 
got underway, the demand of the settlers went beyond the acquisition of land. There was 
equally high demand for African labour on European farms. Many African peasants’ families 
who were driven either by landlessness or by poverty opted to work on farms, particularly in 
the sprawling plantations in the Rift Valley. In the process, a new class of African labourer- 
tenants emerged. Suffice to say, the labour issue became another source of conflicts. By 1932, 
there were 150,000 labourer-tenants living on European estates and their squalid social 
conditions gradually triggered conflicts with the settlers and the colonial authorities. The 
oversupply of labour had, in the opinion of the colonial authorities and the settlers, 
complicated land tenure in the White Highlands and as such there was urgency to address the 
matter.
208  
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The complication mentioned was related to access to land.  Africans who worked on the 
European estates had no rights to land.
209 Those who had employment had access to use land 
temporarily for subsistence crops and keeping a limited number of stock. The offshoot of this 
was that those who had not been absorbed into the labour market were rendered undesirable 
squatters. In addition to the problem of squatting in the White Highlands, there was the 
simmering danger of overpopulated reserves.  The cumulative effects of land alienation to 
European settlers and the creation of African reserves had caused intractable congestion in 
some parts of the colony. The Kenya Land Commission was thus tasked to investigate land 
issues against this bleak background.  
5.3 Mandate of the Commission 
The principal mandate of the Kenya Land Commission was to inquire into matters 
concerning land and report to the colonial government with recommendations on what 
measures needed to be undertaken to resolve them. The Government outlined the tasks to be 
carried out in the Terms of Reference. It appeared that the focus was on some aspects of land 
problems in some parts of the colony, while neglecting the rest. The Terms of Reference 
(TOR) stated that the Commission was “to consider and report upon certain land problems in 
the colony of Kenya.”
210 Further reading and analysis of the Report as a whole reveals that the 
authorities had intended to restrict land issues to certain aspects.  It is important to look at the 
                                                 
209 According to the  Resident Native Labourers Ordinance No.5/1925 and subsequent amendements, No. 28/ 
1928  and  the Ordinace to Regulate the Residence Labourers on Farm, No. 30/1937 as amended by No. 18/1939, 
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extended to other relatives such grandparents, siblings, cousins etc. 
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TOR spelt out by the British government in order to understand the full import of the 
Commission’s work. 
In general terms, the Commission was set up to address what the authorities perceived 
as unresolved land issues relating to both the native Africans and the European settlers.
211 The 
Commission had specific terms of reference to deal with both the African and European land 
question. For example, TOR numbers 1-5 and 7 dealt with the native Africans’ land issues.  
The TOR 6 was specifically provided to cater for the land rights of the Europeans in the 
White Highland.  Overall, it appears that the government had tasked Kenya Land Commission 
with three aspects of land issues with regard to the Africans.  The first aspect, which could, at 
that particular period, is categorised as future land tenure policy was covered under the TOR 1 
and 2. Under the TOR I, the Commission was, “To consider the needs of the native 
population, present and prospective with respect to land, whether to be held on tribal or on 
individual tenure. Under the TOR 2, the Commission was, “To consider the desirability and 
practicability of setting aside areas of land for the present or future occupancy by (a) 
communities, bodies or individual natives of recognized tribes, (c) detribalized natives. The 
detribalized natives referred to were described as ‘natives, who belong to no tribe, or have 
severed connexion with the tribe to which they once belonged’. 
The second aspect of concern by the colonial government about the African land 
question could be termed as the need to deal with historical injustice. The government did not 
directly call it so but it could be inferred from the way it was put under TOR 3, and 4. Under 
the TOR 3, the Commission was, “To determine the nature and extent of claims asserted by 
natives over land alienated to non-natives and to make recommendations for adequate 
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settlement of such claims whether by legislation or otherwise.” Under the TOR 4, the 
Commission was, “To examine claims asserted by natives over land not yet alienated and to 
make recommendations for adequate settlement of such claims.”  
The third aspect of concern could be interpreted as a desire by the colonial authorities 
to review or reform land laws and policies that existed at the time. This was addressed under 
the TOR 5 and 7. Under 5, the Commission was, “ To consider the nature and extent of the 
rights held by the natives under section 86 of the Crown Land Ordinance, chapter 140 of the 
Revised Edition), and whether better means could be adopted for dealing with such rights in 
respect of (a) land already alienated, (b) land to be alienated in future. Under the TOR 7, the 
Commission was, “To review the working of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, 1930, and to 
consider how any administrative difficulties may already have arisen can be best met whether 
by supplemental legislation or otherwise without involving any departure from the principles 
of the said Ordinance.” 
 Term of Reference 6 was provided to address specifically the land tenure security of 
the European settlers in the White Highlands. The Commission was, “To define the area, 
generally known as Highlands, within which persons of European descent are to have a 
privileged position in accordance with the White paper of 1923.” As indicated later in the 
chapter, the authorities were setting the stage for a long-term protection of the settlers ‘land’ 
that had been massively accumulated over the years at the expense of the indigenous groups. 
A brief analysis of the Mandate of the Commission, particularly the way the 
government formulated the Term of Reference provide an idea of whether the proposed 
reformation of land policy was political gimmickry to forestall the simmering revolt by the 
landless Africans or was indeed genuine land tenure reform.  There was no doubt that the 127 
 
British Imperial Government showed some level of willingness to deal with African land 
problems. The question was how far the government was willing to go.  However, the 
approach adopted by the Kenya Land Commission raised more doubt than a cause for 
optimism. In fact, one could be forgiven for thinking that the Commission was more a ‘ploy’ 
than a genuine agency established to address the prevailing land grievances. Looking at the 
Terms of Reference relating to native Africans, it was clear that the Terms were vague, 
narrow, and evasive. Considering the magnitude of the land crisis caused by decades of 
colonial land expropriation, it seems that it would have made more sense to prioritise a radical 
reform of colonial land policy as a whole rather than selective sections of laws as provided in 
TOR 5 and 7. Due to the restrictive nature of the TOR, some of the most controversial land 
laws such as the Crown Land Ordinance, which overlooked the rights of the Africans and 
cumulatively made them tenants-at-will of the Crown,
212 were not addressed by the 
Commission. 
The Commission was also to be blamed for some of the confusion that might have 
emanated from the way the Terms of Reference were framed. The Commission did not 
interpret them, as would have been expected in such an important task. For example, the 
Royal East African Commission had dealt with similar land issues and it clearly interpreted its 
TOR.
213 Such an interpretation would clarify not only the intent and scope of the inquiry but 
also defined issues and terms employed in TOR. It was not clear what, for example, 
‘detribalized native’ stood for as used in TOR 2. 
                                                 
212 The Crown Land Ordinance which was first enacted in 1902 was the the most substantive piece of legislation 
used to assert the policy of  crown ownership of land, thus repudiating the pre-existing land rights of the 
indigenous Africans. The notion of Crown or government as an holder of title surived the colonial rule and 
persist to this day. 
213 Royal East African Commission Report, 1953-1955, Cmd 9475. Chapter , pp.2-4 was dedicated to 
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To contextualise the gravity of African land rights, as late as 1932, the Chief Native 
Commissioner (who chaired the Native Land Trust Board, charged with protection of native 
land rights) attacked the same Africans he was appointed to protect, by undermining the 
customary ownership of land. In defence of the government land policy, he ridiculously 
oversaw the disempowering of the Native Council and the Board he was chairing.  The Chief 
Native Commissioner said: 
I am afraid that we have got to hurt their (the natives) feelings, we have got to wound their 
susceptibilities and in some cases I am afraid we may even have to violate some of their most 
cherished and possibly even sacred traditions if we have to move natives from their land on 
which according to their own customary law they have an inalienable right to live, and settle 
them on land from which the owner has under that same customary law indisputable right to 
eject them.
214 
That kind of attitude was unfortunate at the time when the administration was 
promising to deal with the land question that had completely disrupted the lives of many 
African communities. The government initiative was not actually new, considering that a 
couple of years before the Kenya Land Commission was appointed, a similar body, the 
Hilton-Young Commission, decried the state of African land issues. It made a wide range of 
recommendations that would include a comprehensive land reform to effectively redress 
African land grievances. In its Report
215, the Hilton-Young Commission made it clear that 
there was an urgent need to address the issue of inequality that existed between the settlers 
and the indigenous Africans. The existed policies were criticised for being discriminative 
against the Africans. It recommended, as an irreducible minimum, that there should be no 
                                                 
214 Mr. A de. V. Wade, p.511 of the Leg. Co Debates 1932.  One of the foremost and acerbic c opponents of the 
African land rights, Lord Francis Scott, who a member of the Native Lands Trust Board, argued that the measure 
was for the benefits of the native Africans (p.513). He was supported by H.R. Montgomery, Nyanza Provincial 
Commissioner who claimed that Africans were happyabout the changes because they were ostensibly tired of 
prospectors who were invading their land (515). Quoted in Okoth- Ogendo, ibid, (1991) p.58. 
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ambiguity on the principles that govern the allocation of land. The method by which land was 
allocated to the native population and subsequent land title granted to them should provide 
unequivocal security of tenure.
216 
The policy of native reserves, as one of the most prejudicial colonial measures taken 
against the native inhabitants, should have been on the table. If there was good intention in the 
whole exercise, the Commission should have dealt with the most controversial land, 
especially in the White Highland, and recognised the legacy of ‘land grabbing’ on which it 
was founded. With their failure to deal with that important aspect of colonial acquisition and 
the need to restore the rights of the indigenous peoples such as the Maasai who lost their land 
to the settlers, the Commission confirmed the fear that it was, after all, an instrument of 
distraction formed to deflate growing political tensions among the Africans.   
5.4 Conduct of the Inquiry and evidence 
It is clear from the Report that the Commission was more interested to set the stage for 
the settler friendly land tenure system and to also integrate the Africans in the colonial 
economic structure rather than to resolve the endemic land question. The Report could be 
summarised as a precursor to modernisation of land tenure which would be predicated on the 
western concept of land ownership. The idea was to divide African areas into tenure 
categories that favoured one group against the other thus taking pressure off the classes, 
proposing individualisation and registration, which was modelled on the notion of the English 
property law. Based on both historical and agricultural proximity to the dominant settler 
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economy, the Commission ranked the African reserves into categories, which were arranged 
in pecking order, with the ‘top’ classes eventually expected to feed into the evolving colonial 
land tenure structure. For other areas, in particular the pastoral lands in the northern part of 
the country, the Commission adopted a strategy that generally ‘set aside’ the land for future 
use by the state and private enterprises. For the most part, the Commission concentrated on 
boundaries between African communities, delving into old and odd so-called eyewitness 
accounts by European explorers, without mentioning whether there were claims or counter-
claims made by concerned communities.
217 Like in the case of the Kikuyu, the Commission 
produced a lengthy report covering many pages describing boundaries of three Kikuyu 
districts, quoting dozens of travellers’ accounts, yet showing no relevance to the important 
tenure issues in question.
218  
The Commission also went to great lengths to record incidents of raids and conflicts 
between neighbouring African communities without indicating how they affected ‘tribal’ 
tenure or their implication on the future tenurial arrangements.
219 The report is replete with 
accounts of incidents witnessed by European administrators, explorers, missionaries and 
traders and not the same level of attention was accorded to the Africans’ views, though they 
                                                 
217 There is innumerable amounts of purported evidence given by the early explorers who made journeys through 
certain African countries, claiming to have known who the first dwellers were and  what they saw as their 
historical footprints. See for example the accounts by Von Hohnel Teleki ‘entry into Kikuyu country,  Joseph 
Thomson ‘Through Masailand’, Major Macdonald, ‘Soldiering and Surveying in British East Africa’, MacLellan 
Wilson’s kikuyiu salt-lick, etc, See para. 35, 36, 37 on page 17 to get glipse of  ‘witnesses’ stories. 
218 See Chapters 11, 111, and 1V of the KLC, describing the boundaries of the Kikuyu country covering 
Western, Southern and Eastern and Northern borders ‘when the Protectorate was delared’, pp16-70, paras.32-
214. 
219 See for example attacks Kikuyu attacks on Masai, at para. 40 and Kikuyu and Kamba raids at para.43 131 
 
were said to have overwhelmingly participated in the process.
220 The report is largely 
reflected in the light of statements made by visitors such the following: 
  The evidence of Mr. A.C. Hoey, who was the first European to visit these parts, is of interest 
on this point. He states that before the advent of Government the Elgeyo were confined to the 
forest and did not use this land.  
 
We believe in Mr. MacLellan Wilson’s views’
221or ‘the only European witnesses who can 
speak of that period are colonel Ainsworth and Mr. C.W. Hobley, and their evidence shows 
conclusively that up to till 1894 practically no cultivation and no natives other than Masai 
were seen outside the forest belt in the general neighbourhood of the site where Nairobi now 
stands.
222 “Further significant evidence concerning the native of the Kikuyu occupation in this 
area has been given to the Commission by Mr. Bathscombe, the Hon. Charles Dundas, 
Mr.A.G. Baker and Mr. Isaac.
223 The report was evidently more influenced by the views of 
the Europeans rather than the said ‘natives’ whose occasional inputs were vaguely described 
as ‘claims’ made in  public ‘baraza (loosely organized gathering).  
 
5.5 The Report  
The Report
224 of the Commission was presented to the Parliament in May 1934 and 
was accompanied by a White Paper
225 in which the Government approved the 
recommendations put forward by the Commission. The Commission produced a report within 
one year of the commencement of its work. It was a comprehensive document, which 
consisted of a main Report (running in excess of 600 pages, with three voluminous evidence 
                                                 
220 According to the KLC Report’s breakdown,  out of 736 witnesses that were heard, 507 were  Africans, and 
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annexure). The approach adopted by the Commission was to deal with each region or tribe 
based on what it considered as being either collective concerns or individual claims.
226  
   The Commission principally adopted a tribal approach in its attempt to address land 
tenure in native areas, by dividing them into ‘Nine Native Units.’
227 The Commission did not 
only divide the land into pecking order along regional and ecological lines but also along 
ethnic and racial hierarchies. The classification was based with tribal consideration in mind to 
address the simmering problems in some native reserves such as Kikuyu where land claims 
and population density were putting pressure on the colonial government.
228 This approach 
was possibly aimed at achieving two important objectives. Firstly, the Colonial Office had to 
reassure the African population in the reserves that the government would not encroach on the 
reserves land any more. Each tribe, according to the report, would be secure if they kept their 
reserve. It was partly intended to pacify the already angry population. Secondly, by securing 
reserve for each community or tribe, the Commission would have been justified in 
demarcating the White Highland as a home for the settlers and therefore forestall future 
claims by Africans who lost their land.  The Commission had this to say: 
We consider that it would be invidious if the native reserves were to be protected in this 
manner and no similar security be given to the Europeans Highlands. We recommend 
therefore that external boundaries of the European Highlands be defined under the Order in 
Council, and be subject to analogous safeguards as to exclusions, additions and exchanges.  
                                                 
226 KLC, ibid, Introduction, pp 2-6. 
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which clearly were based on pecking order based on  proximity to the ‘White Highland’ and their agricultural 
potentials. 
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Although the semi-official reference to “White Highland” had somehow entrenched 
itself exclusivity as a special reservation for European settlers, it had no definite boundaries. 
In pre-1920 Kenya, the undefined territorial had served the settlers well because they could 
expand their boundaries, without fear of being accused encroaching on African areas. 
However, what they forgot to realise was the fact that Africans knew the extent of the borders, 
and they had always resisted the forceful occupation facilitated by the colonial government. 
Soon population pressure in reserves and growing population of labourer-tenants (squatters) 
on European farms was becoming a cause for concern both in the government and among the 
settlers.
229  
According to the Commission, it was desirable for the land tenure to evolve towards 
privatisation, beginning with what it described as ‘advanced natives’.
230  The underlying 
assumption was that Africans would eventually ‘emerge from tribalism’
231 and take up 
individualised tenure system, which, according to the Commission was a sort of antidote of 
common or communal tenure.   The Commission was equally unequivocal in what it regarded 
as ‘uncompromised’ and ‘non-negotiable’ place of the government in legal and institutional 
tenure arrangements in native areas. According to its own classification of native lands, Class 
A was supposedly constituted exclusively of native lands which would cease to be Crown 
lands.
232 The Commission made a proposal that advocated for the overriding domain of the 
                                                 
229 The European settlers practiced what was termed as “kaffir” farming where landless Africans were offered 
pieces of land for accommodation and subsistence farming on European farms in exchange for labour. This form 
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Native (Squatters) Ordinance of 1918 was later used to regulate the system and brought it within the broader 
policy of government control of natives labour.  
230  KLC para. 1462 
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Crown over land. For instance, while it suggested that the nuda proprietas was deemed to lie 
with natives’ population generally, the land was to be vested in a trust subject to the 
sovereignty of the crown and its general power of control.
233  
The widely used colonial notion of ‘repugnancy test’ was used to entrench the 
subservience of African customary law. The Commission stated thus: “The rights of families, 
and individuals should be covered by a declaration but they shall have all the rights and 
powers in respect of land which they have under native custom (as it is, or as it may become), 
in so far as they are not repugnant to the Lands Trust Ordinance or rules under it, or any other 
law or ordinance of the colony.” 
234  The Commission adopted a disingenuous approach in 
what it might have considered as panacea in resolving internal boundary disputes among 
Africans. Its proposal to merge marginal land to be taken over by a larger tribe was a recipe 
for displacement of smaller tribes by more powerful and larger tribes. In a cleverly 
camouflaged tenure terminology, the Commission justified such takeovers as ‘exchange’, 
‘additions’ and ‘interpenetration’. It was an attempt to confine the issues of land redistribution 
as an African problem without raising the underlying historical land issues for which 
government was responsible. The Commission came up with alien concepts such s ‘surplus 
territory’ and ‘inter-tribal lease’ as a solution to land claims. It ominously stated: 
Drastic remedies for securing a better distribution are not open to us. To take surplus territory 
from one tribe and give it to another is a step only justifiable in extremities, which has not 
risen or may not rise. To affect a similar result by a process of inter-tribal case may be more 
practicable and we would not rule out as a method should circumstances ever require it. 
235  
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While the Hilton-Young Commission had vehemently rejected the idea of alienating 
land from one tribe and appropriating to another tribe, the Kenya Land Commission supported 
the policy that encouraged encroachment of what it called ‘advanced tribes on others who 
underutilized their lands.
236 The Commission was not even embarrassed to borrow the 
example of South Africa in an attempt to advance its prejudicial standpoint. It referred to 
Professor E.H. Brooke’s History of Native Policy in South Africa.
237 
The ten years after the Report of the Commission of 1852-53 were devoted mainly to 
quiet administration, But steps were being taken...towards the legal securing of the 
Location Lands to the tribes inhabiting them. The first scheme...was granting of 
separate titles for each tribal location, the land to be alienated by Crown to separate 
boards of trustees. Such a trust was created by indenture of the 27
th May, 1858, in 
respect of the tribe (the Amatuli) occupying the Umnini location: under the name of 
the Umnini Trust still exists...But on mature consideration it was decided not proceed 
with the scheme, which would have taken from Government the power of reallocating 
land between tribes.   
 
The Commission was infatuated with the notion of internal re-arrangement of land rather 
than addressing the historical root cause of the problems. The intention was to justify 
government entrenched power to alter a native tenure arrangement, which was essentially 
based on common land rights, and instead vouch for individualised tenure. It presented with a 
confusing suggestion that was more opportunistic than a realistic solution to Africans land 
problems. This was what it stated: 
“We have seen that the possibilities of inter-tribal adjustments are very limited, but chances are 
more hopeful for a penetration by individuals. By this means, surplus members of a congested 
tribe may be able to find some relief by going to live as tenants in the territory of another tribe, 
into which they will eventually be absorbed.
238  
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The strategic manoeuvre of ‘interpenetration’ appeared to be a distraction that was 
aimed at safeguarding the interests of the crown and the settlers. It was a reverse mode of 
sorts it engaged in with realising the risk it might cause by igniting inter-tribal scramble for 
land. Those weaker groups at the end of the spectrum would always lose their land to stronger 
neighbours who would be encouraged and supported by government. The government was 
expected to then entrench its dominant position as the holder of the radical title. The 
Commission asserted that the legal position of the natives as tenants at will “was only created 
in order that native rights might be better safeguarded and defined.”
239 The Commission also 
supported the ‘Barth Judgment’
240 which had confirmed the provision of the Crown Lands 
Ordinance that regarded the indigenous communities as mere tenants. In the same vein, the 
Commission strangely claimed that the natives misunderstood the objective of the Crown 
Land Ordinance. It defended the government explaining, “it must be admitted that to deprive 
a man of his rights in land for the sake of protecting him is a method of procedure which is 
liable to be misunderstood.”
241 The Commission unremittingly stretched its self-indulgence 
beyond belief. The government itself had never explicitly made a claim of that kind. 
The Commission was clearly biased towards areas that it perceived as significant to the 
political economy of the colony in the future. It was well aware that it could not deal with the 
issues of boundaries, without delving into historical claims by victimized groups such as the 
Maasai, whose land became the nuclear upon which Eurocentric agrarian policy was built.  
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para.1635 ( Original Civil Case 626/1921, reported in Vol.IX, East Africa Law Reports, pp.102-103. 
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 5.6  Agrarian State  
The goal of the pioneer settler community and the administrators such as Charles Eliot 
was to constitute a colonial economic structure based on agricultural development. Settlement 
was encouraged with the aim of investing as an elevated farming sector expected to grow into 
exportable industrial level as opposed to African ‘rudimentary’ practices. However, economic 
historians rejected the suggestion that the colonists were driven by economic objectives and 
pointed out the fact the African had not proved any sound technical or practical experience in 
agriculture.  
The settlers and syndicated concessionaires were motivated by the speculative 
accumulation of land. The Kenya Land Commission was mandated to review the situation of 
all the natives’ land in the Colony. Its task was to ‘consider the needs of the native population, 
pre-set and prospective, with respect to land.’
242 However, the report clearly shows that the 
Commission was more focused on the so-called ‘high potential’ areas, that comprise 
European reserve and contiguous African areas, to the detriment of the more arid and semi-
arid regions. The Commission gave unparalleled attention to central and Rift Valley highlands 
to which the colonial administration had directed much of its policies. Those areas were 
treated as central to the long-term colonial vision of the colony. The undisputed objective of 
the colonial government was to entrench agrarian economic structure. 
   The Commission skillfully pre-empted the question of disparity between indigenous 
communities and regions to ward off possible criticism as to why such differences existed 
(reference to the Commission’s lopsided concentration on one region). The Commission was 
quick and upfront in defending its position. Referring to the highly differentiated tribal land 
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tenure arrangements it had recommended, it stated as follows:  ‘The above arrangement, 
which sets Kikuyu Province in one part, and all the other provinces in another part, may 
suggest that we attach more importance to the needs of the Kikuyu in respect of land than the 
needs of other tribes.”
243 The Commission justified its inclination by adding that: “This is not 
the case, but the exceptional degree of individualism to which this tribe has attained in its 
conception of landholding, in conjunction with other considerations which we shall explain, 
have rendered the just settlement of the kikuyu land problems especially intricate, and have 
demanded examination in greater detail than has been the case for other tribes.” 
It is not by coincidence that throughout the report, the Commission vouched for 
individualised tenure type and had nothing positive to say about other systems, particularly 
the indigenous ‘common’ practice that pre-dated ‘modern’ private tenure. The sustained 
attack on what the Commission kept referring to as ‘tribal life’ illustrates the negative 
impulses attached to African systems. The main thrust of the Commission proposals revolved 
around the ‘protection given to private rights of individuals, families or groups’, and   
secondly, support for natives, who have emerged from their ‘tribal state’ and wish to ‘hold 
land on some more individualised form of tenure than possible to them in the reserves.”
244 
We now turn to the question of how the Commission dealt with issues of land in the 
predominantly pastoral rangelands in Maasai and Northern Frontier Province.  
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5.7  Ignoring Maasai Land Question 
In Chapter 2, we saw how the Maasai were forced out en masse from their original 
homeland in the sprawling central Rift Valley.  The Maasai were bitter about the removal 
from their ancestral lands to the two reserves that were inferior in pasturage and water. 
245 The 
colonial officials, in cohort with settlers, once again plotted to remove the Maasai from 
Laikipia, (an area the colonial authorities set aside in place of the lost ancestral lands) for 
them under the pretext of uniting under their ritual leader Oloibon Lenana, who was said to be 
in favour of the removal.
246 The Governor, Percy Gillourd, misled the London Colonial office 
suggesting that it was necessary to have all of the Maasai together so that Lenana could exert 
his authority more easily, to stop the movement of the Maasai between two reserves, facilitate 
administrative control, and to ‘liberate a large tract of country suitable for European 
settlement.
247   
The use of Lenana, according to a letter sent by a sympathetic colonial civil servant to 
Professor Gilbert Murray, one of the acerbic critics of the government policy towards the 
Maasai,  to provide  a bait for the Maasai into conceding the second eviction.
248 The outraged 
Maasai did not accept this second eviction without protest. In spite of the unknown terrain of 
the British legal sophistication, the Maasai contested the eviction and what they saw as the 
breach of the 1904 Agreement that pledged an entreated inviolability of their land once they 
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moved to the two reserves. They might have lost the case in the corridors of the colonial 
courts but the Maasai never gave up on the land question during and after the end of colonial 
rule. 
How then did the Commission address such a critical historical claim? In the first 
place, the Commission paid scant attention to the Maasai land question, compared to such 
communities as the Kikuyu. The concept of ‘reserve’ was borne out of the Maasai land 
debacle, after their two massive evictions, where northern and southern reserves were 
identified with them. The Maasai land issues were, in comparison to Kikuyu, largely ignored 
and indeed dismissed. This was again despite the fact that the Foreign Office was forced to 
debate about reserves policy after the decision to move the Maasai was made.
249 The concept, 
which may have been borrowed from the North Americans’ native Indians reservation policy, 
was applied to the Maasai before it became a central plank of the colonial land policy. 
 In the end, it was in Kikuyu and other mainstream areas that the policy was perfected to suit 
colonial and post-colonial tenurial arrangements. The concept was also viewed as a 
governmental measure to protect the native Africans from further alienation of their land. The 
reserves were once again targeted by various pieces of legislation such as the Native Lands 
Trust Ordinance purportedly to serve the interests of the Africans. 
The historically controversial reserve policies for those like Maasai who suffered 
forced evictions and justifiably expected the Commission to address the issue were 
inexplicably overlooked. The Commission appeared to have discerned the concept in a 
different light even from the colonial administration, which at least attributed to it a form of 
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protective strategy. What the Commission widely referred to as ‘native reserves’ apparently 
looked like a euphemism for tenure conversion from the African communal system to private 
landholdings. Communities and individuals who were adept in adopting the ‘new’ system 
were encouraged and even ‘earmarked’ for government support. The Commission also saw fit 
to openly vouch for communities and individuals who were inclined towards the English 
property system. Those who were perceived to ‘cling to tribal life’ were to be sidelined. In 
addressing the land problem of the Kikuyu and Maasai, the Commission showed a sense of 
affinity towards the former and was more ready to pacify them rather than the latter.  To 
contextualize the Kikuyu land question, the Commission stated:  
“to convince the Kikuyu of Government’s desire to discharge all moral obligations which 
possibly be considered to exist towards them, that a ‘profit and loss’ account should be made 
setting off the areas of ‘unequivocal Kikuyu territory’ which have been granted, and that block 
additions should be made to the reserve equivalent to the balance of Kikuyu losses.”
250  
The Commission was convinced that tenure arrangement or the policy that 
government envisaged for the Kikuyu was inherently advantageous. To the Commission, ‘”it 
would be ridiculous for the Kikuyu to make grievance out of circumstance from which they 
have benefitted so greatly...”
251 
For the Maasai, the Commission’s approach was hinged on a sense of indifference and 
apprehension. It largely borrowed the colonial prejudice against the Maasai that led prominent 
government representatives, for example Charles Eliot, to scornfully brand the Maasai as 
arrogant and primitive. The Commission viewed Eliot as the most informed of the Maasai and 
widely quoted his mostly prejudicial statements such the one he made in 1901: ‘I regard the 
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Maasai as the most important and dangerous of the tribes with whom we have to deal with in 
East Africa, and I think it will be long necessary to maintain an adequate military force in the 
districts in which they inhabit.’
252 
The colonial administration was deliberately engaged in the process that was aimed at 
safeguarding the future interests of the settlers. The Africans’ fervent political activism was 
fostering in the background and threatening to tear down the commercial and industrial 
empire of the settlers. The colonial government was forced to employ a long-term strategy to 
protect those interests. Instead of objectively addressing the underlying land conflicts between 
the Africans and the colonists, the government chose to engage such Commissions as the 
Kenya Land Commission to distract the people from the real issues. It was not surprising that 
the Commission treated the Maasai land question from a narrow view of grazing rights, a 
misconception that was widely perpetrated against them. Contrary to the Commission’s 
position, scholars such as M.P.K Sorrenson, who wrote widely on the colonial settlement in 
Kenya, have argued that the land question was at the heart of the Maasai-British relationships. 
“Once European settlement began in earnest from 1903, it was evident that the Maasai, rather 
than the Kikuyu, were the centre of controversy over native rights to land”
253  
The Commission started by defining what it called the Maasai land claim. It was 
solely based on the then existing boundaries, rather than considering the many factors such as 
forced evictions, indigenous tenure practices, conflicts with other communities and other 
environmental and livelihoods systems. Even for the boundaries, the cut-off date for the 
Commission to review them was 1911 and not beyond. History is replete with the fact that the 
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turning point in the Maasai land issue was 1904 or thereabouts when their first eviction took 
place. The Commission’s 1911 starting point was problematic because it was aware of 
completely locking out the Maasai historical land claims. Responding to Maasai claims of 
certain lands lying between Athi River and Sultan Hamud (which historically belonged to 
Maasai before their evictions), the Commission dismissed them arguing that ‘the claim is not 
included in the Agreement of 1911 or any other agreement with the Maasai.”
254 The 
Commission was factually wrong on both accounts. The 1911 Agreement, as one-sided as it 
was, never explicitly provided for the boundaries in detail, and the Maasai had always used 
the extensive Athi plains as grazing areas. The overarching objective of the 1911 Agreement 
was to remove the Maasai from Laikipia. The 1911 Agreement annulled the previous 
Agreement of 1904 thus all earlier ‘negotiated’ boundaries, which in essence shredded and 
consigned government policy on the Maasai as null and void. After having failed to consider 
Maasai’s historical claims to land, the Commission dwelt on such notions and exchanges that 
it mainly proposed to ease congestion in densely populated reserves that bordered Maasai 
areas.  
The objective of the Commission was obviously not to protect the pastoral livelihoods 
system of the Maasai but rather to accelerate their extinguishment in order to pave way for 
‘advanced’ agricultural economy.  What was more apparent in the Commission’s approach 
was its willingness to engage in a policy roller-coaster that appeared to damage Maasai rather 
than ameliorate their land claims. The Commission appeared to choose deliberately to 
undermine the Maasai way of life.  It stated that the Maasai’s ‘strictly pastoral way of life’ 
was the cause for presumed underutilisation of land. It was proposed that farming 
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communities could make better use of land than the Maasai tribesmen did. The Commission 
thus asserted: “Without doubt, this land would be of great value to other tribes or 
communities who may require scopes for expansion or agricultural development.” And it 
continued. “We consider that it would be of advantage to the Masai, should they be willing, to 
cede some of this land in exchange for the Chyulu triangle, or any other area and which they 
may desire be available.”
255  
It was therefore difficult to understand why the Commission did not find any traction 
with that incredible history of the Maasai and instead chose to focus on issues and proposals 
that would lead to loss of more the Maasai land. Except an insignificant reference to a 
purported support for the Maasai to access a ritual site in Kinangop, there was virtually no 
substantive proposal to redress historical injustice that the Maasai had suffered. The warped 
idea about exchanges of land between Maasai, European farmers and neighbouring 
communities was a ploy to remove the Maasai from more productive areas. For example, in a 
proposal known as the ‘Mau Forest Exchange’, the Maasai was to “give up some forest to 
Forest Department in exchange for an area of grazing on the southern extremity of the Eastern 
Mau Forest Reserve.” 
256    
What the Commission did not mention was that the move to the drier southern edge of 
the forest would expose the Maasai to more vulnerability. The Commission went further and 
proposed that some rich agricultural areas within the Maasai reserve be set apart for use by 
other farming communities to purportedly make better use of land. “In the north-west corner 
of the Maasai Reserve there is an area of dense forest, which protects the head-waters of the 
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Mara and Kipsonoi Rivers. This forest, nearly 200 square miles, is probably more than is 
required for this purpose, and a considerable acreage of good agricultural land, of which the 
Maasai are unable to make any use, could profitably be set aside and leased to others, who are 
prepared to make use of it.”
257  
It appears that the Commission did not take into account the fact that pastoralism, 
which naturally requires vast, well watered, and pasture-rich land would make equally as 
good returns under sustainable environmental conditions. Ironically, the Commission proposal 
on wildlife, which in contemporary settings in Kenya is synonymous with the Maasailand, 
was contemptuous. The Commission did not make any plausible proposal on how the Maasai 
and their wildlife resources should be managed in a sustainable way. The Commission made a 
ludicrous suggestion that once the Maasai accepted “improved pastoral or agricultural 
methods, any obstacles which the existence of a Game Reserve presented should not be 
allowed to stand in the way of useful development and the game reserve should be limited or 
abolished as circumstances dictate.”
258 
5.8  The Northern Frontier District (NFD) 
The wet and agriculturally potential rangelands occupied by the Maasai in the central 
Rift Valley attracted the resource hunting settlers while the drier and shrubby north did not 
attract much attention in terms of European settlement. However, the colonial government, 
even though it had no significant short-term developmental plan for the region, recognised the 
regions’ geo- strategic and future resource exploitation.  
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The combined size of the arid and semi-arid land formed more than two-thirds of the 
country and was home to sprawling wildlife resources and other rich and indigenous fauna 
and flora. At the top of the Commission’s priority list was government and investor future 
interest in the vast land that might contain mineral resources. It saw no sense and urgency to 
propose land tenure policy that could secure pastoralists interests within the colonial and post-
independent legal and policy framework. Did the natives in the vast pastoral rangelands 
deserve tenure security to their land? The Commission was half-hearted and was not 
committed. “These natives clearly have rights in the land, but they can scarcely be said to 
have exclusive rights.”
259  Unlike other non-pastoral areas where the Commission took a 
holistic approach to discuss land tenure issues within broader social and economic conditions 
of communities, the Commission did not consider baseline survey of pastoral areas.
260 
The Commission began its work by categorising native lands into different classes and 
units. As was illustrated, the classification was in a ‘pecking’ order they appeared to give the 
so called ‘native lands’. The Northern Frontier Province and Turkana were not included in 
any of the native reserves category. The regions were omitted from a policy strategy of 
securing land rights for the natives against further alienation and dispossession. From the 
Commission’s own interpretation, native reserves were supposedly to be the last refuge 
against land expropriation. Why then were the northern pastoral regions overlooked? The 
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Commission had posited some justification as to why it left out the region out of protection 
measures. The main reason it gave was:  
While it is clearly our duty to propose means for the protection of the natives in the secure 
occupation of the land, we are averse from recommending that any native reserves should at 
this time be declared in either the Turkana or Northern Frontier Province...” 
261  
  It is clear from the Commission’s perspective, that the means for such protection could 
include a declaration as ‘native reserves’ which should have definite boundaries. The 
communities in particular reserves were to be protected from further loss of land. However, 
further analysis of the Commission’s proposal show that the idea that it wanted to preserve the 
customary practices of access to grazing was ludicrous The reason was more about other 
interests that were more appealing to the Commission than that of the pastoralists. According 
to the Commission it was more profitable to preserve the region for future exploitation by  
others, including government, capitalised corporations and syndicated companies rather than 
protecting the rights of the indigenes. It thus stated: 
In the first place the areas are so vast in proportion to their populations that it would 
amount to an unjustifiable locking up of land, if it were devoted in perpetuity to the 
exclusive use of the occupant tribes. It is true that a great of the country is so arid and 
inhospitable that it is difficult to see to what better use it can be put than to afford a 
home for nomadic pastoralists. But there may be undiscovered sources of wealth, and 
it would be wrong to put unnecessary obstacles in the way of development of such 
possibilities as the land may possess in minerals or otherwise.”
262  
There is no doubt that the said ‘unnecessary obstacles’ included the declaration of native 
reserves, which in other parts of the country were used as a legal measure to protect the 
communities. The Commission in essence was rooting for the interests of non-pastoralists, 
especially those ‘investors’ who would in future be interested in resources exploitation. 
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Pastoralist occupation was only tolerable so long as the land remained ‘harsh and 
inhospitable.’ Future discovery and generated mineral wealth was proposed to be for the 
benefit of those felt to be within the economic structure of the government. The Commission 
did not envisage other dynamic and alternative land and land-based resources tenure security 
for the pastoral areas. It was obviously limited by its prejudicial assumption that pastoralists 
could not adopt changes that could be beneficial to them. While the indigenous communities 
in the colony practised land tenure systems that were different from other farming 
communities, the Commission had no excuse to set up pastoral areas for a future legal lacuna. 
How else could one explain the Commission’s assertion that;  “While it is necessary that the 
native rights be safeguarded, the elaborate safeguards which we shall propose for the 
protection of  Native Reserve under the Lands Trust Ordinance would be unworkable in such 
a region and quite inappropriate.”
263  
The Commission did not offer any explanation as to why that piece of legislation was 
unworkable or inappropriate. Nevertheless, the reason for non-protection of pastoral 
communities becomes more apparent as the Commission made further proposals. In the first 
place, the picture it painted of the pastoral areas as unproductive barren lands, was mundane. 
In its own account, it qualified its own assertion when it said:  “...the Northern Frontier 
Province, while generally of that character, has also extensive areas of valuable pasture-land, 
parts of which are also suitable for agriculture. These areas are worthy of much better use than 
nomadic tribes can give them.”
264 Furthermore, the Commission chose to rely on the notion 
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that the land in pastoral areas was ‘vacant’ and as such, the state had rights to alienate land for 
non-pastoral use in the future. This was how the Commission justified it; 
We do not feel bound to reserve such land exclusively for the natives, since we dot consider 
that they have established a claim to exclusive possession either on historical or economic 
grounds, and we believe that it might be in the best interest of the colony that considerable 
areas should be leased to non-native individuals and companies, who have the capital to 
improve and develop them.
265  
The next chapter focuses on major changes that took place on the eve of Kenyan 
independence. The colonial government made extensive land policy changes, not to address 
past grievances among the Africans but to perpetuate its skewed policy beyond its eventual 
departure, thus preserving colonial agrarian structure.
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Chapter 6 
Road to Independence:  Land Reforms or Containment Policy? 
   6.1 Consolidating colonial land policy   
In the previous chapter, the role of the Kenya Land Commission (KLC) in reinforcing the 
fundamentals of the colonial land policy was broadly discussed. It was argued that the 
recommendations were aimed at incorporating non-European crop farmers (agriculturalists) 
into the colonial economic structure. The policy was meant to serve two important objectives. 
The first and most important aim was to forestall emerging scenarios of Africans’ resistance 
to colonial land policy.
266 The second reason was to ensure continuity of colonial land policy 
even after Africans’ land rights were nominally recognised. Although Kenya’s independence 
came exactly thirty years after the Kenya Land Commission was appointed, there is a sense 
that the Commission looked beyond the colonial rule. Its findings, especially those related to 
pastoral land, had envisaged tenure typologies that would fit individualised or privatised 
regimes.
267 
It was also illustrated that some statutory legislation were formulated for the purposes of 
implementing the recommendations of the Kenya Land Commission. However, what was 
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more important to the colonial authorities were the measures taken to ascertain and entrench 
the boundary of White Highlands, as an exclusive reserve for the European settlers.
268 The 
Commission therefore laid the foundation upon which subsequent legal and institutional 
frameworks were founded. As I shall demonstrate, the colonial administration took further 
steps, especially during the decade before independence to entrench colonial land tenure 
regimes. In those last decades of the colonial rule, the issues of the pastoral lands were 
evidently not part of the colonial equation. The government focused its attention on the 
settlers and was later forced to deal with growing resistance in the African reserves bordering 
the White Highlands. 
As illustrated from the beginning of this chapter, the Colonial government had prioritised 
settler-controlled agricultural activities over the African development challenges since the 
‘White Highland’ was created as an exclusive European zone. The authorities, in most cases 
under the pressure of economically and politically influential settlers, had been inordinately 
preoccupied with their interests.
269 Julian Huxley, an academic who was critical of the 
government policy towards the Africans, observed the relationship between the officials of the 
state and settlers as follows: 
The governor is subject to great political and social pressure from the white community of 
Kenya. His position is one of exceeding difficulties... Few, if any, governors have been able to 
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withstand organized white pressure, and native rights have been violated, and native interests 
neglected.
270  
Since the policy of reservation was entrenched as part of colonial control mechanisms 
of the Africans population, there was little evidence that the government was concerned about 
improving their lives. This was in a complete contrast with the Europeans who had since the 
1920s increased their agricultural outputs and prosperity from the export of various cash 
crops.
271   By the end of World War II in 1945, the situation in the African reserves were on 
the brink of massive social and economic precipice as a combination of internal conflicts over 
land and food shortages took toll on the indigenous peoples. Sir Philip Mitchell, the Governor 
of the Kenya, alarmed by the state of the African reserves wrote to the colonial office as that: 
the native reserves are just frankly going to the devil from neglect, and if the problem is not 
strongly tackled and at once you will have a frightened problem of conflicting land interests in 
a very few years, for what with White Highlands, native reserves and the rest, there is a very 
little flexibility in the position such as the most countries gives scope for coping with land 
problems.
272 
The colonial administration wrongly diagnosed the challenges confronting the Africans as  
problem related to poor food sector, where African agriculture was dismissed as rudimentary     
husbandry that was not sustainable.
273 Attempts were therefore made in the mid- 1940s to ‘teach’ 
selected Africans farmers methods of good husbandry to boost their agricultural outputs. A number of 
‘land improvement’ programmes were undertaken for this purpose. The new agricultural techniques, 
                                                 
270 Memorandum from Professor Julian Huxley to the ‘Joint Select Commmittee on Close Union in East Africa, 
King’s College, University of London. Vol.111 Appendices 1000657, London, HMSO, 1931. Cited i Berman, B, 
supra, p.190. 
271 By 1913, export of coffee and maize, two major settler crops,although were worth mere £65,000 ( i.e 16% of 
total domestic export)  was heavily supported by the colonial state. The Africans in the reserves who had been 
farmig on subsistence basis were not encouraged or supported to partake  in export economy. See Berman, B, 
supra, p.78. 
272 Quoted in Berman, B, supra, p.274. 
273 Okoth –Ogendo (1996) Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management: The Kenya Experience. Sahara nad 
Sahel Observatory Workshop Presentation Report. 153 
 
according to the authorities, would save more land for farming, especially among the Kikuyu 
peasants.
274 Although the Kikuyu community was generally amenable to the learning from their 
European neighbours, this strategy could not appease them because there was more to land problems 
than mere farming techniques. The authorities then changed course and decided that the panacea to 
this problem was the removal of the customary land tenure system practised by the indigenous 
people.
275  According to the officials, the African land tenure practice was inherently defective and as 
such incapable of sustaining better production. The assumption was that because the Africans owned 
lands in common, disputes over access and allocation for individual use might have hampered better 
agricultural production. On the other hand, it was contended that the Africans land tenure could not 
confer indefeasible and secure rights in land because it was not based on individualised tenure 
arrangements. Although this particular claim was based on sheer ignorance,  the government 
authorities were convinced that the only alternative was to embark on individualising the ‘commons’ 
among the farming communities in the reserves. 
  Contrary to those assumptions, the highlands communities such as Kikuyu had been 
practising shifting cultivation where each family and individual members owned their individual 
plots.
276  Furthermore, according to Pinckney and Kimuyu, the indigenous land rights were rarely 
communal in areas where the communities practised cultivation. They argued, “Individual households 
were usually allocated plots of land that remained theirs to cultivate as long as they wished; in 
addition, land was inheritable by sons.”
277 Again, contrary to the official thinking at the time that the 
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economy of the colony depended on large farming enterprises fed by African labour, small-scale 
farming in African areas, given appropriate support, would still have contributed substantially to the 
economy. A minority voice that supported that idea existed even among the government officials. For 
example, F.W. Isaac, an administrator with practical farming experience, argued as far back as 1908 
that it would economically make more sense for the government to support Africans small-scale 
agriculture than to have them work for the European large-scale farms. He argued that, ‘The method of 
land tenure that brings in the greatest revenue to the state is small holdings’ and it was better than   
having ‘one hundred natives cultivating 500 acres for a European.”
278 Unfortunately, such rational 
argument went unheeded because the official policy was based on consolidation of European 
settlement and agriculture. 
 Between 1954 and 1963, before the Kenya colony  became politically independent a series of 
policy and legislative actions took place with the aim of reforming agrarian policy. We shall briefly 
look at the policy intervention that has had enduring influence even long after independence. 
6.2 East African Royal Commission (EARC) 1953-1955 
The East Africa Royal Commission was appointed in 1953 to investigate multifaceted 
social, economic and political problems in the three countries of East Africa: Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania.
279 This broad mandate covered such issues as overpopulation, land tenure, 
economic opportunity, labour, infrastructure, industry, commerce, etc. The Royal Warrants 
dated 1
st January 1953 and 9
th February 1953 specify the main tasks as follows: 
Having regard to the rapid rate of increase of the African population of East Africa and the congestion 
of population on the land in certain localities, to examine the measures necessary to be taken to 
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achieve an improved standard of living, including the introduction of capital to enable peasant farming 
to develop and expand production; to frame recommendation thereon...
280  
In addressing issues affecting Kenya, the Commission had relied heavily on 
propositions made by the Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell in an official dispatch to the Secretary 
of State for Colonies.
281 The dispatch set out in detail the major problems that confronted the 
Africans and why it was important for the government to intervene before they ‘exploded out 
of control.’ As this study has already pointed out, the major concern raised by Sir Philip 
Mitchell was related to the overall land question, which included access to agricultural land. 
He pointed out that the emerging class differentiation even among Africans was causing 
further pressure on land as rich farmers purchased land from the poor.
282 The despatch largely 
emphasised ‘modification’ of tribal land tenure in order to integrate the Africans into cash 
economy. To this end, the Governor proposed “government endeavour control, divert, or 
assist this process of agrarian change, as part of their inescapable responsibility for seeing that 
land is not reduced to desert as a result of over-population by man and his stock.”
283  
The Commission concisely heeded the propositions made by the Governor. One of the 
issues it significantly addressed was the question of land tenure. The Commission strongly 
vouched for individualised land tenure based on statutory laws. Although the Commission 
recognised the fact that customary land tenure systems were deeply rooted among the 
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indigenous communities, it still blamed the society for clinging to them.
284 The Commission 
was of the view that changing customary law was of such critical importance that the colonial 
government should take charge, whether communities were ready for that or not. In its own 
words, the Commission stated as follows: 
A lead must be given by governments to meet requirement of the progress elements of society 
by applying a more satisfactory land tenure law wherever a fair measure of support exits. So 
also the breaking down of exclusive tribal and clan boundaries cannot be left entirely to a 
process of evolution under economic pressure. Positive action must be taken by governments 
to induce these exclusive communities to put land to within their boundaries to full use 
themselves, or to make it available for others.
285  
Even though the East African Royal Commission dismissed the Kenya Land 
Commission Report of 1934 for addressing the African land question from ‘tribal standpoint’, 
it fully endorsed its position on individualisation of land tenure. For example, the Kenya Land 
Commission’s recommendation about the Maasai land elicited support from the East African 
Royal Commission even when it was clear that pastoral land rights were being exposed to 
further seizure. The Kenya Land Commission proposed that Maasai needed to cede more land 
to other land users, meaning agriculturalists, rather than reclaiming land, which was lost as a 
consequence of the Maasai agreements.
286   The EARC Commission singled out this as the 
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most valuable recommendation made by the KLC and added that, “What may be called 
individual rights of land tenure must replace the tribal controls which now exist.”
287 
The other notable similarity between the Kenya Land Commission and the East Africa 
Royal Commission was the fact that they both showed very little interest in pastoral land 
rights. In fact, the Royal Commission went further in its distaste of pastoral communities by 
being contemptuous of their livelihood system. It enumerated specific pastoralists such as 
‘Samburu, Boran, Somali, Galla, Masai, and some of Kamba in Kenya; and the Maasai, Gogo, 
Barabaig, and others in Tanzania.’  Referring to all these groups, the Commission stated that 
Their pastoral way of life portends both a danger and deficiency. The danger is that they may 
turn their lands into desert; the deficiency was that without management of their herds and in 
some cases better usage of their land than mere pastoralism, they will contribute far less than 
their land’s potential to their growing needs of the community.
288 
 It was evident that the standard principle applied to the pastoralists by successive 
colonial governments was to blame their way of life.
289 This was in contrast to other sectors, 
including farming where needs such as technical or financial supports were identified as the 
means to ameliorate social and economic problems. However, the Commission pushed the 
agenda of individualisation of land tenure. It repeatedly emphasised many ingredients of this 
category of tenure such as adjudication, disposition, registration, etc. The Commission 
suggested that for the registration process to succeed, it must be based on a policy of land 
alienation, which in turn facilitated transferability of titles. It therefore recommended a 
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process of adjudication. The Commission emphasised the urgency of this process when it 
stated: 
The administrative machinery of government must ensure that the action to carry out policy decisions 
is quickly initiated and that the technical staff to carry them out. The land tenure officer will require 
the services of officers of a number of technical departments. The services of offices familiar with the 
technical processes of adjudication of interests in land, of registration, of boundary demarcation and 
survey and of land valuation will be required.”
290  
From the way government-planning agents used the EARC as the reference point, 
there is no doubt that it held a great sway in influencing land policy in Kenya. This is 
particularly so in relation to such central land tenure principles as adjudication, consolidation, 
registration and other cadastral regimes. Based on the work of the EARC, the other 
commissions established by colonial governments adapted at various times the approach of 
the Kenya Land Commission, entrenched the concept of individualised tenure. Soon after the 
Commission Report was adopted, the government sprung into action to implement 
recommendations made. It was such an entrenched concept that successive colonial 
governments ensured evolution of the customary tenure to individual landholdings.   
6.3 Swynnerton Plan, 1954 
By the early 1950s, the political environment in Kenya colony was getting out control 
as African political movements took a proactive stance in demanding nothing less that total 
freedom from the British Empire. There was discernible fear that unless the government took 
drastic measures to reform land policies, the cost of maintaining security would be untenable. 
Many among senior government bureaucrats had no illusion that the government must start 
land planning that went beyond the imperial rule, to take into account future protection of the 
settlers land interests. Driven by this consideration, the government took swift action to 
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implement the recommendation made by the East African Royal Commission. A policy 
document known as ‘Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya’ 
(popularly called the Swynnerton Plan) was immediately formulated to solely focus on 
African agriculture.
291  
 The objective of the Plan was to accelerate agricultural development in African areas 
through extensive re-organisation of land tenure and market. This was to be carried out 
through a process of land consolidation and individualisation of tenure. The Africans’ 
ownership of fragmented plots were said to be detrimental to optimal agricultural productivity 
and as such  were required to be consolidated and titles issued for registered land. According 
to Swynnerton, titles were useful in accessing credits for development of land because they 
would be used as security.
292 The Plan, inter alia, recommended the appropriation of £5 
million over a period of ten years for this purpose. It also recommended relaxation of policy 
that restricted African farmers from growing cash crops, provision of credits, extension 
services and infrastructure. The government implemented much of the recommended steps 
swiftly and the outcome of the policy shift was immediately realised with massive growth of 
sugar and other crops in African areas.
293  
Since the Plan was unveiled, it was assumed that it could be applied in pastoral areas 
in the same way as the agricultural areas, regardless of differentiated potentialities in those 
                                                 
291 Swynnerton, R.J.M (1954) A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya. 
Government Printer, Nirobi. 
292 Ibid, p.9. 
293 Okoth-Ogendo (1991) supra, p.141. 160 
 
areas.
294 At the beginning of the colonial rule, the government’s written and unwritten policy 
of ‘segregated development’ was conspicuously visible. Geographical and ecological 
classification of land areas were used as the basis of colonial development and future capital 
investment. The agricultural areas were ecologically categorised to be in medium and high 
potential zones while pastoral areas were in dry and low potential zones. The latter were 
hardly recognised as having potential for agricultural or any other form of development, thus 
receiving a raw deal in government policy and development interventions. The process of 
individualisation was implemented in the Maasai districts of Narok and Kajiado soon after 
Kenya achieved independence and they have since experienced a large influx of 
agriculturalists cashing in on the system.    
6.4 Agriculture Ordinance, 1955 
The government, encouraged by the growing potential of agriculture in formerly neglected 
areas, attempted to seal the gains by enacting laws that would promote the emerging agrarian 
development. The Agriculture Ordinance of 1955,
295 which had been in preparation since 
1949, was a milestone in this process. According to the preamble, its objective was “to 
promote, and maintain stable agriculture, to provide for the conservation of the soil and its 
fertility and to stimulate the development of agricultural land in accordance with the accepted 
practices of good land management and good husbandry.” There was no doubt that with 
renewed commitment to assist African farmers, initial apprehension that led to the failure of 
the previous programmes to ‘teach’ good husbandry was reversed. However, the colonial 
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government ensured that the regulatory regime was in place to control the direction and pace 
of development of African agriculture. On the other hand, the emphasis placed on European 
agriculture was a regime of producer control.
296  
The Agriculture Ordinance of 1955 was specifically designed for the evolving African 
agriculture and the colonial government was clear about its target areas. The agricultural areas 
in the colony were divided into scheduled and non-scheduled areas. The former comprised the 
‘White Highlands’ while the latter referred to the native reserves. The pastoral lands belonged 
to none of the categories outlined in the Ordinance. The Minister for Agriculture was 
empowered, after consultation with the Board, to elevate the non-scheduled areas to 
scheduled areas. The government was now fully behind the policy to co-opt the emerging 
classes of African farmers into the colonial agrarian economy. The girded wall that was built 
around the White Highlands was gradually relaxed, to allow Africans who had the means to 
buy land there to do so. Although it did support claims of land by Africans in the White 
Highlands, the EARC contemplated reopening the Highlands, thus contesting the ‘privileged 
position’ of European settlers.
297 Although agricultural credits and other facilities were not 
immediately extended to those designated African areas, Swynnerton still argued that such 
investment by the government was contingent upon adoption of tenure reform. The policy 
was poised to discourage any element of indigenous practice of communal ownership. 
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6.5 Native Land Tenure Rules, 1956  
  By 1952, the process of individualisation had earnestly begun in the so-called 
‘emergency districts’ of Central Kenya, where political movement had already picked up 
momentum. The government was under pressure to curb the growing rebellion (known as 
Mau Mau and its successor organisations such as the Kenya Land Freedom Army) operating 
mainly in Kikuyu areas and other affiliated regions such as Embu, Meru and in Rift valley. 
The movement targeted not only the government (and by extension, Europeans) but also the 
Kikuyu loyalists (mostly chiefs, headmen and landowning classes).
298  
 The authorities confiscated land from those who were perceived to be members of the 
insurgent groups or those sympathetic to their cause.
299  The process of individualisation of 
tenure was escalated, partly to shut out those who were suspected to have taken part in the 
uprising.  The Native Land Tenure Rules
300 was formulated to facilitate land tenure reform in 
those African reserves that were now teeming with land rights struggles. The rules 
empowered the Minister for African Affairs to set up a process for adjudication and 
consolidation of particular  areas of the  native lands ‘...within which the minister considers 
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that a private right holding exists.’
301 The Rules worked quite effectively because by 1960 
almost all lands in central Kenya had been alienated and registered under individual titling. 
 6.6 Working party of African Land Tenure, 1957-1958 
A Working party of African Land Tenure
302was appointed in 1957 to recommend 
necessary measures to introduce a system of land tenure that would eventually lead to the 
registration of individual titling. The Working Party began its task on the premise that some 
parts of the country had accepted the policy of individualisation of land tenure, and hence the 
need to find legal formula for its universal application. The Terms of Reference stated that: 
Having regard to the emergence of individual tenure in certain areas of the Native Lands of Kenya and 
to the growing demand for the consolidation of fragmented holdings, enclosures and the issue of title 
to individual landowners, to examine and make recommendations as to the measures necessary to 
introduce a system of land tenure capable of application to all areas of the Native Lands...
303  
The Terms of Reference were specific about the requirement for substantive legislations to be 
used to determine ownership of land by expanding and effecting registration of titles. As to 
the general form of titles to be granted to Africans, the Working Party was satisfied that “the 
rights enjoyed by individual Africans in many cases had now evolved to something like full 
ownership and should be registered as such.”
304  To probably legitimise the process and win 
the confidence of the indigenous communities, their own committees were to be vested with 
the power to ascertain individual rights in land, which would be recognised as being owned 
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by that person.  The ascertained land would then be registered as an estate in fee simple.
305  
Accordingly, once the land was registered customary law could no longer apply to that 
person.
306 This was simply a measure proposed to strengthen the concept of adjudication.  
More importantly, the Working Party drafted a Bill, The Native Lands Registration Bill, 1958. 
The Bill proposed freehold title as the preferred tenure under the law, which made the 
registered rights of the proprietor indefeasible and inalienable. This Bill became the 
Registered Land Act, Chapter 300 Laws of Kenya, at independence in 1963. 
 6.7 Constitutional Conference, 1960-1963 
The period between 1960 and 1963 was the busiest time for the British Government as 
it prepared the country for political independence. It was a period of transition where the 
parties involved not only looked at the short term arrangements, but worked on long-term 
constitutional framework in order to entrench their interests. The British Government 
organised a constitutional Conference that, among other important issues of governance, dealt 
with the question of land. The period could be conveniently termed as a time of transitional 
arrangements. 
The Maasai leaders and communities have persistently raised the issue of the historical 
land question. The Maasai community had always made its intention known to the colonial 
and later Kenya government of the community’s rights to reclaim the land from which they 
were removed in the early 1900s.  The Maasai delegation made frantic efforts to convince 
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other delegates at Lancaster House Constitutional Conference to put the Maasai land issue on 
the agenda. A section of Lancaster Report was quoted as follows: 
The Representation made by the Maasai delegation was to the following effect...lands, which 
the Maasai vacated in accordance with the Agreements, belonged to the Maasai .The Maasai 
wanted their ownership to be recognized and have first claim on these lands when they are 
vacant by the Europeans who now farmed them ... The Maasai delegation did not accept that 
they had no claims in respect of the lands which the Maasai had vacated under the 
Agreements.
307  
The Lancaster House Conference although generally recognized as having facilitated a 
smooth transition to Kenya’s political independence, failed to resolve the controversial land 
matters. The leaders of minority groups such as the Maasai in the Rift Valley and Mji Kenda 
from the Coast Province had strongly differed with the leaders of the mainstream political 
party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) dominated by the Central and Nyanza 
Provinces. It appeared that the British Government, although initially uneasy about 
nationalists’ tendencies of KANU, later felt more comfortable with its centralists land policy. 
It is argued that Britain was more concerned with the settlers’ future prospects in the post-
colonial Kenya.
308 While the minority groups had preferred management of land to be under 
devolved regional governments (Majimbo), the mainstream groups pushed for a more 
centralised approach, which in effect, meant the existing colonial arrangement.  
The settlers and their British backers also preferred the latter position. According to 
Ghai and McAuslan, the Europeans were motivated by the fact that under a centralised 
authority it was easier to access foreign funds for government to buy out their lands or 
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reliably deal with them rather than devolved regional of governments.
309 They aptly explained 
why the settlers required that sort of guarantee as follows: ‘The confirmation was important at 
a time when there was a slight uncertainty as to the continued validity of titles due to demands 
from certain sections of the population that those titles should not be recognised after 
independence.’
310  
Kenya was thus ushered into political independence without much paradigmatic shift 
in land policy framework. While land was the critical issue of contention between Europeans 
and indigenous Africans at the onset of the colonial rule, it became the rallying point of 
consensus between the incoming and the outgoing governments at the beginning of the 
African political reigns. It was at this point that the first opportunity to generate a genuine 
land tenure reforms in Kenya was lost. Gary Wassermann observed the situation as follows: 
“Land reform was an integral feature of the decolonization process in Kenya. By mid-1962 with 
entrance of the KANU nationalists into government and the agreement to establish a Million-Acre 
Scheme for transferring part of the European Highlands to African ownership, the “independence 
bargain” had been made....The implementation of the land schemes was designed to “seal the 
bargain”; the colonial bureaucracy’s attempt to insure the continued functioning of a political economy 
under an altered authority structure.
311 
6.8 Trust land and alienation policy 
The enactment of the Trust Land Act (TLA)
312, the Land (Group Representatives) Act 
(LGRA),
313 and the Land Adjudication Act (LAA) in 1960s
314was part of the strategy to 
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continue the policy of individualisation of tenure. It demonstrated the fact that the Africans-
led government was more preoccupied with maintaining the status quo rather than undertake 
effective land reform. Contrary to the expectations, the independent government adapted 
radical steps to align the pastoral land tenure to the agricultural land, further perpetuating 
tenure insecurity in pastoral communities. The Trust Land Act, 1963 was considered as the 
main legislation that applies to pastoral areas such as the Upper Eastern  and North Eastern 
Province while the Land (Group Representatives) Act, 1967 which is commonly known as 
ranches, is associated with Maasailand. The latter legislation was a response to the apparent 
weakness of ‘trust’ principle to protect communal rights. The impact of this legislation, as 
shown in the penultimate Chapter, has been failure in resolving endemic presence of land 
tenure insecurity in pastoral areas. While these two principal laws are often identified in 
relation to land in pastoral areas, the least mentioned but the most operationalised law is Land 
Adjudication Act (LAA), and Physical Planning Act.
315 We shall later revert to these statutes, 
to illustrate how the application in pastoral areas has diminished pastoralists land rights. 
The Trust Land Act is, as we have earlier mentioned, inherent in the colonial policy 
proposed by the Morris Carter’s Kenya Land Commission that pastoral areas should be 
preserved as ‘reservoir’ for other non-pastoral land uses in the future. The adjudication and 
planning laws, whose combined effect has eroded the principle of trust, were in response to 
the East Africa Royal Commission’s recommendation to speed up the individualisation and 
privatisation process.
316 The colonial Government made last ditch efforts to accelerate the 
                                                                                                                                                         
314 Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284, Laws of Kenya. 
315 Physical Planning Act XXx 
316 See EARC, Chapter 23, Tenure Disposition of Land where it was  restated that ‘policy concerning tenure 
should aim at the individualisation of land ownership.’ 168 
 
process in the White Highlands and contiguous farming areas. These areas became the 
agricultural and industrial hub of post-colonial Kenya. As reflected in successive pre-
independent negotiations between the colonial authorities and the emerging African political 
elites, the focus was on the preservation of the agrarian economic structure based on private 
property land. As pointed out earlier, Kenya’s customary tenure conversion was well under 
way at the beginning of the twentieth century, beginning with the Central Province in the 
1950s. Initially, this was carried out without legal backing but in 1956, a set of ‘Native Land 
Tenure Rules’ were formulated to embark on the registration of land and by 1960, the 
objective was almost accomplished. The Native Lands Registration Ordinance was passed in 
1959
317, which eventually became the Registered Land Act
318at independence in 1963. 
For areas that were designed to come under the ‘trust’ tenure jurisdiction in 1963, 
there was no detailed planning, not even some form of negotiations like the ones that had 
preceded the ‘registered’ tenure regime.
319 At least there was a traceable footprint of how land 
tenure in ‘registered’ areas was developed. It all began with the policy of native reservation 
and tenure categories exclusively designated for them to promote agricultural development by 
taking measures against soil erosion.
320 Legislation such as the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 
was promulgated in order to improve and accommodate reserves areas. To cap it all, the 
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Swynnerton Plan proposed the Africans provided with secure title to land as this would 
encourage them to invest in development that would in turn, guarantee returns on capital 
borrowings.”
321 The East African Royal Commission recommended the adjudication and 
registration while a Working Party was appointed to consider legislation. As a result of this 
report, the Native Lands Registration Ordinance was passed in 1959. In 1963, it became the 
Registered Land Act, the epitome of contemporary private land tenure. As for the pastoral 
areas, there was no clear rationale as to why the incoming post-colonial government decided 
to place them under ‘trust’ tenure arrangement. There was no record of prior discussion or 
consensus arrived at to take into account the social, ecological and environmental needs of the 
communities living in those areas. Without such evidence, one may argue that the decision 
might have been made hurriedly and haphazardly in an attempt to ensure the centrality of the 
nascent state in controlling land and resources.  
The Native Trust Land Ordinance, which in 1963 became the Trust Land Act, was 
previously applicable to the pastoral region of Northern Frontier Province and Turkana. 
Although the original reason for the establishment of reserves was to pave the way for secure 
European settlement, it became the ideal instrument to integrate Africans into the colonial 
economic system. The pastoral region was not part of this, except much later as part of 
Maasailand, which was absorbed because of its proximity to the centre of the European 
operation. For example, Simon Coldham who wrote scholarly work on the land registration 
process in Kenya, observed of the land consolidation and registration programmes as follows: 
“Although it was originally devised in response to a very specific situation in the Kikuyu 
Land Unit, it now covers virtually all agricultural areas of the former Native Lands and has 
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recently been extended to the pastoral areas of Maasailand.”
322 However, as soon as Kenya’s 
political independence became official, the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, which was enacted 
in 1938, following recommendations of the Kenya Land Commission, became the Trust Land 
Act. Until then, land in pastoral was in a legal limbo.
323  
Land and property law scholars like Okoth-Ogendo have been ambiguous in their 
attempt to explain this lacuna.
324 For example, in evaluating the organisation of reserves in 
Kenya, Okoth-Ogendo stated that since the Carter Commission did not consider the northern 
region as native lands or reserves, it had a special arrangement for it.
325 The colonial 
Government had what he called ‘special arrangements for the region. He did not say what 
these special arrangements could be. Ogendo’s ambiguity was not surprising because there 
was no special arrangement. That was why the post-independent government took advantage 
of the existing void to legislate irrelevant laws for pastoral areas.  Carter’s Kenya Land 
Commission clearly stated that the areas were to be preserved for future non-pastoral 
exploitation such as oil and mining.  
What numerous commentators on contemporary legal and institutional arrangements 
in pastoral areas have failed to point out is the fact that trust land areas, as they are today, are 
the most unpredictable and insecure tenure regime. It is the only forms of tenure which, 
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despite its glaring weaknesses, is entrenched in the Constitution. No other categories of 
tenure, private (registered) or public (government) lands are provided for in the 
Constitution.
326 The provisions of the Constitution and Trust Land Act are almost identical 
word by word and it only shows the desire and determination of the Government to take 
control of the disposal of land for private and ‘public’ use. The substantive law, the Trust 
Land Act, contemplates the temporariness or transient nature of trust land itself.
327 It is not 
surprising then that the main defining feature of both the Constitution and the Trust Act is 
alienation or  ‘setting apart’
328 of land by the government and the county council which is 
supposed to be the custodian of the local interests. 
To facilitate effective extinguishment of the customary tenure rights, a legislative 
mechanism was created through the Land Adjudication Act. The concept of adjudication 
presupposes government intervention to resolve existing disputes among the customary 
landholders. The evidence is that this does not occur. The Act is simply a converter of 
customary land tenure rights into registered proprietary interests based on the English 
property model.  However, nearly forty years after the Act came into operation, the outcome 
has been anything but orderly. In pastoral districts such as Marsabit, Moyale, Isiolo and Tana 
River and Kajiado, the process of land adjudication has led to massive cases of conflicts, 
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confusion and corruption. Bonaya Godana, the late scholar and politician, wrote how the 
adjudication process in Marsabit and Moyale was mired in irregularities in the 1970s.
329 In 
Tana River District, the pastoralists and farmers have been engaged in perennial conflicts over 
access to land and water, often after the government declared the district as an adjudication 
area.
330 The Loodoriak and Mosiro land adjudication in 1979 remains one of the most 
controversial and unresolved case where the local Maasai communities lost hundreds of acres 
of their land through unscrupulous adjudication officials who had tampered with the land 
register. 
Kenya is widely perceived as the epitome of the British government’s successful 
delivery of a post-colonial state, astutely designed to preserve the colonial political economy. 
Professor Gary Wasserman, one of the leading scholars of the decolonisation politics in 
Kenya, wrote widely about the issues that informed the political independence of Kenya 
between 1960 and 1965. This was the period when the First Lancaster Constitutional 
Conference was held (1960 in London) and the first major policy blueprint, the African 
Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965) was 
formulated by the independent African government. Wasserman graphically described what 
he saw as the most influential stakeholders in the decolonisation process as follows: 
On one side was the European farming community perched at the top of the political-
economic hierarchy they had largely established. Though less than one per cent of the 
population, they owned twenty per cent of arable land, produced eighty five per cent of the 
agricultural exports and generated most of the taxable income in the colony.”
331 In addition to 
                                                 
329 Godana, B.A (1976) Setting Apart of Land in Marsabit District of Kenya, LL.B Dissertation, Univerity of 
Nairobi. 
330 Adhi, G.D (1998), The Crisis of Land Adjudication in Pastoral Areas, A Paper presented in a Workshop 
organized by the Kenya Pastoralists Forum at Mashallah Hotel, Isiolo on 25 November,1998. 
331 Wassernan, G (1976) Politics of Decolonization. Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue 1960-1965, p.2 173 
 
that, the group had up to that point in time maintained the alienated and appropriated 
approximately eight million acres of land in the ‘White Highland’ for exclusive European use. 
On the other side of the divide, there were the majority African land hungry peasants whose 
expectation of the impeding independence was first return of the ‘lost lands.  
The decolonisation process, contrary to the deeply held assumption that it brought to 
an end the colonial dominance; it in reality was an adaptation and co-option device whose 
operational function was to perpetuate historical land issues. The so called nationalists, who 
assumed the role of negotiators during the transition period, were themselves constrained by 
the internal and personal competition for political power. The rivalry was mostly ensconced in 
ethnic and regional interests which individual leaders were assumed to represent in bargaining 
for a share of political power. The decolonisation process was not defined by neither the land 
issues nor the other historical injustices against the indigenous Africans, but used as an 
induction of the political socialisation of Kenya’s new leaders in managing the inherited 
colonial system.  
The colonial policy, which concentrated powers over land in the imperial crown was 
transmitted to the executive authority headed by the president. Successive Kenyan presidents 
have used these powers for personal or public aggrandisement as reported by various 
commissions of inquiries in the recent past.
332 If the president is not involved personally in 
land allocations, he delegates this task to the Commissioner of Land to exercise the powers on 
his/her behalf.  Despite local councils being vested with the power to administer Trust Lands, 
the real power rests with the President, who could allocate Trust Land at will. The Minister of 
Local Government, can impose government decisions on district councils, which are manned 
by council clerks. Their loyalty rests with the minister rather than the council. The 
Commissioner of Lands, who has wide administrative authority over Trust Land, does not 
                                                 
332 See Ndungu Report and Njonjo Commissin Reports of 2002 and 2004 respectively. 174 
 
refer to the council concerned when dealing with land in a local jurisdiction.  The Minister for 
Lands can declare any Trust Land an ‘adjudication’ area to be subdivided without consulting 
a local council of affected area. The process of allocating and sub-dividing land in the pastoral 
areas rangelands to individual owners, as opposed to common access, is gaining acceptance 
among the pastoralists. 
The next chapter discusses contemporary challenges affecting pastoral land rights, 
especially in the context of the emerging land use practices such as mining and ecotourism. 
These practices involve large investments projects and top businesspeople in the corporate 
world. The ongoing debate on land reform and national land policy is also examined in view 
of increasingly shrinking pastoral land resources.175 
 
CHAPTER 7 
New challenges Undermining Pastoral Land Rights 
7.1 Unresolved Land struggles  
The pastoralists and other minority groups such as hunter-gatherers, forest-dwellers, 
and riverine farmers have continuously struggled with land issues since the colonial period 
and yet nothing seems to have changed for the better. The most critical ingredient of the 
contemporary land question is related to legal and policy constraints in determining the land 
and land-based resources rights of these groups. This explains why land has been the most 
contentious issue, often causing open defiance of government policy actions such as land 
allocations, demarcation of boundaries, and resettlement.
1 Many of these conflicts can be 
traced to many years, including, the period of colonial administration. Many pastoralists such 
as the Maasai, Pokot, and some Kalenjin sub-groups have been directly affected by colonial 
land alienation and claim it as a significant historical injustice.
2 This study has addressed the 
Maasai land issue comprehensively as an old colonial question that has not been resolved. 
The Maasai, as we have discussed in chapter 3, took their land struggles to the colonial 
courts and set a historical record as the first indigenous tribe in Kenya to challenge an 
oppressive colonial land policy.  The policy, which was founded on alienation of land, had the 
                                                 
1 Currently there is a fierce debate going on in some parts of the country regarding such issues as repossessing  
catchments areas which were allocated to individuals by previous governments, The case of Mau Forest 
Complex has been at the centre of debates between politcal parties, landholders and the Government. In recent 
months isuue of land appears in mainstream daily newspapers  in Kenya. See for example, The Standard, for 
coverage of Mau forest complex. 18/06/09, ‘Mau Complex is Our Land, Claim Ogiek’, 19/06/09, ‘Deputy 
Speaker Orders House Probe into Mau Forest Controversy’,  conflict over access to pasture among pastoral 
communities have become ‘normal’ and most time go unreported. Resettlement of landless squatters, refugees 
and Internally Displaced Place (IDPs) have in most occasion attracted controversies. 
2 Kenya Land Allience ( 2004) The National Land Policy in Kenya: Addressing Historical Injustices, p.10. Issue 
Paper No.2/2004. 176 
 
disastrous consequence of dispossessing indigenous owners. Loss of land was not confined to 
the pastoralists, it also affected the other indigenous farmers and agro-pastoralists that tilled 
and used land for different activities. Nomadic pastoralism depended on the extensive use of 
rangelands, covering large swathes of land to facilitate opportunistic utilisation of drylands 
resources. The colonial land alienation policy resulted in the diminishing of livelihoods 
system of communities that depended on drylands resources.  
The cumulative experiences over the years illustrates that a number of factors have 
combined to militate against the attainment of secure land rights by the pastoralists in Kenya. 
First, the government which has overbearing and interventionist powers has made trust land 
less secure. The communities have no control over the government frequent interventions.
3  
As I have pointed out, since 1963 when the Trust Land Act was enacted to administer land in 
pastoral and other marginal areas, the government or parliament has not taken any initiative to 
review the Act.
4  The Act adopts a significantly contradictory approach to communal land 
tenure rights.  Blanket application of the Trust Land Act, diminishes rather than preserving 
pastoral land. The Act as it stands today is a conveyor belt or a conduit through which 
customary land tenure is converted to private regime. Under the pretext of ‘public purposes’, 
the pastoralists have lost critical land resources such as seasonal pastureland and wetland to 
private use.
5  As for the Land (Group Representative) Act, which was legislated in 1968 to 
                                                 
3 For a general overview of weakness in customary interests in Trust Land Act, see Migai, A.J.M (2001) 
Rescuing the Indigenous Tenure from the Ghetto of Neglect. 
4 The most notable alteration was made by the Minister of Lands vide Legal Notice 43/1968 which included s.7 
that empowers the Government to set aside trust land for public  purposes. The same Legal Notice  introduced 
s.13 which vested the County Council  powers to set aside land for public purposes and extrcaction of minerals. 
This was a subsiadiary amendment, therefore did no afford members of parliamentthe oppportunity to discuss 
the merits of such powers whose obvious ramification was more alienation of pastoral land. 
5 Adhi, G.D (2001)  The Role of County Council in Management of Trustland in Isiolo. A Workshop Report of 
Waso Trustland, 22 August. 177 
 
curb illegal allocation of trust land in Maasai areas, the situation has been worsening rather 
improving. The objective of the Act is to enhance collective holdings of land through group 
ranching, however, due to the weakness of the law and apparent laissez faire approach by the 
policy makers, groups are sub-dividing land and selling tracts of land to individuals.  The 
emerging scenario of subdividing group ranches was initially resisted by some government 
agricultural planners but practice has become the norm rather than the exception.
6  
There is also the issue of boundaries. The European colonial powers and Abyssinian 
Emperor Menelik agreed to partition and place the predominantly pastoralist-inhabited 
territories in the region under their respective domain. The Somali, Maasai, Boorana and 
several indigenous groups were divided into two or more states which meant that some groups 
would have lost access to some important ‘common pool’ resources like wells (e.g. Boorana’s 
Tula Sagalan wells complex in Ethiopia).
7 This arbitrary redrawing of the existing resource 
boundaries had negative implications on pastoralist’ long-term land and resources rights. 
Access to such resources, often depended on the goodwill of a particular government 
institution rather than the customary networks such as clans and kins on the other side of the 
border.  However, the most critical boundary issue today is that of administrative levels 
within a country rather than between states. In pastoral areas in the north, grazing lines were 
drawn to restrict movement of pastoralists within designated areas. For example, the Galla-
Somali line was used to demarcate the land resources boundary between Boorana and 
                                                 
6 Mwangi, E (2006) Subdividing Commons: The Politics of Property Rights Tansformation in Kenya’s 
Maasailand. CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights. 
7 According to Buxton, D (1967) Travels through Ethiopia, p.91, Tula Sagalan (nine famed wells) were “... 
among the most remarkable things in southern Ethiopia...believed to have been excavated in the distant past, by 
the ancestors of these same Boran tribesmen.” Quoted in Tache, B.D (2008) op. cit. p.16.  178 
 
Somali.
8 The colonial boundary demarcation in pastoral areas was intended to avoid the cost 
of administering the vast and factitious region.  Until the 1950s successive government did 
not address development needs of the pastoral regions, including livestock production.  In this 
respect, A. Castagno observed the situation as follows: “There were no serious attempts made 
to alleviate the situation by improving pastures and by expanding water facilities.”
9 The post 
independent government followed the same path in demarcating administrative boundaries 
between communities, mainly for political reasons, without taking into account established 
customary resource borders. Numerous conflicts in pastoral areas are caused by such arbitrary 
actions that may have served the political interest of one group against another.
10 The 
situation is exacerbated by inter-ethnic or intra-clan competition for ‘our own’ location, 
division, district and even province. National and party politics play a key role in this 
seemingly emotional charged.      
Another major factor that has undermined pastoral land tenure rights is the increased 
level of encroachment by agriculturalists and other land users. In many predominantly 
pastoral districts and areas where ‘oases’ of wet land is to be  found, government and other 
land users tend to take land up. Many pastoral areas have experienced conflicts over 
competing land use between farmers and pastoralists.
11 The encroachment of land in Maasai 
                                                 
8 Oba, G (1996) op.cit.p.130. There was a heated debate in the British official circle from 1918 as to justifiability 
of moving the Boorana from Wajir as part of controlling the borderlands between Boorana and Somali. At the 
time the British colonial administration was under pressure to control westward influx of the Somali.   
9 Castagno A.A (1965) op.cit.p 170. 
10 Wario, H.T (2006) Historical and Current perspectives on Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Northern Kenya. 
Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway; Roba,S.B (2007) Land Ownership and Conflicts in Isiolo 
District, Kenya. See also Comparative Research on Crossborder Conflicts in the East African Region-Case 
Studies of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, 2006. UNECA,, Addis Ababa. 
11 Fratkin, E (2001) East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Boran, and Rendile Cases, pp 1-25. African 
Studies Review, Vol.44, No.3. See Ndaskoi, ole N (2005) The Roots Cause of Maasai Predicament. Widespread 179 
 
is particularly historical dating back to the colonial days. As early as 1913 an influx of 
farmers, particularly Kikuyu, moved into Maasailand and started cropping in higher potential 
areas, including those on the slopes of the Ngong Hills, the foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro, Ol 
Donyo Orok near Namanga,, and Nguruman on the western wall of the Rift Valley. Although 
the area of land involved was small, it nevertheless denied the herders critical dry-season 
fallback grazing.
12  
   Over the past two decades in particular, conservation policy and politics have put 
pastoralists on the losing side as their land is literally ‘padlocked’ to avoid what is popularly 
framed as human-wildlife conflicts.
13 Wildlife conservation did not seem to appeal to colonial 
administration considering that it started 50 years after it established its rule. However, when 
it began to consolidate wildlife reserve policy, the administration targeted the pastoral 
rangelands, which were vast and home to a variety of flora and fauna. Under the National 
Parks Ordinance of 1945, the Kajiado Maasai lost access to two areas bordering the District: 
Nairobi National Park and Tsavo National Park. This Ordinance also established a game 
reserve in Amboseli (3248 km
2), and game conservation areas at Kitengela (583 km
2) and 
West Chyulu (368 km
2), restricting the use of these areas by the Maasai. As more grazing 
lands were fenced off for national reserve and game parks, the communities began demanding 
                                                                                                                                                         
conflicts were reported in Mai Mahiu in Naivasha areas between Maasai and Kikuyu. See also Roba, S. B (2007) 
ibid, cases of Boorana, Meru and others  in Isiolo 
12 Grandin, B.E (1987b) Land tenure, sub-division,and resdential changes on  a Maasai Group Ranch. 
Development Anthropology Bulletin 4 (2) 9-13. See Also Grandin, The Maasai Socio-Historical Context and 
Group ranches, FAO Documents Repository.  FAO Publication index 2009. 
13 Omondi, P (1994) Wildlife-Human Conflict in Kenya: Integrating wildlife conservation with human needs in 
the Maasai Mara Region. Ndaskoi, N (2001) Maasai Wildlife Conservation and Human Need: The Myth of 
“Community-based Management.” 180 
 
access to pastures in protected areas.
14 There are about sixty-five national reserves, game 
parks and wildlife sanctuaries covering almost 50,000 square kilometers or 8% of the Kenyan 
land mass.
15 Most of these protected areas are located in pastoral districts. Population growth 
and scarcity of pasture in marginal areas contiguous to wildlife reserves have necessitated 
pastoralists to fallback on these lands, resulting in conflicts with authorities. On many 
occasions, the wildlife, by straying out of their reserved areas, cause damage to communities 
by preying on their livestock. Conservation has thus become very contentious, necessitating 
proper policy reforms.
16   
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of ecotourism projects in pastoral areas, 
especially in Maa speaking areas of Maasai and Samburu. In pastoral areas ecotourism has 
become part of the tourism industry ‘cashing in’ on natural environment romanticised as 
safari destinations. The controversial marginalisation of local communities by more organised 
actors in the industry such as hotels, tour agents, government bodies and even local county 
authorities are blamed for land and environmental pressure on pastoralists.
17 The industry has 
exponentially flourished in recent years and is among the leading sources of revenue for 
government and business. According to the Ministry of Tourism, the tourism/ecotourism 
industry accounts for 10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) making it the third largest 
                                                 
14 Campbell, D.J,; Gichohi, H.; Mwangi, ; Chege, L (2000) Land use conflict in Kajiado District, Kenya. Land 
Use Policy, Vol.17, Issue 4.  
15 Mwanjala, J.M (2005) An Overview of Wildlife and Tourism Management  in Kenya. A Presentaion to the 3rd 
African Conference on Peace through Tourism. Lusaka, Zambia. 
16 Woodroffe, R.; Thirgood, S.J.; Rabinowitz, A. (2005) People and Wildlife,  
17 Tourism Reform in Kenya. Development of Maasai Ecoutorism Principls. Maasai Environmental Resource 
Coalition (MERC). http://maasairoyaladventures.com/mercindigenous.htm. Acccessed 19/04/09. See also Eliiott, 
J., Mwangi, M.M (1998) Developing Wildlife in Laikipia, Kenya. Who Benefits? 181 
 
contributor to the economy following agriculture and manufacturing.
18 The Ministry states 
that it earned approximately 850 million US dollars or 65.4 billion Kenyan shillings in 
2007.
19 It is also said to be the third largest foreign exchange earner after tea and horticulture. 
Pastoralists are reportedly not enjoying the wealth created by tourism industry.
20 Financial 
and economic benefits aside, the ecotourism industry has deeply encroached on pastoral 
rangelands, diminishing access to pasture, water, woods, and other resources that are the 
lifeline of communities. In communities such as Boorana, Samburu and Rendile, where the 
concept of ecotourism is a new phenomenon, unlike Maasai, tensions are already rising as the 
‘news’ trickles through regarding impending loss of grazing lands.
21 Former settler ranchers 
such as the current owners of Lewa Downs Conservancy, which also runs the Northern 
Rangelands Trust, have been steadily expanding into pastoral areas.
22 According to Lucy 
Hannan, a researcher who has been critical of the tactics employed by conservancy groups, 
found the notion of community-based conservations as being harmful to futures of the 
pastoral community unless the interests of the locals become paramount. She elaborately 
described the emerging scenario as follows: 
                                                 
18 Ministry of Toursim.Facts and Figures. http://www.tourism.go.ke/ministry.nsf/pages/facts_figures. Accessed 
19/04/09 
19 Ibid. 
20 Nyambura-Mwaura, H.   Wild Game herds of Serengeti: Wonder or Worry? Reuters, 08/01/2007. One of the 
local community member lamented that the Maasai do not benefits from the industry. He stated that:  “The local 
people are not benefiting at all, we are being exploited. The revenue collected is not being pumped back," said 
Peter Sapalan, a Maasai employed by Governor's Camp. 
21 Adhi D.G (2003) Pastoralists Under Siege: Expansion of Ecotourism in Rangelands. A Presentation at   
Workshop for Local NGOs on 19 May  at Northern Resources Centre, Isiolo. Northern Rangelands Trust is an 
NGO founded by the Lewa Downs family that operates the biggest ecotourism projects in areas that now 
transcend Isiolo, Meru, Samburu and Rendile.  
22 For more information about these projects see the website of the Northern Rangelands Trust, 
http://northernrangelands.wildlifedirect.org/category/communities/ 182 
 
White settlers are a minority group with disproportionate access to land, wealth and influence, 
who are feeling pressure to establish good relationships with their pastoralist neighbours, in 
order to retain huge swathes of land originally acquired through the colonial system. 
Community based ecotourism is one of the ways forward; but there is enormous imbalance 
between the two groups. The obvious vulnerability of indigenous communities within this 
relationship is their lack of political and economic standing, and the ease with which they can 
be exploited. The Lewa conservation vision incorporates a huge area of land known as the 
Northern Rangeland Trust, and is a good example of how diverse the notion of ‘community’ 
can be. It includes the Mugokogodo and Laikipia Masai, the Borana, Rendile, Samburu and 
Turkana pastoralist minorities.
23 
The land reform issues in pastoral areas have not received adequate publicity in 
mainstream institutions such as parliament, press and other forums but there is currently better 
understanding and recognition across the spectrum, The Government which has previously 
been adamant in ignoring pastoral land question later initiated a broad-based policy that 
recognises the inappropriateness of current land tenure frameworks.
24  This is a pointer that 
communities have for an inordinately long time been exposed to policies that have negatively 
affected their land rights. A new ministry has been established since 2008 to specifically focus 
on development of pastoral regions of Kenya.
25 Such recognition is important in setting future 
agenda for legal and institutional changes in pastoral areas. Some national and local Non-
Governmental Organisations have made significant contributions by highlighting the concern 
of the pastoralists, particularly during national reform processes. However, both Maasai and 
Boorana areas have tried to deal with some specific cases of historical and contemporary 
nature, as part of the continuous land struggles.  
 
                                                 
23 Hannan, L (2008) Trouble in Paradise: Tourism and Minorities. A Kenya Case Study. State of World 
Minorities 2008. Climate change Special, events of 2007. Minority Right Group, London. 
24 Draft National Policy for Sustainable Development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands of Kenya. See part 4.1.6 
Reviewing Land Tenure Policy. Republic of Kenya, December 2004.  
25 Ministry of  Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands.  183 
 
 
7.2 Contemporary Maasai Land Campaigns  
On one side of the fence line, the farmed grass grows thick and trembles in the wind. On the 
other side, the ground is nearly bare, chewed down in places to the rocky topsoil. In between 
are splintered fence poles and scattered strands of electric wire that, until last month, closed 
off a 20,000-hectare central Kenyan commercial ranch from the communal grazing lands of 
Masai herdsmen.
26   TIME Magazine, 2006. 
The land struggles of the pastoral communities such as Maasai are as old as the state 
of Kenya. As has been illustrated in Chapter 3, the Maasai did not meekly resign themselves 
to their fate when the second eviction was carried out by the colonial administration in 1911. 
They fought back in the corridors of courts, although they did receive justice they had sought 
in respect of the land in Laikipia. Nevertheless, their action sowed the seed of enduring 
determination to fight for land rights. Unfortunately, for them the wheel of justice grinds 
incredibly slow, even today the struggles continue. After 1911 the next time the Maasai took 
up the matter was in 1932 during the review process of the Kenya Land Commission. The 
Maasai leaders, including Legalishu (Ol-le Gelesho/ Gilisho who was a signatory to both 
Maasai Agreements) gave evidence before the Commission and petitioned their loss of land.
27 
The Commission’s attitude to Maasai land was to say the least, dismissive. In its Report, the 
Commission had stated that compared to Kikuyu, Maasai land was “entirely of minor 
character” and therefore did not hold as much significance.
28 As I have discussed in Chapter 
5, the Commission refused to address the Maasai land claims ostensibly because the Maasai 
                                                 
26 Quoted from the Time, a weekly magazine based in United States of America, 19
th September 2004. 
27 Hughes, L ( 2006) Malice in Maasailand: the  historical roots of current  political struggles. The Ferguson 
Centre fo African and Asian Studies. Open University,Uk. Ole Gilisho gave his evidence in Naroki on 19 
October 1932. 
28 Kenya Land Commission, Cmnd 4556,  para. 675. 184 
 
had more land than they required. It actually proposed that Maasai should cede some of their 
land to “other tribes or communities who may require scope for expansion or agricultural 
development.”
29 The petition was lost. 
The next viable opportunity came another 30 years later at the Lancaster House 
Constitutional Conference. The Lancaster talks were in three phases i.e. 1960, 1962 and 1963. 
The second Conference that took place in 1962 was the most critical phase where the 
constitutional frameworks for independent Kenya were being negotiated, including the 
structure under which land management was to be placed.
30 In the Conference the Maasai 
were represented by a delegation led by Justus Ole Tipis and John Ole Konchellah who were 
members of Legislative Council (Legco). In a Memorandum to the Conference the Maasai 
leaders demanded redress of the historical land question in relation to the 1904 and 1911 
Agreements.
31 A special Committee was formed to deal with Maasai land but there was no 
evidence it made any concrete proposal which satisfied the Maasai delegates.
32 In fact the 
Maasai, in protest, refused to sign the final agreement made at the end of the Conference and 
instead walked out.
33 It appeared that the KANU leaders and the British Government had their 
priority elsewhere; thrashing out political structure that suited African leaders and protection 
of the Europeans land property respectively. According to Gary Wasserman, the farmers and 
European delegates representing the interest of settlers made sure their land interests took 
                                                 
29 Ibid, para.682. 
30 Ghai, Y.P., McAuslan, J.P.W.B (1970) op. cit. p. 201. 
31 ‘Memorundum on Maasai Land in Kenya’. Quoted in Hughes, L (2006) op.cit.p.4 
32 See Parliament of Kenya: History and Development. The Second Lancaster House Constitutional Confrerence. 
http://www.bunge.go.ke/parliament/history_Steps_2_Independence.php. Accessed 23/04/2009. 
33Ndaskoi, N (2006) The Roots causes of Maaasai Predicament. 185 
 
precedence over demands by others. This was not just about security of title and getting 
compensation for those who were leaving but also interest in future agrarian policy.
34  
The political competition among the mainstream parties was so intense and fluid that it 
was easy to manipulate the leaders into submitting the demand of the colonial negotiators 
regarding sensitive land issues. Some African leaders used land as a stump card to derive 
better deals for themselves in future political arrangements. As far as the Maasai land question 
was concerned, the bet paid off for the British Government and centralist KANU leaders. It 
was easy for KANU to sweep the Maasai demand ‘under the carpet’ in exchange for political 
favours from the departing colonial government.  After all, if the KANU stalwarts dithered, 
the British could still use regionalists KADU, who had initially got support from settler 
community wary of KANU’s ‘nationalist’ stance. Both ways the land issue was posed to serve 
the interest of the dominant settler groups and emerging African political and economic 
bourgeoisie. Nasieku Tarayia, a Maasai lawyer and women rights activist analysed the 
outcome of the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, stating as follows: 
The African leaders were stream-rolled into granting enormous constitutional and economic 
concession to European settlers in exchange for a speedy transfer of political power-to 
disappointment of the African masses, and more, particularly, the Maasai. Recognition of 
colonial land titles became the bedrock of transfer of political power.
35 
Parselelo Kantai, a Maasai Journalist who has written widely on land and 
environmental issues in Maasailand, vividly describes the Maasai contemporary struggles as 
follows: 
                                                 
34 Wasserman, G (1976) Politics of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans and Land Issue 1960-1965, p.101. 
London,. Cambridge University Press. 
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Moving forward fifty years, the Maasai arrived at decolonisation in early 1960s in much the 
same way as they entered the twentieth century; weakened once again, this time by severe 
drought that had killed off two-thirds of their stock and consigned many to famine relief, they 
had begun to see the patterns of their history with sharper clarity.”
36  
The epigraph stated above of the TIME magazine was from an article written at the 
height of a confrontation between Maasai on the one hand, and the Government and European 
ranchers in Laikipia on the other. This was in 2004, another milestone in Maasai land 
campaigns 40 years after the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference. The article 
figuratively contextualized the contrasting situation between the sprawling ranches and 
desolate grazing land from which Maasai herders eked out a living. Driven to the despair by 
drought and dying stock, the Maasai forced their way into the lush ranches in search of 
pasture. Alarms were raised and the government sprung into action to mainly protect the 
barricaded ranchers. The Maasai, in a bid to showcase their historical claims, marked the 100 
years since the 1904 Agreement, that heralding the loss of land. Numerous community 
members participated in organised demonstrations in August 2004. The popular thinking at 
the time was the lease for ceded land was for 99 years and therefore the land was supposedly 
to revert to the Maasai owners upon the expiry of the lease period. The government had a 
different view. Although he did not produce any evidence, the then Minister for Lands, Amos 
Kimunya, argued that the lease was for 999 years and “the Maasai will have to wait a lot 
longer”
37  The Minister, displaying an aura of arrogance, asked the Maasai that “they should 
come back in another 900 years and we can discuss the matter...”  The attitude of the Minister 
was not overly shocking to the Maasai and larger public because it was a mere restatement of 
government policy since independence to dismiss claims made on an historical basis. The first 
                                                 
36 Kantai, P(2007) In the Grip of the Vampire State: The Maasai Land Struggles in the Kenyan Politics. Journal 
of East African Studies, pp.108-109. 
37  Quoted in Otieno Aluoka (2004) Maasai Demands Return of Ancestral Lands. IC Publications Ltd. 187 
 
President Jomo Kenyatta in a rather carious gesture that was devoid of a balanced view 
regarding land, reassured the settlers by giving them personal guarantee.  In his own words, 
he stated; “I am a politician, but I am a farmer like you... I think the soil joins us all and 
therefore we have a kind of mutual understanding.”
38 As the Time Magazine aptly describes, 
the herders in Kenya continuously faced deprivation long after the departure of the colonial 
administration empire, because the succeeding government of Kenya was adamant in 
preserving the status quo. To make his compelling case, Kantai adds the political dimension 
of the recent development in Maasailand in the context of Kenya’s broader political discourse. 
He stated the heightened expectations as follows: 
Under the regimes of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, Maasai were denied the political space in 
which to revive their claim to the ‘lost lands’. Public silence over these years did not betoken 
acquiescence, however, and within a few months of the election defeat of the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) in December 2002, Maasai protagonists were gain stirred into action, with 
expectations that the ‘new dispensation’ of Kenya politics might afford opportunities to revisit a 
distant but still potent history”
39  
The situation in Kenya heavily contrasts with other developing former colonies in 
Africa and the East African region. According to Liz Alden-Wily, at least thirty countries in 
Africa
40, have begun land tenure reform processes during this period, and the situation in 
Kenya is still in a state of flux and confusion. Although the debates about legal and policy 
reforms started in earnest much earlier than most of these countries in early 1990s, the 
achievement on critical issues like land is barely noticeable. The neighbouring East African 
                                                 
38 Kenyatta addressed a sizeable crowd of European settlers in Nakuru, the de facto capital city of the settler 
community in the sprawling Rift Valley region. The gathering was surprised and charmed by Kenyatta apparent 
“transformation” from what they had all along believed was a revolutionary “devil”. See Widner, J (1993) The 
Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From “Harambee” to “Nyayo.” University of California Press. 
39 Ibid, p.109. 
40 Alden-Wily, Liz (2003) Community-based Land Tenure Management: Questions and Answers about 
Tanzania’s new Village Land Act, 1999.IIED, Issue Paper No.120, p.2.  188 
 
countries such as Uganda and Tanzania
41 have made strides in addressing land policy and 
legal reforms, while Kenya has been missing out on crucial transitional opportunities since 
that time.  Professor Gary Wasserman has correctly and assertively shown in his writings on 
Kenya’s political transition how the so called ‘nationalists’ betrayed the trust bestowed upon 
them at the altar of the political expediency and self-aggrandisement. His writing on Kenya’s 
decolonisation period aptly describes how the outgoing and incoming political elites 
reconfigured the state of Kenya at the country’s independence into a sheer transfer of powers. 
Even the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Law System (Njonjo Commission) 
confirmed Wasserman’s assertions when it stated: 
It was expected that the transfer of power from colonial authorities to indigenous elites would 
lead to fundamental restructuring of the legacy. This however did not materialise. Instead what 
happened was a general re-entrenchment, hence, continuity of colonial land policies, laws and 
administrative infrastructure.”
42 
As indicated in this study the pastoralists are the most disadvantaged group in Kenya 
as far as land and resources development is concerned. Many factors that have been triggered 
mainly by external interventions have contributed to the marginality of the pastoralists in the 
Kenyan state. One observer summarised the current condition of pastoral peoples as follows:  
Pastoralist societies face more threat to their way of life now than any previous time. 
Population growth; loss of herding to private farms, ranches, game parks, and urban areas; 
                                                 
41 The Government of Tanzania established the Presidential Commission Inquiry into Land Matters, in 1991, 
headed by its well known critic and land rights advocate Prof. Issa Shivji which did an extensive collection of 
views throughout the country. The Community, though, later developed cold feet in implementing the Shivji 
Report, borrowed heavily from it in formulating a parliament approved national land policy in 1995. Two major 
statutes, Village Land Act, No.7 of 1999 and Land Act, No.6 of 1999 were enacted to comprehensively apply to 
land in Tanzania’s Mainland. Zanzibar has its own set of laws to take care of the autonomous Island.  
Uganda had a comprehensive constitutional in 1995 which provided for land and tenure reform principles. 
Uganda’s Land Act, 1998 attempts to install an accessible and participatory framework of land administration 
through elected boards and tribunals. 
42 Republic of Kenya(2002) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya.p.30, 
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increased commoditisation of livestock economy; out-migration by poor pastoralists; and 
periodic dislocations brought about by drought, famine, and civil war.” 
The grim picture about loss of land due to accelerated privatisation of common 
resources reflects the reality of current situation of pastoralists in Kenya. A well documented 
example is the Maasai case in Kajiado District who have been pushed to the dry margins of 
the district as massive influx of townspeople encroach on their grazing land.  
7.3 Land Issues in the Boorana sub-region 
A study commissioned by the Government-run and the World Bank-funded Arid 
Lands Resources Management Project, Land Tenure and Resource Management in Kenya
43 
presented a report that underscored how insecurity has negatively affected access to resources 
such as grazing. The failure of the government to intervene by implementing relevant 
programmes to support pastoral communities has forced them to resort to their own devices. 
The Report broadly expressed the situation as follows: 
“It is an established fact that inter-ethnic feuds over a dwindling resource base and subsequent renewal 
of territorial land claims and counter claims among different ethnic groups are prevalent in the arid 
lands of Kenya (examples of Tana River, Baringo, Samburu, Isiolo and Marsabit). Consequently, a 
state of insecurity has emerged, thus restricted, and even totally blocked access to common resources 
by certain pastoralist groups. Insecurity has distorted the original grazing patterns and forced 
pastoralists to resort to environmentally unsustainable resource use systems.”
44 
In Isiolo, the situation is even more complicated as competition among multiple land 
users from disparate background exerts pressure on shrinking land resources. While the 
Boorana-Somali conflicts over grazing rights are historically recorded, the new entries into 
the fray are the Meru farmers. With the setting of intense competition between various land 
                                                 
43 The Report entitled Policy and Legal Framework on Pastoral Land Tenure and Resource Management in The 
Arid Lands of Kenya was written in February, 1999.   
44 Ibid, 18. 190 
 
users, claims have been either based on historical land rights, particularly by pastoral groups, 
or statutory ‘laissez faire. rights of owning property ‘anywhere in Kenya’ normally made by 
agro-farmers. In the case of Kenyanga and Three Others v Isiolo County Council, the two 
paradigms (historical versus statutory) clashed. In a long and acerbic ruling that was definitely 
directed at the pastoralists, the Presiding Judge, Alex Etyang had this to say:   
There is a class of people in this country, as it is clearly demonstrated in this suit, which 
believes that certain areas of this country, Kenya, should exclusively be inhabited or occupied 
by a particular community of people so as to promote the welfare and well being of that 
community. This class of people believes that Kenya should be divided into convenient units 
to be occupied exclusively by members of its community. An example of this class are the 
plaintiffs in this suit who hold this stupid notion that  the suit land ought to be declared by a 
court of law, in the present Kenya, as an area exclusively to be occupied by them, and 
everybody else is a trespasser who ought to be removed from that area. To this class of people, 
including the plaintiffs and any other person whosoever and wheresoever’s, I say this: any 
intended division of this country into tribal or community in order to promote particular tribe 
or community welfare, well being of tribal interests, be they of a commercial or political 
nature, would be unconstitutional and unacceptable.
45  
The ruling of the court was not surprising because the idea of pastoral people owning 
land was still held in apprehension by the majority of Kenyans who view pastoralism as a 
practice that is inimical to national development. The conservancy groups have for a long 
time adopted similar approaches in claiming land for exclusive ecotourism ventures. It is 
hardly surprisingly that conservancy groups and big ranchers are seemingly unstoppable 
today.
46 The conservancies are private enterprises enjoying full protection of the government 
security agents, and heavily funded by international agencies and Western corporate and 
                                                 
45 Kenyanga and Three Others v Isiolo County Council, Civil Suit number 11 of 1995 at Meru High Court. 
46 The conservancies have its roots in the sprawling ranches in Laikiapia plateau where settlers reoccupied the 
land from which Maasai pastoralists were evicted following the 1911 Maasai Agreement. One of the conspicous 
and contentious conservancies, Lewa Wildlife and its subsidiary, Northern Rangeland Trust, is owned by Craig 
family who came a decade after the Maasai Agreement in 1922. The Conservancy which is now being run by the 
Ian Craig, the well-connected aristocrat of  ranching settler ancentry. 191 
 
individual donors.
47 For example, one of the most established conservancies, Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy which initially began as a ranch in 1922 owned by the Craig/Douglas family has 
since the mid 1990 sprawled into the exotic eco-tourism industry attracting sizable and prized 
western tourists.   
Propelled by this windfall of wildlife prosperity, the family is using its financial power 
and political connection to expand its wildlife ‘colony’ to encroach into the prime grazing 
lands in Isiolo, Samburu, Laisamis and Marsabit through the recently established Northern 
Rangeland Trust (NRT).
48 The most recent target of NRT are the prime grazing areas of Bisan 
Biliko/Bulesa in northern part of Isiolo District that Boorana has depended on for generations, 
especially during dry seasons. A corridor of conflicts has now been opened between Borana 
and Samburu pastoralists allegedly fuelled by alleged extension of conservancy that is said to 
overflow into one another’s resource border.
49  According to a recent media source the Lewa 
Wildlife Conservancy through its Trojan horse Northern Rangeland Trust, is pushing the 
frontier of the conservancies its running in Samburu into the Boorana grazing areas of Kom, 
Nyachiis, and Sabarwawa. The East African Standard carried the report as follows: 
In a month, 12 people have been killed in ugly battles between nomadic communities in Isiolo 
District. A herder in Merti searches for pasture for livestock. It is found the violence, caused 
by competition over pasture and water, and could get out of hand, as drought pushes herders to 
move to areas occupied by communities regarded rivals. And a local conservancy has been 
                                                 
47  For example, according  to the Daily Telegraph of the UK dated 29 September, 2008 , Lewa Conservancy, 
one of the leading establishment  has a well oiled donor basket such as;  USAID, Task Trust(UK), Sandstorm,  
WSPA, WWF,etc. Task Trust alone has so far funded Lewa to the tune of US$ 10,000,000.  The other major 
conservancies are Solio Game Reserve, Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Borana Ranch.. 
48 Northern Rangeland Trust which is managed by Ian Craig , was inugurated in a ceremony presided over by the 
US Ambassador  in January 2005. Its initial projects were funded by the USAID to the tune of US$ 400,000. 
49 See Oba, G (1996) op.cit. Shifting Identity, pp.117-131. He describes ‘resource borders’simply as water and 
pasture envelop that exists in a particular  pastoral setting  which could be ascertained  as belonging to a specific 
community but is in a state of flux depending on the ability of the neighbours to oust one another hence the 
shifting identities.   192 
 
drawn into the row, with Kenya National commission on human Rights moving in to probe 
claims its scouts were involved in the chaos.
50  
This particular phenomenon of ‘eco-tourism’ that is increasingly spreading in pastoral 
rangelands in some parts of northern Kenya and Maasailand may not be surprising. There is a 
considerable historical antecedent of destructive practice by the European adventurers at the 
dawn of colonial settlement. For example, pioneer colonialists Hugh Cholmondeley, the Third 
Baron of Delamere (later Lord Delamere, and the patriarch of the well-established settler clan 
in Kenya) travelled across from Somaliland through to Marsabit in 1897, where he engaged in 
elephant poaching for financial gain..
51 The settlers used their influence to fence off a swathe 
of land, especially in wildlife rich pastoral rangelands. Jeffrey Gentleman, writing in the New 
York Times, in 2006 following two separate incidents of murders on the family’s two 
expansive ranches, retraced its Kenyan ancestry as follows: 
That settler, Hugh Cholmondeley (pronounced CHUM-lee), the third Baron of Delamere, took 
chunks of the Rift Valley from local (and illiterate) Masai tribesmen in the early 1900s, 
turning the area into playground for white. He rode horses through bars, and shot chandeliers 
at fancy hotels and went on to become a leading dairy farmer and politician. Nairobi’s main 
street was named Delamere Avenue until independence in 1963.”
52  
There is no argument about economic benefits of tourism and its contribution to 
national state revenue. The question is how much damage it causes to land and environment 
of the communities, especially in pastoral areas where most of those business projects are 
located. There is an obvious imbalance between economic benefits derived from tourism and 
land and human rights of the communities. The Minority Rights Group in a report mentioned 
                                                 
50 See East African Standard, 13/10/2008. 
51 Trzebinski, E(1985)Kenya Pioneers, p.27 
52  The New York Times, 5,September, 2006. The murder incidents referred to by the NYToccurred in separate 
occassion in 2005 and 2006. In April, 2005, an undecpover ranger working for the Government’s Kenya Wildlife 
Services, Samson Ole Sissina was alledly murdered by Thomas Patrick Gilbert Cholmodeley, the Great Grand  193 
 
above contends that, ‘…tourism industry too often leads to land loss, destruction of traditional 
livehoods, impoverishment of indigenous communities and violations of human rights.’
53 
7.4 Policy Debates: Fixation or Vision? 
This study has so far demonstrated that successive Kenyan governments used their 
unfettered powers to create a political and economic structure that marginalised the majority 
of the indigenous people. Systemic legal and institutional mechanisms were created to 
facilitate colonial dominance and subjugation of the pre-existing land rights of various 
communities. The imposition of the British rule established entirely new structures based on a 
command state, which included a variety of legal traditions, rules, and administrative 
practices alien to the natives. For close to four decades debate about land reform was either 
coercively thwarted or deliberately ignored by government, sometimes with the tacit support 
of donor countries or multilateral organisations. Political dissent was heavily repulsed 
especially during the height of KANU regimes from the 1960s to 1980s.  
When the Government finally agreed, after well-coordinated campaigns by Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), and the donors to a 
comprehensive review process, many Kenyans supported the agenda. Many organisations 
mobilised communities, especially in rural and pastoral areas and provided them relevant 
information for effective participation in the process. The government set up a secretariat for 
National Land Policy Formulation Process, which was based at the Ministry of Lands in 
Nairobi.
54 The donors led by the Swedish International Development Assistance (SIDA) and 
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Britain’s Department of for International Development (DFID) provided financial backings 
for the process. Much of the activities regarding official consultations were almost entirely 
concentrated in Nairobi.  Except initial publicity and regional workshops, public participation 
during the formulation was limited.  Moreover, there were a good measure of input from 
NGOs and scholars, whose influence is clearly reflected in the final draft.
55 To fill the gap of 
public outreach, organisations like Kenya Land Alliance provided alternative communication 
platform to some rural communities.
56 To that extent, the process was fairly and significantly 
successful. At a philosophical and practical level, the mere attempt to formulate the ‘first’ 
national land policy was in itself a bold move on the part of the government.  
The ‘Draft’ National Land Policy was launched in May 2007 but before the full 
implication of the policy and proposals reached the public domain for discussions and further 
deliberation, the wave of general elections, which were due at the end of that year, eclipsed 
whatever momentum National Land Policy had gathered.  The Draft Policy was however 
widely distributed by Non Governmental Organisations and other civil society groups who 
took part in the process. It is worthwhile to make a brief overview and assess whether the 
critical issues at the heart of this study have been dealt with by the proposed policy. The other 
important question is whether Kenya, with the draft policy already in place, has broken the 
gridlock that has stymied the prospect of land tenure reforms.  
                                                 
55 In fact four out of  the  six Thematic Groups that facilitated consultations, review and formulation of  policy  
were drawn from experienced representaives of civil society. Kenya Land Alliance even indepedently engaged 
land tenure experts whose views were incorporated in the final inputs. A number of  prominent land law and 
rural land development experts such Prof. Okoth-Ogendo, Prof. John Syanga, were widely consulted during 
forulation process. 
56 Kenya Land Alliance is a network of organisations that focuses on land issues in Kenya, particularly among 
marginal groups. The organisation was at the forefront in campaigning for land policy reform and published 
information kitties to keep the public informed on major thematic issues such as historical injustices against 
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In general terms, the proposed policy has successfully demystified the notion 
expressly and implicitly and propagated that land is an untouchable and explosive issue that 
would shake the country to the core. To a great extent many people will now view that as an 
excuse not to resolve many issues pertaining to land, the government creates ad hoc 
commissions and committees every time land crises arise.  The policy unequivocally restated 
the fact that ‘Kenya has not had a clearly defined or codified National Land Policy since 
Independence.’
57 This in a way is an indictment of the top political leadership who denied for 
many years that Kenya required or lacked a policy framework. It was also a vindication of 
those who had consistently campaigned for such a policy.  The draft policy adequately 
recognised the major land issues including those that are of critical importance to pastoralists, 
such as historical injustice, restitution, communal land tenure and security. 
One of the fundamental features of the draft policy is the stated vision, values and 
principles of equity, justice, security, sustainability, transparency, inclusiveness, and access to 
information.
58 Perhaps, the most striking and honest admission made in the draft policy was 
about the origins of land problems in Kenya, particularly the failure by the post-independent 
governments to take advantage of that early opportunity to resolve colonial land question. 
This is succinctly stated as follows: 
It was expected that the transfer of power from colonial authorities to indigenous elites would 
lead to fundamental restructuring of the legacy on land. This did not materialise and the result 
was a general re-entrenchment and continuity of colonial land policies, laws and 
administrative infrastructure. This was because the decolonisation process of the country 
represented an adaptive, co-optive and pre-emptive process, which gave the new power elites 
access to European economy.
59  
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58 NLP, ibid, paras.3, 7, 8. 
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Again, the critical issues that lie at the heart of colonial and post-colonial land tenure regimes 
which was mostly based on principles of individualisation and privatisation was pointed out 
as  ‘wanting’ in some aspects. The recommendation under para.73 may eventually recognize 
and restore legitimate rights of spouse and children, which have been diminished under 
private registration. There are many cases where some members of a family were denied 
rights in land because one of its members registered the land in his or her name before the 
others. The legal menace that disinherited many in Kenya is exemplified by the widely cited 
case of Esiroyo v. Esiroyo, 
60and Obiero v. Opiyo.
61 In both cases, registered rights 
overturned the customary rights to part of family land. 
 If the National Land Policy endorsed and necessary legislations were enacted, such 
anachronistic provisions as currently contained in the Registered Land Act that makes first 
registration of land an absolute sanctity
62 should be repealed.  Furthermore, the effect of the 
registered Land Act is that an extended family is legally restricted to own land in common as 
no more than five persons can be registered as co-proprietors.
63   In the context of an African 
family and the preponderance of its customary values and practices, such exclusive and 
individualised notion of property can cause damaging social disruption and disharmony.  
                                                 
60Esiroyo v. Esiroyo [1973], E.A. 388. 
61Obiero v. Opiyo [1972], E.A. 227 
62 Registered Land Act,  1963, Chapter 300 Laws of Kenya. The Act is generally perceived as an embodiment of 
land laws in Kenya and was promulagated at independence to consolidate all the fragments of laws used to 
entrench private landholdings. 
63  See s.101 (3) and (4) of the RLA, 1963. 197 
 
However, the draft policy has serious shortcomings that could immeasurably 
compromise its good intention. The crafters of the draft policy used a broad brush in 
approaching the issues. While land is a common problem in the whole country, and a national 
strategy may be desirable, there should have been sectoral -specific and prioritised approach 
rather than the one-size-fits-all framework. For example, a commission that can separately 
deal with unsolved historical and increasing complex land question of the pastoralists should 
have been proposed. In other jurisdictions such as Ghana, the land reform project focus on 
customary lands, although like Kenya the powerful influence of donors’ may be a cause for 
concern.
64    
One of the major weaknesses of the draft policy is with respect to pastoral land where 
the recommendations made are vague, generalised, and irrelevant and take an approach of 
‘business as usual’. The historical land question, which has been the bane of many pastoral 
land issues in areas like Maasai and Pokot, has not received the serious attention it deserved.  
Paragraph 53 which deals with restitution states that the ‘Government shall develop a legal 
and institutional framework for handling land restitution’ which is clearly a vague statement 
and does not illustrate how it could be operationalised. In any case, there is no timeframe 
provided to fast-track compensation and restitution for affected individuals and groups. 
Based on this historical watershed the absence of predictable and transparent policy 
frameworks is hardly surprising.  The post-independence approach and attitudes of the ruling 
elites have been a source of disconcerting ‘ethnicised’ political rivalries, and was a matter 
                                                 
64 Land legal and institutional reforms in africa nad other developing countries are by and large donor funded. 
Multilateral institutions like the World Bank has been involved in land reform and development aspects since 
1960s, most supporting market-oriented policies and programmes. For example countries such as Kenya and 
Ghana are heavily supported by a corsotium of donors which include, British DFID, World Bank,  Swedish 
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openly negotiated and bargained between Britain and leaders as preconditions for 
independence.
65The abiding principle was to maintain the status quo. A constitutional 
protection for acquired private property was guaranteed in a more elevated section of the 
document which, in a contemporary sense, is equivalent to a bill of right.
66 The ‘status quo’ 
policy in essence implies that successive independent Kenyan governments must ensure 
respect for the existing laws and institutions that regulate land ownership and tenurial 
systems.  
J. Forbes Munro, in his review of books on land and politics in Kenya asserts that ‘... 
from at least governorship of Eliot onwards, officialdom worked on the basic premise that the 
future lay in European settlement without holding any clear ideas about the long term 
implications of such a policy.’
67  Wassermann further describes how this policy was secured 
during the independence constitutional settlement.
68 In a nutshell there had never been any 
commitment to reform land and land tenure policy in Kenya during 40 years of KANU 
governments, even though the pressure of multi-party politics pressurised former President 
Moi to initiate reform debates in 1999 with little effect 
The historical land question of the pastoral communities has yet to be addressed by the 
government even though evidence are abundant as to the extent of the struggles and suffering 
these group continue to face. The laws and administrative policy continue to expose the 
                                                 
65 Okoth-Ogendo, ibid,  
66 Chapter V, The Independance Constitution, 1963. 
67 Munro, J.F (1968) Review: Land and Politics in Kenya: A Review Article. Canadian Journal of African 
Studies, p.205, Vol.2, No. 2, (pp 203-209). Charles Eliot, the most controversial and unrepetent supporter of 
European settlement was a Governor from 1900-1904. 
68 Wasserman, G (1973) Conntinuity and Counter-Insurgency: The Role Of Land Reform in Decolonizing 
Kenya, 1962-70. Canadian Journal of African Studies, pp. 133-148. 199 
 
common land resources to massive transfer of land to private land owners and corporate 
investments, leading to diminished livelihood systems for pastoralists. Since independence 
successive governments have been alienating vast pastoral rangelands for projects that mainly 
serve the interests of big businesses such as ecotourism and resources mining.   
The final chapter of this study summarises the issues that have been identified as being of 
fundamental importance to Kenyan society, particularly the pastoral Maasai and Boorana 
communities for whom land still remains their source of livelihood. The concluding chapter 
stresses the fact that challenges to land tenure reform are monumental and is deeply rooted in 
historical nuances.200 
 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
This study commenced at a time of unprecedented social and political instability in 
Kenya. The year 2008 will go down into the annals of history as the most tumultuous period 
when the country edged towards political and social turmoil. The gravity of violence left 
many unanswered questions in its wake. Although many parts of Kenya have been 
experiencing some level of ethnic violence since the early 1990s, the post-elections violence 
of 2007-2008 was by far the most critical political dilemma to have shaken the foundation of 
the state. Professor Makau Mutua, a legal scholar and critic on contemporary governance 
issues, in an article regarding the 2008 violence stated that; ‘although post-election violence 
appears to have been triggered by the allegations of fraud, the fundamental cause is the failure 
of the state to create a viable democratic nation.’
1 As this study has pointed out, most of these 
violent eruptions have been attributed to the historical land question. As many observers have 
indicated and this study has emphasised elections had only ‘triggered’ latent grievances over 
land.  The study has put land and land tenure debate in its historical perspective. 
In introducing the subject of the study, I emphasised that what lies at the heart of the 
land question in Kenya, is the issue of unresolved grievances. These grievances can be traced 
back as far back as the colonial era. At the time the Imperial British Government took control 
of the territories, each community was autonomous and managed its own affairs. The pre-
colonial Maasai and Boorana communities, in common with the other indigenous groups, 
formed interactive and dynamic configurations, with shared resource borders and settlements 
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conditioned by adaptation to vagaries of weather and ecology.  For millennia, they groups 
lived side by side, sometimes with overlapping orbits of clans and territories induced by 
cross-cultural exchange. The study has evidently demonstrated that the Maasai and Boorana 
communities had developed effective socio-political systems, accustomed to  their systems of 
livelihoods where land and natural resources governance featured prominently. 
The British colonial authorities ‘lumped’ those disparate peoples and regions into an 
entity that later became Kenya. From numerous historical data studied, there is no evidence of 
the indigenous peoples being consulted or having willingly consented to the formation of 
political entity based on colonial structure. Instead, the colonial government unilaterally 
established new institutions and legal frameworks, which were used as the basis for political 
jurisdiction and control of land resources. Declaration of radical title of the crown as a 
manifestation of sovereignty equated to ownership of land, which essentially nullified 
indigenous land rights. Land and land-based resources became the ‘property’ of the Imperial 
Crown for almost seventy years of colonial rule. Alien notions based on English property 
jurisprudence were introduced, changing indigenous peoples’ relationship to land. The 
Africans, as individuals and as members of communities became in effect tenants of the 
Crown.  
Policy of land alienation, which constitutes taking charge of transfer of property, was 
the cornerstone of colonial rule. The governing authorities became the sole custodians of land 
and land resources, determining access by individuals and communities. As the Maasai case 
of the early 1900s has illustrated, the policy was based on unequal power relations. This is  
especially so when colonial authorities used their force majeure to seize land and expropriate 
it for the benefit of settler community. Even though in the early phase of the occupation, the 
British Government was cautious and avoided uncontrolled allocation of land to the European 202 
 
settlers, it was just a matter of time before the policy alienation became the guiding principle 
of the colonial rule. This study demonstrates how legal and administrative instruments 
facilitated dispossession of the indigenous population.   
Land was the prime target of the colonial authorities and as such became the main 
instrument of colonial establishment. The acquired territories were integrated to form a 
nascent political and territorial entity that later formed Kenya, extensively and radically 
transforming the pre-existing social and political order. Moreover, the indigenous 
communities’ perception, of land which was shared, based on mutual respect, reciprocity, and 
inter-generational equity was challenged and distorted. In contrast the colonial authorities 
viewed land as a ‘commoditised’ asset to be dominated and exploited for material enrichment. 
The seventy years of colonial rule was mired in controversies surrounding conditions of land 
ownership, use and access to land.  What began as an external (temporary) intrusion that 
would terminate with the departure of colonial government, has today become a permanent 
feature entrenched by laws and institutions.  
The Africans though were not sophisticated in the way the western European powers, 
took advantage of military and industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, still managed to 
challenge occupation and usurpation of their territories. The Maasai quest for justice in 
respect of the historical loss of land was arguably unmatched in the British East Africa at the 
time. From 1912-13 the Maasai challenged colonial Government in the courts in a bid to 
restore their land rights. The seed sown by the British in taking over Maasai land in 1904 
vibrated 100 years later as the Maasai resorted to public court in the streets of Kenya in 2004.  
The Maasai were convinced that the colonial land leases for Laikipia (the northern reserve to 
which they were moved after the 1904 Agreement), which was for 99 years had expired in 
2004. The Government on the other hand was adamant that the leases were for 999 years. 203 
 
Some of the current owners of large-scale land and ranches who have been interviewed did 
not know the length of their leasehold or details of how their predecessors came into 
possession of sprawling property.  The Maasai sense of loss and betrayal has not dissipated 
and their case was particularly controversial. The High Court dismissed the case on the 
ground that the Maasai were not subjects of the crown and therefore could not come before a 
municipal court.  The Court of Appeal upheld that ruling. The attempt by the Maasai to seek 
restoration of their land rights failed as the courts decided the case on procedural 
technicalities rather than the substantive issues raised by the Maasai. 
As this study has shown throughout the chapters, the weight of history was felt more 
in the overall land policy which had been brought about by that colonial government. The 
land policy left an indelible mark in the lives of the society, especially among the pastoralists. 
I have discussed extensively how laws and regulations were used as instruments of 
dispossession and alienation.  The colonial legal framework radically transformed land tenure 
arrangements that different communities had always utilised. The dominant European view at 
the time was that the Africans neither owned land nor had the conceptual capacity to develop 
tenure regimes capable of defining tenure rights.  
Understanding the root cause of contemporary land tenure relations is important in 
appreciating the challenges that society must address in the process of land tenure reforms. In 
Kenya these challenges, as we have demonstrated in this study revolved around colonial land 
tenure conversion of indigenous landholding systems, which has been consistently retained by 
successive postcolonial governments. I have also demonstrated that the pastoral communities, 
who were and continue to be on the periphery of colonial and post-independent political and 
economic order, face intractable dilemmas in view of insecure land resources. The policy of 
‘benign neglect’, which was originally adopted by the colonial governments, has permeated 204 
 
contemporary land policy as evidently illustrated by statutory laws such as Trust Land Act, 
Land (Group Representatives) Act and Land Adjudication Act. Although customary laws 
have shown some measures of resilience in the face of disruptive formal legal mechanisms, 
they are becoming increasingly vulnerable.  
This study has proved arguments that land tenure regimes have fundamentally 
remained as they were during colonial time.  Many indigenous Africans have their land rights 
undermined because of the erosion of their pre-existing land rights. The prevailing conflicts 
among Kenyans, especially the pastoralists, show that government land policy has put 
enormous pressure on land and land-based resources.  These challenges are deep and require a 
comprehensive review of the past land tenure policies and practices. The situation in pastoral 
areas in particular calls for urgent policy and legislative actions. This study has mainly 
focused principally on the diagnosis of these historical problems and how they have 
permeated the contemporary land tenure regimes. Land-based grievances have served as a 
rallying point for political agitation by various communities in demanding redress in new 
legal and constitutional dispensation. Unresolved land grievances remain as the ‘sticking 
points’ in the efforts of forging a tolerable society. The state holds enormous power over land 
resources, particularly in the so-called government (public) and trust lands. Not only was the 
architecture of the colonial political and economic structures left intact but the ruling elites 
nurtured and perpetrated the situation to suit their reconfigured interests based on regional, 
ethnic, class and other gradations.  
In recent decades, there has been a universal clamour for land and land tenure reforms 
in many part of the world, targeting those policies and laws inherited from colonial powers. 
This was especially popular among developing countries, in Africa, Asia, South America and 
others. However, not every country has successfully reformed policies and legislation to bring 205 
 
about better governance of land resources. Kenya is a prime example of a country that is 
struggling with land reforms, and it will take a lengthy debates and persistence before reforms 
finally come to fruition.  Long after colonisation was dismantled, the concept of land and land 
tenure reform continues to attract different meanings depending on where one stands from 
social, political, economic and cultural viewpoints. About three decades ago, Russell King, 
who written widely on land tenures in many societies, stated that land reform was the most 
important social change that was taking place in the world. According to King, land reforms 
fall under three headings.
2 Firstly, the social equity arguments based on the ethical-moral 
premise that inequality, and worse still, exploitation, is perverse in many countries. Secondly, 
and partly linked to the first argument, land reform has become closely involved with 
ideological positions, and, therefore, political dogmas. It is important to acknowledge the fact 
that historical development not only provides the basis for reforming contemporary land 
tenure regimes, but also establishes justification for such reforms to be informed by principles 
of justice and equity.   
The issue of historical injustice in pastoral areas, which successive governments have 
evaded for so long, needs to be addressed in the light of positive debates that have evolved 
over the two decades of Kenya’s ‘endless reform journey.’. The starting point for 
understanding current tenure issues in Kenya requires taking stock of  both colonial and 
postcolonial systems and how they have affected land tenure rights of the Kenyans, especially  
communities like pastoralists who still depend on land resources for their livelihoods. Since 
early 1960 successive governments have either rejected or ignored calls for land reforms 
because of heavily vested interests by political elites and economically dominant classes. The 
                                                 
2 King, R (1977)  Land Reform: A World Survey, p. 3. G. Bell & Sons Ltd.  206 
 
preference of these politically entrenched groups was to maintain the status quo of inherited 
land tenure arrangements. Besides, the post-independence governments’ land tenure policy 
was in accord with the colonial strategy of private and individualised landholdings, which is 
perceived to be amenable to market economy. 
Given that customary tenure systems have evolved over a long period, they are often 
adaptable to specific conditions and needs. Even in situations where such arrangements reach 
their limits, building on that which already exist in many cases is significantly easier and 
more appropriate than trying to ‘re-invent the wheel’, which can end up creating parallel 
institutions with all their disadvantages. In the past, dominant multinational and donor 
institutions like World Bank have considered customary arrangements as conceptually and 
programmatically inferior. In their neoliberal market economy, they felt that customary 
systems were incapable of facilitating economic efficiency and dynamic growth. They 
therefore proposed establishing freehold title and subdividing the commons. The pre-existing 
land rights and tenurial dynamics that could respond and adapt to changing times were largely 
relegated to the periphery of dominant post-colonial discourses. The reform processes and 
narrative have been largely defined by powerful groups and institutions operating outside the 
control of the ordinary rural and peri-urban communities. It is important to make land reform 
processes more inclusive, especially for rural and pastoral communities who have been 
struggling with land issues for a long time.  
Comprehensive land reform can still falter without a deliberate effort to consider 
customary land tenure of the various communities. The fact is that customary tenure practices 
have been the subject of many policy distortions, resulting from simplistic reliance on English 
concepts of land property in trying to understand the nature and institutions of African land 
relations. Three fundamental assumptions have arisen from over reliance on foreign notions of 207 
 
land ownership. One, land tenure security is guaranteed only by registration and titling. Two, 
that land belonged to the community and not individual ownership, existed; and three, that 
traditional land use systems were not efficient in an era of market economy. These 
misconceptions have continuously led to the relegation of customary land law to an inferior 
status in Kenya’s legal and constitutional framework. This is clearly exemplified by Sessional 
Paper No: 10 of 1965-African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. This Paper 
is widely acknowledged as the blueprint of economic policy in Kenya. Its focus is on agrarian 
development of what it terms as ‘high potential’ areas, which historically (note the 
classification made by the Kenya Land Commission 1934) marginalises pastoral land systems 
in favour of individualised land tenure regime in agricultural areas.  
Successive governments have consistently moved towards individualising land tenure 
in predominantly pastoral settings thus causing conflicts as multiple land users engage in 
competition. Land adjudication and subdivision as practised in Maasai and Boorana areas 
have aggravated the already simmering landlessness. The problem is further compounded by 
non-state actors, including multinational companies and other corporate groups, whose 
demand for land is increasing daily. These groups of ‘global corporate’ are currently 
prospecting pastoral rangelands for mining and ecotourism investments. What will happen to 
those who depend on land for their livelihoods as more rangelands are being ‘set aside’ for the 
other ‘public’ purposes that appear to mostly exclude pastoralism?  While pastoralism can 
accommodate such sectors as ecotourism, the investors have been permitted to monopolise the 
benefits that accrue from range resources. Government and other key players in the sector 
certainly have to adopt more inclusive systems that allow local communities such as 
pastoralists to appropriately benefit from local resources. The government’s deliberate 
exclusion of the local communities during negotiation for mining of natural resources such as  208 
 
the case of Chinese exploration of oil and gas in the rangelands of Merti in Isiolo, is a breach 
of trust. 
One of the key questions posed in the introductory part of this study, touches on the 
fact that land tenure reform issue in Kenya has become such a daunting and unpredictable 
subject for such a long time. For Kenya, the opening of political space was not all positive. 
The competitive multi-party politics concomitantly lifted the veil of dysfunctional state of 
Kenya.  As experiences in various communities have shown, land has become the most 
explosive issue at the centre-stage of spiraling land clashes. In the build up to the first 
multiparty general elections of 1992, some parts of the country were gripped by violent 
clashes that witnessed claims and counter-claims over land rights.  In 1999 and 2002 
commissions of inquiries were appointed to evaluate land issues and since 2004, a national 
land policy reformulation process has been going on and a draft is already in parliament. 
    Why is the land question in Kenya worsening rather than improving? Although these 
conflagrations have proved momentous in the body politic of Kenya and have placed land at 
the centre of public debate, this has paradoxically not translated into successful policy 
transformation. Many have tried to blame institutional and legal weaknesses such as the 
inability to deal with corruption and mismanagement. Some scholars such as Professor Okoth-
Ogendo have tried to explain this anomaly but have inordinately based their arguments on 
juristic and administrative shortcomings. The approach may unduly miss the important 
historical preponderance of the colonial involvement in land tenure transformation. In the 
government circle, the land question has not, until recently received the attention it requires, 
until recent times. The veil was partially lifted when, for the first time in 1999, the 
government commissioned an inquiry to officially investigate the vexed land question. 209 
 
This study has demonstrated the interface between the colonial and contemporary land 
tenure issues, which have now become more imperative as land crises increasingly trigger 
conflicts among and between communities. Issues such as poverty, food insecurity, conflicts, 
and landlessness have dominated recent legal and constitutional reform debates. These 
concerns are deep-seated and have been consistently articulated by individuals and 
communities. Why are successive governments of Kenya unable or unwilling to facilitate land 
and land tenure reforms even in the face of enduring social conundrums that have often 
resulted in huge social, economic and political costs?  What is it that makes Kenya’s legal and 
institutional jurisprudence different from other colonial experiences, making it difficult to 
reform even when evidence is overwhelming?  Although the clamour for change has been 
going on for two decades, no concrete achievements have come out as far as land reform is 
concerned. It is only recently in 2008 that a draft national land policy was formulated after 
many years of disillusioning lack of interest by both parliament and government. Competition 
and suspicions among leaders have masked any pretence of national or public good and have 
led to endless stalemate of legal and constitutional reforms. 
The past and present governments have not committed themselves to land reform, 
even in the face of frequent land-related conflicts. Unfortunately, as Gary Wasserman 
observed in his study of the decolonisation process in Kenya, land reform prospects wilted 
away on the altar of independence ‘bargaining’. The possibility or even inevitability of 
reforms was thus scuttled no sooner than Kenya achieved its political independence and since 
then every other transition has faced similar fate.  Although attempts have been consistently 
made since the 1990s, the most conspicuous being the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission, Kenya has not managed to achieve concrete legal and institutional changes  210 
 
          The political environment prevailing in Kenya, at least since the coalition of parties’ 
formed the government (since 2002), has been anything but conducive to change. 
Competition and suspicions among leaders representing ethnic blocs have masked any 
pretence of national interests and have led to endless stalemates of legal and constitutional 
reforms. Like the ‘Bomas Draft Constitution ’, is the Draft National Land Policy is likely to 
face parliamentary guillotine once it is presented and proposed for adoption? The issue of 
land tenure reform has become one of the critical agendas in Kenya’s quest for 
democratisation. Although it was among the first countries in Africa to embrace multi party 
politics and rule of law, Kenya has relatively lagged behind in addressing the vital issues of 
land tenure and land rights. There is a growing concern as to why Kenya has failed to make 
progress in land tenure reforms and while many countries that had shared similar colonial 
experience have achieved significant milestones. What is the underlying factors that made 
land and tenure problems seemingly insurmountable during this ‘transition’ period’? Why has 
the government failed to recognise the unique set of circumstances, resulting therefore in 
jeopardizing of their land rights? An assessment of historical evolution of land tenure systems 
has shown how a deliberate government policy have entrenched colonial notion of land tenure 
with negative consequences on communities. 
Land is and has been the most important asset of every human society since time 
immemorial. Pre-colonial societies in Africa had organised their social, political, cultural, 
economical and spiritual lives around land and natural resources for millennia until they were 
disrupted by the colonial wave of the nineteenth century. The most potent consequence of the 
European colonisation was the formation of state structures based on alien legal and 
institutional frameworks. Over the many decades of its rule, the colonial authorities 211 
 
systematically established new institutions and administrative systems that led to the erosion 
of the indigenous land tenure organisations and land rights. 
Although contact with the colonial rule may have differed amongst various 
communities, the impact on their land had continuously evolved over a long period. For 
example, among the pastoral people, the Maasai had a direct and most compellingly 
controversial relationship with the Europeans which led to intensive loss of land. The pastoral 
Boorana had only weak link with the colonial administration but today faces serious 
challenges to their traditional land due to increased alienation of land through policy of land 
adjudication and ‘project-based’ allocation. There is a clear convergence between the old 
direct alienation and those that emerged later because of the legacy inherited from the past 
colonial policy of expropriation. The consequence is the same for the communities who have 
depended on land resources from time immemorial. Both the Maasai and Boorana are 
struggling to hold onto the ‘last frontier’ as their rangeland resources have been exposed to 
unequal competitions and unfamiliar alienation processes facilitated by statutory laws. Today, 
new and extensive mega projects with global links involved in mining resources are 
emerging, threatening the already stressed pastoral communities. With mounting pressure on 
them, the survival of pastoralists, more than before is hanging in the balance. It is a 
fundamental task of any government to urgently and effectively address problem of land 
reforms in Kenya, with particular focus on the historical land question. It is only then that the 
current fixation with the colonial land tenure systems will be replaced by organically 
harnessed laws that improve and sustain community’s livelihoods.  Majority of Kenyans agree 
that a new roadmap for growth and development is required that is more inclusive and 
democratic.  212 
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APPENDIX 2 
1904 MAASAI AGREEMENT 
 
AGREEMENT, dated 10th August, 1904, between HIS MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONER for 
the  
EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE and the CHIEFS of the MASAI TRIBE. 
We, the Undersigned, being the Lybons and Chiefs (representatives) of the existing clans and 
sections of the Masai tribes in East Africa Protectorate, having, this 9th day of August, 1904, 
met Sir Donald Stewart, His Majesty's Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate and 
discussed fully the question of a land settlement scheme for the Masai, have, of our own free 
will, decided that it is for our best interests to remove our people, flocks, and herds into 
definite reservations away from the railway line, and away from any land that may be thrown 
open to European settlement. 
We have, after having already discussed the matter with Mr. Hobley at Naivasha and Mr. 
Ainsworth at Nairobi, given this matter every consideration, and we recognize that the 
Government, in taking up this question, are taking into consideration our best interests. 
Now we, being fully satisfied that the proposals for our removal to definite and final reserves 
are for the undoubted good of our race, have agreed as follows:- 
That the Elburgu, Gekunuki, Loita, Damat, and Laitutok sections shall remove absolutely to 
Laikipia, and the boundaries of the Settlement shall be, approximately, as follows:- 
On the north, by the Loroghi Mountains.  
On the west, by the Laikipia (Ndoror) Escarpment.  
On the south, by the Lesuswa or Nyam and Guaso Narok Rivers.  
On the east, by Kisima (approximate). 232 
 
And by the removal of the foregoing sections to the reserve we undertake to vacate the whole 
of the Rift Valley, to be used by the Government for the purposes of European settlement. 
Further, that the Kaptei, Matapatu, Ndogalani, and Sigarari sections shall remove into the 
territory originally occupied by them to the south of Donyo Lamuyu (Ngongo), and the 
Kisearian stream, an to comprise within the area the Donyo Lamuyu, Ndogalani, and 
Matapatu Mountains, and the Donyo Narok, and to extend to Sosian on the west. 
In addition to the foregoing, Lenana, as Chief Lybon, and his successors, to be allowed to 
occupy the land lying in between the Mbagathi and Kisearian streams from Donyo Lamuyu to 
the point where both streams meet, with the exception of land already occupied by Mr. 
Oulton, Mr. McQueen, and Mr. Paterson. 
In addition to the foregoing, we asked that a right of road to include certain access to water be 
granted to us to allow of our keeping up communications between the two reserved areas, and 
further, that we be allowed to retain control of at least 5 square miles of land (at a point on the 
slopes of Kinangop to be pointed out by Legalishu and Masakondi), whereat we can carry out 
our circumcision rites and ceremonies, in accordance with the custom of our ancestors. 
We ask, as a most important point in this arrangement, that the Government will establish and 
maintain a station on Laikipia, and that officers whom we know and trust may be appointed to 
look after us there. 
Also that the Government will pay reasonable compensation for any Masai cultivation at 
present existing near Nairobi. 
In conclusion, we wish to state that we are quite satisfied with the foregoing arrangement, and 
we bind ourselves and our successors, as well as our people, to observe them. 
We would, however, ask that the settlement now arrived at shall be enduring so long as the 
Masai as a race shall exist, and that European or other settlers shall not be allowed to take up 
land in the Settlements. 
In confirmation of this Agreement, which has been read and fully explained to us, we hereby 
set our marks against our names, as under:- 233 
 
LANANA, Son of Mbatian, Lybon of all the Masai.  
MASAKONDI, Son of Arariti, Lybon at Naivasha. 
Signed at Nairobi, August 15, 1904:- 
LEMANI, Elmura of Matapatu.  
LETEREGI, ditto.  
LELMURUA, Leganan of Kapte.  
LAKOMBE, Elmura of Kapte.  
LIMOISONG, Elmura of Ndogalani  
LISIARI, Elmura of Ndogalani.  
MEPAKU, Head Elmoran of Matapatu.  
LAMBARI, Leganon of Ndogalani. 
Naivasha, representing Elburgu, Gekunuku, Loita, Damat, and Laitutok:- 
LEGALISHU, Leganon of Elburgu.  
OLMUGEZA, ditto.  
OLAINOMODO, ditto.  
OLOTOGIA, ditto..  
OLIETI, ditto.  
LANAIRUGU, ditto.  
LINGALDU, ditto.  
GINOMUN, ditto.  
LIWALA, Leganan of Gekunuki.  
LEMBOGI, Leganan of Laitutok. 
Signed at Nairobi, August 15, 1904:-. 
SABORI, Elmura of Elburgu. 
We, the undersigned, were interpreters in this Agreement: 
C. W. HOBLEY, (Swahili).  
MWE s/o LITHIGU (Masai).  234 
 
LYBICH s/o KERETU (Masai).  
WAZIRI-BIN-MWYNBEGO (Masai). 
I, Donald Stewart, K.C.M.G., His Majesty's Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate, 
hereby agree to the foregoing, provided the Secretary of State approves of the Agreement, and 
in witness thereof I have this 10th day of August, 1904, set my hand and seal.  
D. Stewart 
We, the undersigned officers of the East Africa Protectorate Administration, hereby certify 
that we were present at the meeting between His Majesty's Commissioner and the Masai at 
Naivasha on the 9th August, 1904, and we further heard this document fully explained to 
them, and witnessed their marks affixed to same: 
C. W. HOBLEY,  
Acting Deputy Commissioner. 
JOHN AINSWORTH,  
His Majesty's Sub-Commissioner, Ukamba. 
S. S. BAGGE,  
His Majesty's Sub-Commissioner, Kisumu. 
J. W. T. McCLELLAN,  
Acting Sub-Commissioner, Naivasha. 
W. J. MONSON,  
Acting Secretary to the Administration. 
I, Donald Stewart, K.C.M.G., His Majesty's Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate, 
hereby further agree to the foregoing parts of this Agreement concerning Kapte, Matapatu, 
Ndogalani, and Sigarari Masai, provided the Secretary of State approves of the Agreement, 
and in witness thereof I have this 15th. day of August, 1904, set my hand and seal. 
D. Stewart 235 
 
We, the undersigned officers of the East Africa Protectorate, hereby certify that we were 
present at the meeting between His Majesty's Commissioner and the Masai at Nairobi on the 
15th August, 1904, and we further heard this document explained to them, and witnessed their 
marks affixed to same: 
C. W. HOBLEY,  
Acting Deputy Commissioner. 
JOHN AINSWORTH,  
His Majesty's Sub-Commissioner. Ukamba. 
T. T. GILKISON,  
Acting Land Officer. 
W. J. MONSON,  
Acting Secretary to the Administration. 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I translated the contents of this document to the Masai 
Lybich, who, I believe, interpreted it correctly to the Masai assembled at both Naivasha and 
Nairobi. 
JOHN AINSWORTH,  
His Majesty's Sub-Commissioner. 
Reprinted from East Africa Protectorate, Correspondence Relating to the Masai, Command Paper No. 
20360. Received 28 March 1910, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1911 Volume LII pp., 
730-731.  
-- 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
1911 MAASAI AGREEMENT  
 
AGREEMENT 
We, the undersigned, being the Paramount Chief of all the Masai and his regents and the 
representatives of that portion of the Masai tribe living in the Northern Masai Reserve, as 
defined in the agreement entered into with the late Sir Donald William Stewart, Knight 
Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, His 
Majesty's Commissioner for the East Africa Protectorate, on the ninth day of August, one 
thousand and nine hundred and four, and more particularly set out in the Proclamation of May 
thirtieth one thousand nine hundred and six and published in the Official Gazette of June first 
one thousand nine hundred and six, do hereby on our own behalf and on behalf of our people, 
whose representatives we are, being satisfied that it is to the best interest of their tribe that the 
Masai people should inhabit one area and should not be divided into two sections as must 
arise under the agreement aforesaid whereby they were reserved to the Masai tribe two 
separate and distinct areas of land, enter of our own free will into the following agreement 
with Sir Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard, Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished 
Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Member of the Distinguished Service Order, 
Governor and Commander in Chief of the East Africa Protectorate, hereinafter referred to as 
the Governor. 
We agree to vacate at such time as the Governor may direct the Northern Masai Reserve 
which we have hitherto inhabited and occupied and to remove by such routes as the Governor 
may notify to us our people, herds and flocks to such area on the south side of the Uganda 
Railway as the Governor may locate to us the said area being bounded approximately as 
follows and as shown on the attached map. 237 
 
(Not reproduced) 
On the south by the Anglo-German frontier:  
On the west by the Ol-orukuti Range, by the Amala River, otherwise called Eng-are-dabash or 
Eng-are-e-'n-gipai, by the eastern and northern boundaries of the Sotik Native Reserve, and 
by a line drawn from the most northerly point of the northern boundary of the Sotik Native 
Reserve to the south-western boundary of the land set aside for Mr. E. Powys Cobb on Mau; 
On the north by the southern and eastern boundaries of the said land set aside for Mr. E. 
Powys Cobb, and by a straight line drawn from the north-eastern boundary of the said land to 
the highest point of Mount Suswas otherwise called Ol-doinyo onyoke; 
On the east by the southern Masai Native Reserve as defined in the Proclamation dated June 
eighteenth one thousand nine hundred and six, and published in the Official Gazette of July 
first one thousand nine hundred and six. 
Providing that nothing in this agreement contained shall be deemed to deprive the Masai tribe 
of the rights reserved to it under the agreement of August ninth one thousand nine hundred 
and four aforesaid to the land on the slopes of Kinopop whereon the circumcision rights and 
ceremonies may be held. 
In witness whereof and in confirmation of this agreement which has been fully explained to us 
we hereby set our marks (finger impressions) against our names as under:- 
Mark of.SEGI, son of Ol-onana (Lenana), Paramount Chief of all the Masai. 
Mark of.OL-LE-GELESHO (Legalishu), Regent during the minority of Segi, head of the 
Molelyan Clan, and chief spokesman (Ol-aigwenani) of the Il-Kitoip (Il-Merisho) age-grade 
of the Purko Masai. 
Mark of.NGAROYA, Regent during the minority of Segi, of the Aiser Clan. 
Mark of.OL-LE-YELI, head of the Mokosen Clan of the Purko Masai, and one of the 
spokesmen (Ol-sigwenani) of the Il-Kitoip (Il-Merisho) age-grade of the Purko Masai. 238 
 
Mark of.OL-LE-TURERE, head of the Mokesen Clan of the Purko Masai. 
Mark of.OLE-LE-MALIT, one of Masikondi's representatives, of the Lughumae branch of the 
Aiser Clan of the Purko Masai. 
Mark of.OL-LE-MATIPE, one of Masikondi’s representatives, of the Lughumae branch of 
the Aiser Clan of the Purko Masai. 
Mark of.OL-LE-NAKOLA, head of the Tarosero Clan of the Purko Masai. 
Mark of.OL-LE-NAIGISA, head of the Aiser Clan of the Purko Masai. 
Mark of.MARMAROI, uncle and personal attendant of Segi. 
Mark of.SABURI. The Prime Minister of the late Chief Ol-onana (Lenana) and principal elder 
of the Southern Masai Reserve. 
Mark of.AGALI, uncle of Segi, representing the Loita Masai. 
Mark of.OL-LE-TANYAI of the Tarosero Clan, chief spokesman (Ol-sigwenani) of the 
Lamek (Meitaroni) agegrade of the Purko Masai. 
The above set their marks to this agreement at Nairobi on the fourth day of April nineteen 
hundred and seven. 
A. C. HOLLIS, 
Secretary, Native Affairs. 
OL-LE-MASIKONDI, head of the Lughumas section of the Aiser Clan: chief elder of the 
Purko Masai, called in the former treaty of 01 Oiboni of the Purko Masai. 
OL-LE-BATIET, head of the Aiser Clan of the Purko Masai on Laikipia, Ol aigwenani of the 
age known as Il Merisho. 
The above set their marks to this agreement at Rumuruti on the 13th day of April nineteen 
hundred and eleven. 239 
 
E. D. BROWN 
Assistant District 
Commissioner, 
Laikipia.  
Witnesses: 
J. M. COLLYER  
D/C. Laikipia. 
His Mark:.OL-LE-LENGIRI, of the Aiser Clan Purko Masai. 
His Mark:.OL-LE-GESHEEN, head of Tarosero Clan of Purko Masai. 
His Mark:.OL-LE-SALON, brother of Ol-le-Kotikosh, as a deputy for Ol-le-Kotikosh. 
The above set their marks to this agreement at Rumuruti on 19th. day of April 1911. 
E. D. BROWNE, 
A.D.C., i/c Laikipia. 
We, the undersigned, certify that we correctly interpreted this document to the Chief, Regents, 
and Representatives of the Masai who were present at the meeting at Nairobi. 
A. C. HOLLIS, 
OL-LE-TINKA, of the Il-Aiser Clan. 
We the undersigned certify that we have correctly interpreted this document to the 
Representatives of the Masai at Rumuruti. 
A. J. M. COLLYER,   
District Commissioner. 
OL LE TINKA. His mark. 240 
 
In consideration of the above, I, Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard, Knight Commander of the 
Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Member of the Distinguished 
Service Order, Governor and Commander in Chief of the East Africa Protectorate, agree on 
behalf of His Majesty's Government but subject to the approval of His Majesty's Principal 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to reserve for the exclusive use of the Masai tribe the area 
on the south side of the Uganda Railway as defined above and as shown on the attached map, 
which area is coadunate with the Southern Masai Native Reserve and to further extend the 
existing Southern Masai Native Reserve by an addition of an area of approximately three 
thousand and one hundred square miles, such area as shown on the accompanying map the 
approximate boundaries being on the south the Anglo-German Frontier, on the west the 
eastern boundary of the aforesaid Southern Masai Reserve, on the north and east by the 
Uganda Railway zone from the Athi River to Sultan Hamud Railway Station thence in a line 
drawn from the said station to the north-west point of the Chiulu Range thence along the 
Chiulu Range to the south-eastern extremity thereof thence by a straight line to the meeting 
point of the Eng-are-Rongai River and the Tsavo Rivers thence by the Eng-are Rongai River 
to the Anglo-German frontier and to undertake on behalf of His Majesty's Government to 
endeavour to remove all European settlers from the said areas and not to lease or grant any 
land within the said areas (except such land as may be required for mining purposes or for any 
public purpose) without the sanction of the Paramount Chief and the representatives of the 
Masai tribe. 
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and official seal this twenty-sixth day of 
April one thousand nine hundred and eleven. 
Signed sealed and delivered by the within named Sir Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard in the 
presence of 
C. HOLLIS 
E. P. C. GIROUARD 
We, the undersigned were present at a meeting between His Excellency the Governor and the 
Masai at Nairobi on the fourth day of April one thousand nine hundred and eleven, and we 241 
 
heard this document explained to the Chief and the representatives of the Masai who entered 
into this agreement of their own free will and with full knowledge of the contents thereof. 
R. M. COMBE  
Crown Advocate. 
C. W. HOBLEY,  
Provincial Commissioner, Ukamba. 
JOHN AINSWORTH,  
Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza. 
C. R. W. LANE,  
Provincial Commissioner, Naivasha. 
S. L. HINDE,  
Provincial Commissioner, Naivasha. 
J. W. T. McLELLAN,  
Provincial Commissioner, Kenya. 
A. C. HOLLIS,  
Secretary for Native Affairs. 
C. C. BOWRING,  
Treasurer and M.L.C. 
 
Reprinted from East Africa Protectorate, Correspondence Relating to the Masai, Command Paper No. 
20360. Received 28 March 1910, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1911 Volume LII pp., 
719-722  
 
 